Urban Mongols: Ethnicity in Communist China

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“There are three great men in history,” Temujin would patiently explain to me, “Julius Caesar, Napoleon, and Ghengis Khan. The greatest, of course, is Ghengis Khan.” He never laughed whenever he reported what was for him an obvious historical fact. I suspect one reason for his insistence in repeatedly pointing out this “fact” arose from a deep-seated uneasiness that the world had forgotten about the Mongols and their place in contemporary Chinese society. In Huhhot, the capital of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China, urban Mongols continuously sought me out to learn about America and, for them, more importantly, to teach me about their culture and experiences living in a communist society.¹

INTRODUCTION

In 1949, the Communist party came to power, promising to curb government complacency, corruption, and economic individualism, and thereby rescue Chinese society from impending economic and moral bankruptcy. Under the party’s guidance, a “socialist ethos” was promoted that stressed public virtue over individual gain, the importance of self-denial and social obligations, and an overall egalitarian life-style. Promoting this ethos, the party felt, would improve the moral climate and, in turn, increase the unity and therefore the productivity of the entire nation. To achieve this goal, the party enthusiastically embraced political nationalism as a means to incorporate and unify its people, especially its numerous ethnic minority cultures located along its sprawling frontier borders. (Officially the state recognizes fifty-five ethnic groups; however the number of unrecognized ethnic groups is much higher. The Han, China’s largest and most influential ethnic group, form over ninety-five percent of the nation’s total population.)

In this chapter I will examine the creation and transformation of Mongolian culture and identity in Huhhot, the capital of Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China. I will illustrate the long term impact of the state’s work enterprise system, minority entitlement policy, internal migration, and the after-shocks of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) on the formation of the Mongols’ perceptions of justice and ethnic integrity. In
this way the chapter moves from descriptions of what is consi-
ered appropriate behavior to personal accounts of Mongolian
yearnings and idiosyncratic behaviors.

HUHHOT: THE CREATION
OF A MODERN
MONGOLIAN COMMUNITY

The Communist party’s decision in 1954 to transfer the Inner
Mongolian Autonomous Region capital to Huhhot occurred
simultaneously with the national effort to modernize China’s
inland cities. Tens of thousands of Chinese from Nanjing,
Shanghai, Tianjin, and Beijing either volunteered to move to
Huhhot, or were transferred, both individually or collectively,
along with their companies (or work units), to Huhhot.

Within two years of the capital’s transfer, Huhhot’s popula-
tion surged from less than 50,000 to more than 268,000. Urban
Han Chinese (the majority culture), strongly influenced by
Marxist-Leninist concepts and cosmopolitan values, settled in the
city’s east district. Simultaneously, thousands of Mongols from
the northeastern grasslands and adjacent towns and farms
poured into Huhhot, the same city their ancestors founded more
than three hundred years earlier. Fiercely dedicated to Marxism
and the principle of cultural pluralism, these newly arrived
Mongolians, many of them high-ranking government officials,
remained openly sympathetic to, and highly protective of, the tra-
ditional Mongolian herding culture. Huhhot was no longer a cul-
turally homogenized city. There now existed conflicting attitudes
and value on a scale unknown before.

An important aspect of the party’s attempt to advance its re-
putation as protector of China’s minority cultures is to incorporate
numerous ethnic motifs and images into the design of important
autonomous region’s office buildings. In Huhhot the policy
resulted in the formation of an architecture style filled with
images of Mongolian herding culture. These include a statue of a
galloping Mongol horse on top of the Inner Mongolian Museum,
a Mongol cultural place fashioned after a Tibetan Monastery, an
Inner Mongolian horse-racing pavilion shaped like a giant yurt (a
Mongolian tent), and numerous city billboards adorned with images of grassland herders. Moreover, the names of all government buildings, bus lines, and official publications are written in both Chinese and Mongol script, as are all the city street signs. The central Chinese government’s cultivation of its image as protector of minority traditions extends to an insistence that Mongolian students wear traditional herding costumes (a mode of dress seldom seen in the city) whenever a national or regional magazine decides to feature Huhhotian Mongols. These publications are viewed as opportunities to demonstrate the success of the state’s minority policy as well as its continuing commitment to regional autonomy. In every way Huhhot is promoted as the symbolic center of the state’s commitment to protect and promote Mongolian cultural heritage.

Despite considerable government support, both materially and symbolically, two critical events have undermined the Mongols’ own efforts to form a viable ethnic community. First, the state’s expanding control over the urban economy, which resulted in the radical reorganization of the work-place into a work enterprise system (*danwei*) that combines one’s residence with one’s place of employment. The work enterprise system was instituted as a means to provide full employment as well as various kinds of public assistance (free medical service, marriage registration, mediation of divorce disputes, and low cost public housing). It also serves as a primary means by which the state seeks to control its urban population.

The most prestigious occupations in urban China are in the public sector. Huhhotians, regardless of ethnicity, have therefore actively sought employment and promotion in a work enterprise. Some of the occupations Mongols occupy in the city’s social hierarchy range from the city mayor, President of Inner Mongolia University, university professor, schoolteacher, police chief, train conductor, to steelworker. In short, like their Han counterparts, Mongols hold both important and unimportant positions in the city’s work enterprises. Since the state owns everything, there are no private apartments in the city. Both Mongol and Han live in the *danwei*-assigned apartment. For the Mongols, an unintended consequence of the collectivization of private property was to thwart the formation of a viable ethnic enclave.

Second, Han settlement patterns in Inner Mongolia, both with and without government sanction, contributed to the “filling up of Inner Mongolia.” There had always been some migration to
Inner Mongolia; however, it was not until 1956 that massive resettlement in northwest China and Inner Mongolia got under way. The state’s goal was to make every ethnic group numerically a minority in their own region. For example, in Inner Mongolia the population of Han to Mongols was approximately four to one in 1947, increased to nine to one by 1980, and by 1968 reached an estimated twelve to one.

By demographically “filling up Inner Mongolia”—that is, populating it through immigration—the state hoped to accomplish two things: (1) ease some of the overcrowding in other areas; and (2) ensure the region’s continued loyalty to the nation by making Mongols a minority within their own region. The impact of this long-standing policy in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region can be seen by comparing the 1962 census with the 1982 census. In 1962 there were twenty-two counties where Mongols formed the majority population. Moreover, census data reveal that in 1962 there were six million people living in the IMAR, 15 percent of whom were Mongols. By 1982, however, Han outnumbered Mongols in every county but one, in the IMAR. Additionally, although the region’s population expanded to 19,850,000, Mongols (2,681,000) form just 10.5 percent of the total population. In Huhhot, only 42,435 (or 10 percent) of the city’s population is Mongolian.

