THE LAWS. Translated by George Burges

Plato

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Introduction

There is considerable debate regarding whether or not Plato's Republic is a work in political philosophy. Such is not the case with the Laws. Much of the reason that Plato's Republic is mistakenly assumed to be a work in political philosophy is that Plato spends nearly half of the ten books of the work developing Kallipolis [The theoretical ideal city developed as a thought experiment in the Republic.] (the ideal city). In constructing this city, Plato identifies the various component parts that must be a part of the city, from those who do the farming to those who do the protecting to those who do the ruling. Each of these classes is completely separate and is separated on the basis of the kind of soul each person who is a member of the relevant class has. However, despite this, there is also considerable agreement that the Republic is actually not a work in political philosophy.

The first reason for this is that the Republic is framed by a single question - what is justice in the individual soul. The analogy that Plato uses is the structure of the soul to the structure of the ideal city. By imagining the city (something large) he says that perhaps we can isolate justice in the individual (something much smaller). Thus, it appears that in context, the construction of the "ideal" city in the Republic is a thought experiment designed to illuminate the question of justice in the individual soul. The second reason to suppose that the Republic is not a political work, or at least not essentially one, is that it bears little or no resemblance to the clearly political work that is the Laws. In the Laws, several constitutions are examined, both ideal ones and actual ones. Each is explored for its strengths and its weaknesses. The role of law itself is turned over and over again and the argument that the laws of a city are properly so insofar as they participate in the Form of Law is at the very least a tacit feature of the dialogue. In this way, that is, in its substance, the Laws is strikingly similar to Plato's early dialogue, the Crito. There, Socrates engages in a long discussion with the Laws who convince him that it would be an unjust action to escape from Athens, even though he has been unjustly convicted and faces execution at the hand of the Athenian democrats. Given that the Crito (an early dialogue) and the Laws (a late, and likely the final of Plato's
works) develop views that are very much in common with one another and very different indeed from the authoritarian ideal city in the Republic, it is perhaps best to read them as the central works (along with the Sophist [A teacher for hire in ancient Greece and the primary competitors and foils of Plato.] and the Statesman) in Plato's political philosophy.

Within the Laws, we encounter the interpretive difficulty that sometimes plagues the late dialogues of Plato. Unlike the early ones where it is reasonably clear that Socrates speaks for Plato, here Socrates does not appear at all. Instead, three interlocutors [A participant in a dialogue.], Cleinias, Megillus, and an Athenian stranger meet and engage in discussion about government and proper rule as they journey along the road in the Grecian countryside. The Laws is a long and winding work, with long excurses. At times, it is difficult to identify who, precisely, has Plato's view. It is generally accepted that the Athenian Stranger is playing the role of Plato, for the most part. Ultimately, the view that is hit upon as the proper construction of government is something of a modified aristocratic democracy in which the Laws constrain the rule of potential despots and restrain the often impetuous impulses of the masses.

Reading

BOOK I.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

AN ATHENIAN GUEST, CLINIAS OF CRETE, AND MEGILLUS OF LACEDAEMON.

  Athenian. HAS a god, or some man, obtained from you, O guests, (the fame of being) the cause of the laying down of laws?

  Clinias. A god, O guest, a god, to say what is most just; with us indeed, Zeus; but amongst the Lacedaemonians, from whose country is this person here, I think, they mention Apollo. Is it not so?

  Megillus. It is.

  Athen. Say you then, according to Homer, that Minos did constantly on the ninth year go to a conference with his father, and according to the oracular responses given by him, lay down the laws found in your states?

  Clin. It is so said by us; and, likewise, that his brother Rhadamanthus for you have heard the name was the most just [of men]. Now we Cretans would say that he obtained this praise from his distributing at that time things pertaining to justice in an upright manner.
Athen. And honourable is the renown, and very becoming to the son of Zeus. But since both you and this person here have been brought up in legal institutions of this kind, I expect it will not be unpleasant for us at present to have a dissertation, by speaking and hearing respecting a form of government and laws, and at the same time to be taking a walk. Now the way from Cnossus to the cavern and temple of Jupiter is, as we hear, altogether sufficient, and the resting places along the road are, as is proper, during the present sultry weather, shady amongst lofty trees; and it will be suited to our age to rest in them frequently, and by relieving each other during the conversation, to go in this way through the whole walk with ease.

Clin. There are indeed, guest, to a person as he goes on, in the groves cypress-trees of wondrous height and beauty, and meadows, in which while we rest, we may discourse.

Athen. Speak you correctly?

Clin. Entirely so; and we shall say so more, on seeing them. But let us go with a good fortune.

Athen. Be it so. But tell me, why has the law ordained for your joint-feasts gymnastic exercises and the handling of arms?

Clin. I conceive, O guest, that it is easy even for every one to apprehend these customs of ours. For you see that the nature of the whole country of Crete is not a plain, like that of Thessaly. On this account, they make use of horses more; but we of running. Now as this irregular [ground] is more adapted to the exercise of foot