The minority status of Huhhotian Mongols affected parents’ ability to transmit the Mongolian language to their children, who tended to refuse to speak Mongolian whenever they played with their more numerous Han age-mates. Of 123 Huhhotian Mongolian households, almost 80 percent of the children were no longer fluent in Mongolian. Studies of language acquisition consistently reveal that children often refuse to learn a language that they perceive as inferior or useless in daily interaction. Given that herders and farmers are frequently perceived by Huhhotians as “culturally backward,” it is not surprising that Han children refuse to learn Mongolian while their Mongol playmates, yearning to be accepted by their more numerous Han friends, lose the interest and then the ability to speak their native Mongolian.

Indeed, Huhhotian Mongol parents prefer that their children become bilingual. For Mongol children, the typical educational pattern is to go to an elementary school that teaches Mongolian and then transfer to a key middle school that offers English and
Mandarin, the two languages required for admission to the university. Mongolian parents are very aware that, if a child does not develop proficiency in Mongolian by the sixth grade, the child never will. I frequently observed that, whenever Mongol students came out of a Mongolian language class, they would spontaneously begin speaking Mandarin to each other. The only method of Mongolian language transmission that proves effective was for a family to have their children live for a few years with relatives on the steppes. This method was used by a number of both rural and urban families. While some say that one’s native language is the essence of ethnicity, it is ironic that the first Mongolian generation born in Huhhot, the symbolic center of China’s commitment to protecting Mongolian cultural heritage, cannot speak Mongolian. At times, this generation studiously avoids it.

**Urban Kinship and the Mongolian Family**

Both Han and Mongolian parents, children, siblings, and kin tend to live scattered through various neighborhoods. Neolocal (new), and not patrilocal (father’s), residence is common, necessitated in part by housing units packed so closely together that living space cannot always be expanded to embrace a new nuclear unit. Kinship is clearly regarded as much a potential burden as a potential benefit or a familial necessity. Although an uncle, cousin, or nephew is expected to be a more willing and effective relationship than a mere friend, it is unlikely that he would have access to ‘more doors,’ or favors, than anyone else with whom the lower-income or lower-ranked individual deals. In fact, upwardly mobile kin often deliberately cut ties of blood that bind them to their more economically humble relatives. Parents, children, siblings, and other kin tend to work at different kinds of jobs, developing individual skills and, thus, unconnected networks of job-related friends. As a result, traditional dependence upon one’s kin is greatly reduced in favor of increasing reliance on friends in the workplace.
This change requires that Huhhotians pursue a broad-based strategy of social interaction that includes both kin and non-kin. One insightful informant, when asked to make a distinction between kin and friends, acknowledged that “friends are for mundane matters, family is for ritual affairs.” A twenty-eight-year-old female informant poignantly observed, “We hide from our cousins but not our friends.” In general the “big family” as a form of social organization no longer exists in urban China or, if it does, it exists in small numbers. Only at times of a major rite or life crisis (marriage, death, or serious illness) will all siblings and their children congregate. Although the range of kinship bonds is shrinking, the value attributed to marriage and family life has never waned. People continue to think of the family as the dominant metaphor by which to assist and evaluate another’s progress through life. Marriage and the establishment of a family remain a critical, yet truncated, marker that the urban Mongols (like the Han) use to sort one another out into relative degrees of social maturity, adulthood, and psychological stability. In this and many other ways, Mongolian kinship sentiments and obligations remain strong.

CULTURAL REVOLUTION:
REINFORCING CULTURAL BORDERS

The government refers to the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) as “a national disaster.” Huhhotians remember it as the “time when we were all a little crazy.” During this period spouses, neighbors, and strangers tormented, imprisoned, and even killed one another. Believing that China’s customs were barbaric, backward, and responsible for holding back China’s development, teenagers organized into Red Guard units. It was not until 1970–1971 that order was restored in the IMAR. Homes had been vandalized, lives ruined; parents and children were missing, imprisoned, or dead. In 1976, after the death of Mao Zedong, the return of Deng Xiaoping to national leadership signaled the end of political upheaval. It brought an intense cathartic reaction throughout China. In Huhhot, the years of frustration, anger, bitterness, and grief erupted in a spontaneous outpouring of personal anguish,
dramatized in posters put up throughout the city. For the first time, the public learned firsthand about the horrors of the Cultural Revolution. Temujin and other high-ranking Han and Mongolian government officials (or cadres) were just as surprised as the public to learn of the extent of the persecution.

Below are a sampling of accounts recounted to me by Mongolians:

My father would never name anyone who supposedly belonged to the so-called Inner Mongolian Revolutionary Party, although many made up names or provided their interrogators with names of friends and neighbors and work associates just to stop the torture. My father was proud and he would not falsely accuse anyone. Even after they broke both his hands.

Another reported:

The Han devils broke into my house and started slapping my mother and father, accusing them of being members of the Inner Mongolian Revolutionary Party. They then took my father away, saying they would come back for my mother... My father was beaten for several weeks.... One night they tied him to a chair and slowly poured boiling water over his head. By morning he was dead.

Another recalled the ethnic epithets used when:

They took me into a room and started to slap me, and demanded to know if I loved Genghis Khan more than Mao. Suddenly one of them threw a pot of boiling water on my back. They laughingly called me a Mongol with no back.

In the aftermath of intense outpourings of personal grief, a team of Mongol scholars was organized to investigate and quantify the number of people imprisoned and killed in the IMAR. The state estimated that at least 16,222 people had been killed and between 350,000 and 500,000 had been arrested. This is probably an understatement. It is difficult to obtain exact figures on the ethnic composition of those killed and imprisoned. One Mongol informed me that “There was not a single Mongol who did not lose a close relative or friend during the Cultural Revolution.”

The Cultural Revolution also has had a dramatic and long-lasting impact on Huhhot’s design. Red Guards units destroyed
much of the city’s ethnic heritage. An inventory of destruction would have to include every Tibetan-Buddhist temple in or near the city, countless billboards depicting Mongolian herder imagery, and the galloping white horse atop the city’s museum, which faced “unpatriotically” north toward the People’s Republic of Mongolia, and not south toward Beijing (the capital of the People’s Republic of China). The horse, in particular, was a popular symbol of Mongolian culture because of its dramatic, always visible perch over the city. Since 1979 both the provincial and national governments have been attempting to make restitution, and repaired some of Huhhot’s gutted temples, its many billboards, the numerous broken Mongolian statues, and, at the top of the Inner Mongolian Museum, the emotionally charged white horse. To this day, the horse remains symbolic, but symbolic of reversal because, although it was rebuilt, it now faces south, toward Beijing.

The horror of the Cultural Revolution jolted ethnic consciousness and opened a far-reaching dialogue among herders, farmers, and urbanites over the meaning and significance of regional autonomy and Mongolian unity. In Huhhot, many Mongol-Han friendships were dropped. A number of Huhhotians noted that prior to the Cultural Revolution, Mongols and Han attempted to interact and maintain a hospitable demeanor, but there now emerged a segment of the urban Mongol community that “refused to touch Han,” that is, would not associate with anyone who was ethnic Han Chinese.

**AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE NATION STATE**

Overall, China’s entitlement program, designed to protect, support and promote minority rights, has provoked among the numerically dominant Han population a smoldering resentment toward the Mongols and, indirectly, toward the government. The competition for preferential government treatment and consideration is one of great interest and value and is responsible, in large part, for the biting hostility that occasionally erupts between members of Huhhot’s two largest ethnic groups.
There is hardly an ethnically divided state without its civil service issue. China is no exception. China’s ethnic entitlement policy is a product of historical expediency and a genuine concern for protecting the interest of its minorities. Although the state proclaimed this entitlement ideal, there has been difficulty in implementing it. It is incorrect, however, to assume that the principle of minority entitlement does not effect a constraint on government actions; it does. The ambivalence of officials in implementing the policy stems from having to justify a policy that undermines deep-seated folk notions of what justice and fairness are. This is especially true in Huhhot where different notions of fairness are often hotly contested within and between both the Han and the Mongol communities.

Most Mongols regard the state’s minority entitlement policy as legitimate; most Han do not. Publicly, Han endorse the policy while privately they insist that the policies should favor majority representation and individual merit, and not group entitlement. Whenever I broached the topic of minority rights, many Han admitted that, if they had the opportunity, they would leave what one Han called “this Mongolian land.” Another Han grudgingly confessed that “Mongols got all the important benefits.” Still another Han angrily asked, “Why are we second-class citizens? Don’t Han also have rights?” Entitlements are perceived by both Han and Mongols as privileges and this joint perception indicates the extent of the rift in viewpoints. Many Mongols justify their privileges by maintaining that “Mongols are Inner Mongolia’s true representatives” and, therefore, should be treated as “the defenders of the soil.” Furthermore, their needs are more pressing than the Han’s because, in the words of one Mongol official, “Inner Mongolia is an underdeveloped region in need of special assistance.” Not every Mongol, however, agrees with this opinion. One peasant Mongol told me that he was against affirmative action because it implied that “Mongols lack the ability to perform.” He added that “this policy is an insult to our minority identity.”

Another herding Mongol concurred by adding:

I don’t like this policy because it insults the Mongols. They should have to earn benefits and not be given them. By giving special benefits to Mongols we have become lazy and will not achieve. Go to any small restaurant in the city and you will find it full of Mongols talking, playing cards, and drinking. They will not study. They are just lazy. Why?
Because they know that they will be given a good job, regardless of ability.

Although many Mongols saw some merit in this argument, few agreed that Mongols did not therefore warrant special consideration.

Much of the Mongols’ success stems from the horror of the Cultural Revolution, which generated intense feelings of guilt among local and regional government officials. Some felt indirectly responsible for the severity of the Mongol suffering. For example, one Han official told me (momentarily shielding his face) that he still “felt occasional pains of uneasiness” over what he called “the slaughter of so many innocent Mongols.” Mongol leaders have used this lingering guilt to push through a number of ethnic benefits that the state, prior to the Cultural Revolution, had denied the Mongols. The state expanded its affirmative action quota policy to include not only government positions but also jobs in higher education. By 1980 the regional government instituted an additional entitlement policy which decreed that minorities must comprise at least twenty-five percent of every college entrance class. Because it is not stipulated whether the minorities are to come from an urban or rural social background, educated urban Mongols have parlayed their background into an advantage over grassland Mongols. They form the majority of the students at Inner Mongolia University. However, at the Teachers University, the majority of the Mongols, who form half of the student body, are from the countryside and speak Mongolian. Whatever the exact enrollment ratio of countryside to urban Mongolian students, most Han regard the policy as an unfair competitive advantage for the urban Mongols.

Another source of Han conflict is the two-tier birth control policy that allows minorities to have more than one child. This policy further exacerbates Han irritation. Until as recently as 1985 Mongols were not at all restricted by the state’s one-child policy and could have as many children as they chose. In 1986 the state limited urban Mongols to two children, the same number allowed to the region’s Chinese Moslems (or Hui). My survey of Mongol households formed after 1976 found that only three out of fifty-seven households have more than one child. This extremely low ratio is a response to the notion that “modern” means having only one child.

The conflict that surrounds the government’s entitlement policy finds its fullest expression in the work-unit organized around
a three-tier ranking system that sets a fixed ratio of Mongol to Han government officials (or cadres) for each of the three administrative levels within the work-unit. For instance, in 1949 ninety percent of the high cadre strata, seventy percent of the middle level, and fifty percent of the lower strata were Mongols. By 1983 those proportions were significantly modified. An influential Mongol told me:

In 1962 the ratio of high-ranking Mongol officials to Han officials was seven to three; however, at the middle-level the ratio was six to four in favor of the Han officials; and at the junior level the ratio was eight to two in favor of Han officials. Today [1983] the percentage has shrunk further and only fifty per cent of the high-ranking officials are Mongol, but at the middle level eighty percent are Han, and at the junior level ninety percent of all governmental positions are filled by Han.

Intended or unintended, the consequence has been the same: the number of “ethnic slots” is now closer to the current population proportion of eight Han to one Mongol. Nonetheless, most Han insist that, within the city’s work enterprises, Mongols are typically promoted faster. Mongols disagree, feeling that their promotions are on merit. I never could substantiate which point of view was accurate.

During the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, many Huhhotian Mongols, especially the offspring of Han-Mongol marriages, switched their official ethnic classification to Han. Recently, however, given the real and perceived benefits of being a minority in the IMAR, offspring from mixed and non-mixed marriages were reclaiming their original ethnic identity. The government ruled that anyone having one ethnic parent or grandparent from any side of the family, could, if so desired, be reclassified as a minority. The government’s overall policy of benefits and affirmative action provided families with powerful incentives to acknowledge their ethnic heritage. In 1982 a government official told me that over “five hundred families had come forth and changed their ethnic identity from Han to Mongolian.” The actual rate was larger. The growth rate of Mongols between 1981 and 1982 was 15 percent, or around 350,000 people, and is the direct result of former Mongols and some Han reregistering as Mongols. This reversal itself is seen by most local Han as further proof that urban Mongols are given special status.
Significantly, neither the government in its official capacity, nor the Huhhotians themselves, regard the children of mixed parentage as an ethnic hybrid. A child can be only one, a Mongol or Han or Hui; it cannot be both and at birth parents must designate their child’s ethnicity.

Given the material and political advantages granted to Huhhot’s minority populations, it is not uncommon to find parents designating their only child as a Mongol. While local census data on this point were not available, my own sample, of thirty-one inter-ethnic households, where a Mongolian woman had taken a Han spouse, indicates that in all but seven cases, the child was designated to be Mongol.

The reluctance of Han husbands to pull their Mongol wives away from their ethnic roots is more the result of state policy than any personal conviction to protect minority cultural identity. One Han worker summed up the basis for this pattern by noting that “I want my child to have a lot of benefits.” Another Han intellectual told me that “Mongols have it easier to go to college and I want my child to go, too.” This acceptance has enabled Mongolian women, both prior to and during their marriage, to successfully insist that their children be raised as proud Mongols. Appropriately, their husbands seldom disagree. When they do, the Mongolian wives simply disregard them. This is due, in large part, to the socialist transformation of the household, which has freed women from the prescriptions of their husbands’ male kinsmen and given them an independent source of income which, in turn, has fostered greater equity in household politics.

Political nationalism as an ideology holds that the highest expression of a people’s collective identity is statehood, and that the population of a given state should express a single, unified sense of being a people. This ideology, in multiethnic societies, often manifests itself in strong pressures toward assimilation of the non-dominant groups, thereby heightening latent ethnic antagonism. The salience of the antagonism can readily be found by examining the cultural conceptions that Han and Mongols hold of one another.
STEREOTYPES AND ETHNIC ANTAGONISM

Ethnic stereotypes are cultural exaggerations that imply that behavior is, to varying degrees, either “good” as it relates to social solidarity or “bad” as it relates to personal selfishness or animalistic behavior. Huhhotian Han freely admit, in conversation, that Mongols are “simple people,” “not civilized,” “stupid,” “ugly,” “backward,” “ignorant because they eat with a knife” (that is, they do not use chopsticks), “don’t like vegetables or fruit,” “lazy,” “eat raw meat,” “dirty,” “drunkards,” “[their] knees shine from excessive wiping of their drinking bowls,” “good only at memorizing facts, which is why they make good doctors,” “beat their wives,” or are “sexual animals who don’t know who their fathers are.”

On the other hand, Mongols perceive Han to be “crafty,” “cunning,” “dishonest,” “impolite,” “loud,” “unkind,” “greedy,” “slippery,” “speak an ugly language,” “eat dogs,” and “look like jiaozi” (soggy and steamy on outside and soft on the inside). These ethnic slurs or negative stereotypes closely resemble the attributes Mongols ascribed to Guomindang officials and pre-1949 Chinese merchants, whereas the Han slurs are unsympathetic portraits of certain features of nomadic life that are no longer relevant to Huhhotian Mongols. In Huhhot, both Han and Mongols feel that their “people” are more “polite,” “friendly,” and “generous.” Mongols enjoy countering Han boasts of cultural superiority by noting that the grasslands are the repository of idyllic values or pleasant manners. Although folk images of “grassland beauty” are used to celebrate the continuity and importance of Mongolian cultural heritage, a majority of Mongols privately admit that they do not want to return to the grasslands because it is “too backward.” There is an attempt to distance themselves from these images, though Mongols do not hesitate to invoke them to press their case over the Han.

The salience of the city’s ethnic borders can be evaluated by observing the frequency and vigor in which ethnic hostility—symbolic and actual—is publicly expressed. For example, it is
common, especially during rush hour, to share a restaurant table with strangers who ignore one another (unless one happens to be a foreigner). Whenever I was in the company of a Mongol, and a group of Han joined our table, it was not unusual for the Han to express contempt by either sneering at him or by telling me that “Inner Mongolia was a backward province that has improved a lot since the arrival of Han settlers.”

Other incidents of ethnic antagonism were readily observed in a number of public settings. For example, it was not uncommon, whenever I strolled through Huhhot’s two largest parks, to overhear Han curse at visiting grassland Mongols. If these slurs were overheard, the Mongols often returned in kind. However, I never observed a single fistfight stemming from these exchanges. Physical confrontations do occur on Huhhot’s university and college campuses, where violence often erupts between Han and Mongol students over the Mongols’ refusal to cease singing after 10:00 p.m. The Han students, many of whom are afraid of the more robust grassland and agricultural Mongols, are adamant about their selfishness in refusing to observe quiet hours. The Mongolian students, for their part, insist that they are living in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and that they can do whatever they please. A twenty-seven year-old Mongol angrily summarizes the fears of his cohorts:

Inner Mongolia was given a lot of promises by the Han. We were told we would have power and rights over natural resources. We have never received them. Before liberation there were a lot of Mongol leaders in Inner Mongolia. Now there are only a few. Most leaders in Huhhot are Han; all the leaders of every country are Han; Mongols simply have no power.

Another Mongolian student argues that the Han do not understand the true meaning of an autonomous region:

This is the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. This is Mongolian territory. If this were Outer Mongolia every student would be Mongolian. If this was a true autonomous government then every high-ranking official would be Mongol. Within thirty years we would have developed our own economy. It would be just as developed today as now. Maybe more so. Everyone knows Outer Mongolia is more
advanced than Inner Mongolia. People miss the point. This is our land. We should have the right to develop it as we want.

Given this view and the fact that the Mongols are very sensitive to their social standing in Huhhot, the students are alert to anything that might smack of Han prejudice. The sensitivity often produces a collective response, especially among Huhhot’s large Mongolian student population, to anything that appears to insult their ethnic heritage. For instance, when a Mongolian student was publicly reprimanded by the class monitor (a Han), his Mongolian friends felt an immediate urge to retaliate for what one student called “his lack of respect for Mongols.” The next day the monitor, on his way home, was confronted by a cohort of Mongolian students, made to apologize and then was beaten. Off campus, most Han, especially those who are uneducated, are not afraid to voice their displeasure whenever they come upon what they deem improper behavior on the part of Mongolians. It is not rare, for instance, to enter a restaurant in the “New City” (where most Mongols live) and find an ongoing shouting match between Han and Mongol urbanites over the question of minority rights and benefits. Although Huhhotians hold negative images about other ethnic groups, it does not necessarily follow that they also carry hostile feelings about particular Mongols or Han. Han, especially intellectuals and cadres, feel strongly that as long as a Mongol does not act “crude” like a grassland Mongol then it is possible to interact as good colleagues, if not become good friends. In this way, Han resentment of Mongols as a cultural group does not prevent the formation of Han-Mongol friendships. If a Han believes in the ideal of cultural pluralism, then he or she will usually have Mongolian friends. If he or she does not fully accept this ideal (and most Han do not), an interethnic friendship is not formed.

In summation, the realities of the Huhhotian Mongols’ situation are formed by a combination of clear demographic factors and important historical events such as demographic engulfment of the local Mongolian population by the Han, the institutionalization of the work-residential enterprise system preventing the formation of a viable ethnic enclave, and the establishment of an ethnic entitlement policy that generates among the local Han population a backlash of bitterness concerning the fairness of the poli-
The result is a perennial discussion among and between Mongols and Han about the meaning, expression and significance of ethnic identity and, more importantly, the role of the state in cultural transmission.

**LIFE-ORIENTATIONS: COMPETING NOTIONS OF ETHNIC INTEGRITY**

Huhhotian Mongols have adopted a range of attitudes toward their cultural heritage. They vary from complete emergence in Mongolian culture to absolute rejection of all “things Mongolian.” The lack of consensus concerning ethnic identity has fostered a number of different and competing notions of ethnic integrity, which have generated four distinct life-orientations, described as cosmopolitanist, traditionalist, revisionist, and assimilationalist.

In Huhhot most of the city’s Mongolian population embraces cosmopolitanism with its emphasis on preserving, in some form, Mongolian cultural heritage. The traditionalists typically speak Mongolian and are oriented toward the grassland or farming social networks and culture. The majority of the cosmopolitanists, however, do not speak Mongolian and are oriented toward the modernization and urbanization of China. The assimilationists make up a small share of Huhhot’s Mongolian population and are indifferent to Mongolian cultural heritage. The revisionists make up a larger share of the city’s ethnic population than the assimilationists but a much smaller share than the cultural pluralists. They insist, first, that Mongols should associate only with other Mongols while remaining civil with the Han. The revisionists differ from the traditionalists in that they actively attempt to influence government policies by persuasion, whereas the traditionalists tend to ignore such things.

Within most Mongolian households, there is a range of conflicting opinions over the relevance of Mongolian cultural heritage for both personal identity and establishing a career. It is not unusual to find Huhhotian Mongols veering sharply between a yearning for a closed ethnic community and a desire for an open one. The degree to which a Mongol will seek a closed or open community depends, in large measure, upon a male’s or female’s
The cosmopolitan view maintains that a proficiency in Mongolian expression and behavior, while highly desirable, is less critical as an ethnic marker than is an overall pride and commitment to “things Mongolian.” The spirit of this can be heard in the comments of a thirty-seven year-old Mongol who insisted that “Mongols have to learn to cooperate and learn from the Han, while Han have to respect Mongolian traditions and not be so arrogant.” Similarly, a forty-seven year-old Mongol cadre stressed that “Mongols must learn from many cultures. We shouldn’t restrict ourselves.”

The revisionist view is organized around the protection and promotion of Mongolian cultural heritage. This view did not exist prior to the Cultural Revolution. It arose as an aftershock from the trauma caused by the fabrication of the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party movement, which resulted in the imprisonment or death of over twenty-five percent of the Mongolian population living in Inner Mongolia. An unintended consequence of these deaths was to renew within first-generation Mongols born in Huhhot a very intense interest in understanding their cultural heritage. The rebirth of interest was organized around a notion of ethnic integrity which held that one should not merely assume a pride in being a Mongol as “purity of the heart” (i.e., consciousness), but in fact nurture that pride. In view of the deaths, this purity required new affirmations. In any event, advocates of this view may or may not be fluent in Mongolian (though most cannot speak Mongolian), may or may not use a Han surname (though most use their Mongol name), and may or may not marry a Han (though interethnic marriages are rare). Besides restricting ethnic intermarriage, revisionists strive to maintain an integrity of ethnic consciousness through the diligent study of Mongolian history and activism in ethnic politics.

The revisionists’ interpretation of modern Mongolian history competes with the state’s emphasis, which prefers to celebrate those leaders who rallied the Mongols (and, by implication, local Han) to fight Japanese aggression and the corrupt Chinese (Guomindang) government, forging in the process a new national identity organized around the principles of citizenship, not ethnic separation. In contrast, the revisionist interpretation, a view disapproved by the government and not taught in either the city’s middle or high schools, champions Mongols such as Genghis Khan, Gadameiren, and De Wang as inspirations who should be
remembered for their struggle for Inner Mongolia’s political autonomy or independence. Significantly, with the exception of De Wang, these figures are discussed in the universities’ Mongolian language and literature department. In this way Mongolian cultural heritage is preserved by only an elite few.

The traditionalist orientation, in contrast to the cosmopolitanist and revisionist ones, contends that the essence of ethnic identity and, therefore, ethnic integrity is simply the ability to speak Mongolian. It has a strict view of Mongols who are not fluent in Mongolian, labeling them tainted and “false Mongols.” For the traditionalist, ethnicity is seldom an issue because core meanings are not disputed or contested. Traditionalists grudgingly accept, however, in the interests of promoting a united front, the cosmopolitanist and revisionist claim that “purity of the heart” is just as important as “purity of language.” For instance, when I asked a grassland Mongol if Huhhot Mongols were real Mongols, he made a face, and responded “if they cannot speak Mongolian, they are assimilated.”

Other characteristics of the traditionalist view is an insistence on ethnic endogamous marriage, the use of one’s Mongolian name in every social encounter, a revulsion towards cultural assimilation, and a strong indifference to politics. Moreover, they are consistently appalled at the cosmopolitanist’s acceptance, if not endorsement, of intimate interethnic friendships and marriages. They prefer, by and large, to read Mongolian newspapers and magazines, listen to Mongolian music, eat Mongolian food and, most pointedly, remain intimately linked to the countryside Mongols as opposed to cultivating any urban social networks. A traditionalist inevitably prefers to be married in his or her hometown and attempts to “return home” at least once a year during the Lunar New Year. Although traditionalists are concerned about the long-term durability of Mongolian culture, they are not worried about the loss of cultural identity. For instance, one fifty-nine year-old Mongol told me that he rarely thought about ethnicity because “I am a Mongol and do Mongolian things.” He was dismayed that “so many younger urban Mongols couldn’t speak Mongolian.” Another Mongol, a forty-one year-old female, told me that she rarely participated in the cultural life of the city and “missed the grasslands and the way I once lived.” Another admitted that she liked living in Huhhot because there were “a lot of conveniences, but associated only with other Mongols who
understood my heart, and rarely touched Han.” Significantly, her family had constructed a domestic shrine, complete with an incense burner and a portrait of Genghis Khan, to signify that “this is Genghis Khan land, and we are Genghis Khan’s people.” Her feelings are typical of other traditionalists who focus almost exclusively on the intimate bonds between them and their relatives and friends living on the grasslands.

Finally, assimilationists believe that ethnic integrity is irrelevant and one’s origins unimportant. Because the assimilationists derive little or no aesthetic pleasure from Mongolian cultural heritage, they seem to be indifferent to the problems and fears of other Mongols. The assimilationists’ indifference toward protecting Mongolian ethnicity is summarized by a twenty-three year-old Mongol woman who said:

I do not remember the grasslands, nor am I clear about the Cultural Revolution. I know it was terrible. Many Mongols suffered, but I was just too young to become directly involved. Today, I have a lot of freedom and while I am not ashamed of being a Mongol, I am not crazy about it.

Another Mongol, when I asked if she was worried about forgetting that she was a Mongol, replied, “My mother was a Han. The minority question is not very important to me.” Other assimilationists, while proud of their cultural heritage, readily agreed with their Han colleagues that the Mongolian herders are “backward” and in “need of assistance.” Some are clearly embarrassed by their Mongolian roots. Others are less ambiguous and frankly declare that they “don’t like the Mongolian culture.” As one thirty-six year-old Mongol woman put it, “I don’t believe in the Mongolian question. I don’t like studying history, eating millet, or drinking milk tea. My younger brother is very interested in this, but I am not.” Another Mongol adamantly said to me that “Mongols are backward because they are dirty, lazy, and use a knife and not chopsticks to eat raw meat.” On one occasion, a twenty-two year-old Mongol was delighted that I mistook her for a Han and blurted out, “Oh, you think so? You have made me so happy. You know, my family is from Shenyang. We have culture; grassland Mongols do not.” It is important to note that assimilationists make up the smallest share of Huhhot’s Mongol population and, unsurprisingly, have the highest frequency of ethnic intermarriage in my sample population (fifteen out of twenty-
The males, in particular, prefer to use their Han surname.

**ETHNIC INTERACTION**

**IN A CHINESE COMMUNIST STATE**

The Communist party is fearful that if Han and Mongols form voluntary associations (such as traditional hometown, temple, clan associations, or the dreaded secret societies) it will lead them to ignore and even challenge the government’s authority. Therefore, the government outlaws the formation of ethnic associations. Unable to establish hometown or occupational associations, the only thing that stands between the Mongols and total assimilation is their inclination to form and maintain ethnic friendship networks. These networks are typical of other displaced ethnic groups responding to residential and occupational dispersal. My survey of informal Mongolian friendship networks found that, although every Mongol born in the city had at least one good Han friend, their best friend was usually a Mongol; moreover, Huhhotian Mongols overwhelmingly prefer that intimate social ties be organized around ethnicity, which is often the cause or occasion for the tie. In addition, I discovered other informal opportunities for Mongols to gather together. For instance, it is not unusual for Mongols to sponsor a dance open only to Mongols, attend a purely Mongolian concert held by one of the IMAR’s local or regional song and dance troupes, or support local sports contests that feature Mongolian athletes. Although the latter two events are open to anyone, they are attended predominately by Mongols.

The government’s injunction against voluntary associations has restricted Mongols, regardless of life-orientation, from performing rituals that promote ethnic solidarity. This was not, however, always the case. The government had made an exception and from 1956 until 1980 allowed Mongolian students and local citizens to hold in the fall an annual ritual commemorating Genghis Khan. However, in 1980, ever watchful for a potential challenge, the government issued an injunction forbidding the ritual because it “promoted minority interest over that of majority interest.” It further asserted that “all meetings must be open to
everyone regardless of ethnicity.” In spite of this injunction, most Mongols manage to circumvent it by creating an array of ad hoc counter-rites regularly performed whenever Mongols meet socially. For instance, some Mongols (two out of 186) wear traditional Mongolian costumes to special events and present their close friends with a Mongolian ceremonial scarf. Most Mongols use mundane pastoral and agricultural dietary staples such as milk tea and millet in order to foster ethnic pride and solidarity among urban Mongols. Mongols, typically, pick up a bowl of millet tea and say: “When I eat this I feel like a Mongol.” Mongols use common cultural motifs such as wrestling, Genghis Khan pins and movie posters (after 1986), wear Mongolian clothes, and perform religious ceremonies such as pouring libation and butter on a fire during the Lunar New Year to signify commitment to their cultural heritage.

Huhhotian Mongols move in a number of different social arenas (work, school, or in public) that are marked by distinct forms of discourse, which contribute to enhancing or reducing cultural distinctions. Although friendly contacts are considered necessary to insure real communication between ethnic groups, Huhhotian Mongols confine their most intimate interpersonal contacts to their own ethnic group. Interviews with 113 Mongols found that only thirty-seven of them regularly associated with a Han in an intimate setting. In short, for most Mongols, friendship patterns sustain and nurture cultural borders.

My own observations confirmed this. For example, one college-educated Mongolian cadre proudly declared that “Han feel comfortable in my presence. I can speak Mandarin. I know how to act. They enjoy my company.” However, whenever he was alone, or could select his companions, he preferred the exclusive company of Mongols. He justified this attitude by explaining that he was a Mongol, so “Why shouldn’t I be with Mongols?” He added that “I like to drink. All Mongols enjoy drinking. I also like to sing and talk loudly. Educated Han do not like this, so I wait until I am with good friends, then I can be free and easy.”

The mid-autumn festival is another instance where many Mongols perceive a different and, in this case, negative meaning and use it to celebrate their ethnic separateness and Mongolian solidarity. The festival is a time of national celebration observed by Han on the fifteenth day of the eighth month of the Chinese calendar. During it, moon cakes—large round cakes made of flour and brown sugar, and filled with lotus or bean paste—are
eaten on the evening of the full moon. This festival is a very old and popular Han celebration not embraced by most urban Mongols (except those who have adopted an assimilationist posture) because it is seen as an affirmation of Han ethnicity. One forty-eight year-old Mongolian intellectual told me that “both my children and I enjoy eating moon cakes, because they are very tasty; however, we don’t participate in the celebration by eating the cakes on the fifteenth, as it is a Han festival.” A twenty-seven year-old Mongol woman informed me that “mid-autumn festival is used in my family to remind us that we are Mongols and not Han.” She further added, “My father tells us to eat the cakes and remember that all that is sweet is not good.” Mongols who have recently come to a revisionist view also refuse to participate in the festival.

Because Han, regardless of education, are unfamiliar with the Mongolian interpretation, the Han often ascribe a different meaning to a public event. For example, most Han believe that the popular Mongolian song “Gadameiren,” glorifies a Mongolian prince’s fight against the Japanese invaders who were moving into a region in southeast Inner Mongolia. Accordingly, Gadameiren is a symbol of pan-ethnic solidarity against the Japanese. In the Mongolian unofficial view, this song symbolizes Mongol displeasure with the Han peasants who were, at the time, pushing out into the Inner Mongolian steppes in search of arable land. In both readings, the song stands for ethnic solidarity and, thus, it is not uncommon for Han and Mongols students alike to whistle and sing the tune during restaurant drinking parties. The Han are unaware of the Mongols’ interpretation and the irony of Han singing a song of Mongolian solidarity is not lost on the Mongols. The disagreement over the meaning of a common song exemplifies the misunderstanding and ethnic unawareness between the two groups.

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**DREAMS, AMBIGUITY, AND UNRESOLVED IDENTITY MARKERS**
The issue of cultural heritage and identity remains extremely salient, as I have shown above and, like any minority caught between two cultures, Huhhotian Mongols are constantly juggling class expectations with those of ethnicity. Thus, high-ranking Mongols privately enjoy a free-wheeling, bantering style of social interaction with other Mongols, characteristic of countryside Mongols. But they tend to adopt within their neighborhood and work-unit a more genteel, reserved demeanor. Amongst themselves (or with a visiting anthropologist), they do not hesitate to revert to a more joking, informal style, one that is associated with grassland cultural behavior. The point is that Huhhotian Mongols, regardless of life-orientation, do not believe that they are being false, unauthentic or disloyal to their personal convictions by maintaining a variety of role postures toward social interaction. For the cosmopolitanist and the assimilationalist, grassland culture is not primary for measuring “ethnic integrity.” The revisionists, on the other hand, tend to see it as a source of spiritual purity, the embodiment of a cultural heritage and the essence of Mongolian identity. Although they have visited and have lived on the grasslands, revisionists do not want to abandon their urban life for a pastoral one. They want all the urban conveniences yet yearn for the pastoral images and values. It is not surprising that revisionists are ambivalent in the criteria they use to assess ethnic purity. In spite of the ideological boasting of the revisionist Mongols, rejuvenating their commitment to “things Mongolian,” as well as countering the Mongolian-speaking charge that they are “false Mongols,” is not easy. Dreams collected from Mongols indicate cultural ambivalence (not immediately apparent in daily conversation) toward their own belief that the essence of ethnic integrity is “purity of the heart.” For example, a Mongol’s notion of ethnic integrity was severely undermined by a grassland friend who, during an all-night drinking party, called him a “false Mongol.” The next week he reported the following dream:

I was riding a white horse to Outer Mongolia when, just as I started to cross over, the border guards stopped me and asked me to speak Mongolian. I couldn’t. So they called me a Han and send me back to Inner Mongolia.
After relaying this dream, he became withdrawn. A few weeks later, he told me that it was “important to study history and push the government to honor the principle of regional autonomy so all Mongols could benefit.” Another Mongol reported a similar dream, “Last night I had a very interesting dream in which I was walking with my son in the city park and we were speaking Mongolian when I suddenly realized my son did not understand a word I had said. He could not speak Mongolian, only Han.” Another Mongol told me that he had a dream where he was riding “my bike through the city when I saw a coffin with my father in it. My father [who was alive] was dead, and the coffin looked like one of those funeral coffins you take pictures of in the old city” [i.e., a Han coffin]. Still another Mongol, who had recently adopted a more moderate cosmopolitanist posture, reported that “I was riding a horse when I noticed that my wife was laughing at me. I asked why? She said that I wasn’t a real Mongol. I was only a city Mongol.” Of the more than seventy-nine dreams I collected from Mongol informants, only fifteen could be interpreted as a product of an ethnic ambiguity. Still, it is highly suggestive that, for a number of Mongols, the question of ethnic integrity is less secure than is self-acknowledged.

**DUAL NAMES:**

**POLITICAL NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC INTEGRITY**

In a multiethnic society, the minority elite is often torn between the conflicting expectations of class and ethnicity. This is especially true in Huhhot, where Mongols, the sole beneficiaries of the government’s entitlement program, have the most to lose in any conflict over the program. The Mongolian elite is keenly aware that a wealth of benefits are tied to their continued support for government policies in general.

Consequently, in an attempt to widen informal and formal connections, particularly within the political elite, ambitious Huhhotian Mongols regardless of life-orientation maintain a
demeanor that will be perceived as cooperative, friendly and gentle. This concern with correct demeanor has produced, among the Huhhot’s Mongol community, a profound dilemma: How can one achieve respectability among both Mongols and Han? One solution is the utilization of dual names.

Every Huhhotian Mongol has a Mongol and a Han name; the name publicly adopted often depends upon parental expectations, gender, and career ambitions. Mongols do not have family surnames; instead they rely upon a single name. This system of nomenclature has certain difficulties for an emerging nation-state. If the personal and family surnames are interchangeable, it is difficult to distinguish individuals with similar names. This can play havoc with the government’s effort to accurately register its citizens.

The People’s Republic of Mongolia instituted a new system of naming in order to facilitate a more accurate recording of kinship relationships. China itself has yet to institute a similar policy; however, I found that, in the IMAR, many Mongol cultural pluralists used their Han surname, while still remaining very involved in Mongolian cultural issues. Why is this? Initial interviews with Mongol informants explained that they used their Han surname out of consideration for their Han colleagues and friends who cannot, without much difficulty, pronounce Mongolian names. Of course, Han convenience would not be consistent with the fierceness of simple Mongolian ethnicity. Later I learned of another more powerful reason: childhood peer group pressure. It was the Han playmates of the Mongol children who professed difficulty pronouncing and responding to a different language. Consequently, the Han playmates would tease their Mongol playmates, often mercilessly about their strange language and name. Twenty years after the fact, a college-educated Mongol informant vividly recounted the stress that teasing had engendered: “I would run home crying and beg my father to let me use a Han name. Of course, he would always refuse, telling me that I would understand later.” Another male cadre told of fighting his playmates because “they would deliberately mispronounce my name to mock me.” Still another male cadre remembered that his playmates once composed a short poem that stated his “name was so long that he needed a donkey to pull it.” Significantly, no Mongol women reported being the object of their playmates’ teasing. Most Mongol parents refused to change names, believing
that ultimately their children would understand and come to appreciate their Mongol name. However about one-third of the parents I studied did change their children’s names.

During the late 1970s, amidst the aftershocks of the Cultural Revolution, many Mongols renewed their commitment to Mongolian cultural heritage by readopting their given Mongol name. However, again, some Mongols did not. These Mongols felt that, since they were already known by a Han surname, it would confuse colleagues and childhood friends to switch. Females were much more likely to use their Mongol name than males. Eighty-nine percent of the females in my survey used their Mongol name. If parents spoke Mongolian, their children almost always used a Mongol name; but, if the parents no longer spoke Mongolian, they were more lax about insisting that their sons use a Mongol name.

Many Huhhotian Mongols believe that a Han surname gives their son a career advantage, which is not necessary for a daughter. Huhhotians, regardless of ethnicity, believe that men are more intelligent than women and, therefore, men should be promoted at a faster pace. Not lost on Mongol families is the shared Mongol and Han folk belief that it is the father who defines a child’s ethnicity. Thus, a Mongol male’s children would always be Mongol, regardless of his mate’s ethnicity. Correspondingly, if a woman married a Han, it would result in the ethnic loss of her children. Mongol families, even those who told me that ethnicity was not that important, insisted that their daughters use a Mongol name, while being more tolerant of a son’s decision to use a Han surname.

If a name is the most obvious of all symbols of identity, then the fact that the second generation of Mongols who did not experience the terrors of the Cultural Revolution are proudly using their Mongolian names suggests that, at least, at the level of symbolic ethnicity, the cultural identity of Huhhotian Mongols continues to thrive. There are, however, social class variations. Only fifty-six percent of the high-ranking cadre’s sons (twenty-one out of thirty-eight), but ninety-seven percent of their daughters (twenty-seven out of twenty-nine), publicly retained their Mongol name. Clearly, high-ranking families believe it is to a son’s advantage not to use his Mongol name in all social contexts, holding the opposite view for their daughters. Within this social class, there is
no relationship between life-orientation and the presence or absence of a Mongol surname. There is, however, a relationship for Mongols at the bottom of Huhhot’s urban hierarchy. Typically, a Mongol who is uneducated and cannot speak Mongolian, will veer between being a reluctant cosmopolitanist and a full-fledged assimilationist. Consequently, it is in high-ranking families that debates and reflections over the meaning and purpose of ethnic relations within the emerging Chinese socialist state are most vividly and colorfully played out.

CONCLUSION

The Huhhotian Mongols hold conflicting notions about the “essence” of Mongolian ethnicity. The very variety of Huhhotian Mongol life-orientations is derived from conflicting beliefs about ethnic integrity which, depending upon the fervor of conviction, may or may not change during one’s life.

The state’s preferential policies have had the unintended consequence of intensifying ethnic hostility and confusion by institutionalizing a system of resource allocation organized around criteria that are ascribed rather than achieved. These criteria violate generally held folk conceptions of fairness. The state’s oscillation has contributed to the meaning of ethnicity which has taken many forms in the history of Huhhot.

The intense rivalry amongst Mongols over the meaning of ethnic integrity generates continuous debates over the importance of maintaining an open or closed ethnic community. Most Mongols, excluding the assimilationalists, remain proud of their cultural heritage and enjoy the government’s benefits. The entitlement policy, however, continues to provoke Han resentment while discouraging Mongols who are leaning toward an assimilationist life-orientation from publicly denying their cultural heritage. Because Mongols, regardless of orientation, feel that they themselves have some things to gain, or believe that in the long run their children will benefit, they continue to favor government entitlements. Nevertheless, Mongols have seen the political winds shift before and thus remain anxious over the state’s commitment
to continuing that policy.

The anxiety that many Mongols articulate is no different from the experiences of other minorities in China. It is a collective insecurity that stems, in large part, from the perception that their relative status as a privileged minority is declining and that their cultural heritage is endangered. The Chinese state, for its part, is placed in an impossible situation of being committed to upholding two opposing ideals—political nationalism and ethnic autonomy. The state’s inability to reconcile these opposing ideals contributes to the volatility of ethnic relations to this day.

NOTES

1. The material that forms much of this research was collected between 1981–1983 and again in 1987 for a period of two and a half years. Huhhot is a city with over 491,000, of which 80 percent are Han and the remaining 20 percent are either Chinese Moslem (Hui) or Mongolian. Partial funding for the research was provided by the University of California General Research Grant, Sigma Xi, and CSCPRC, National Academy of Sciences. An expanded treatment of the material discussed in this chapter is found in W. Jankowiak, Sex, Death, and Hierarchy in a Chinese City (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). I am grateful to the following scholars for their advice, encouragement and thoughtful suggestions: Emily Allen, Chris Atwood, Jim Bell, Carol Ember, Mel Ember, Steve Harrell and Tom Paladino.


6. M. Whyte and W. Parish, Urban Life in Contemporary China


**SUGGESTED READINGS**


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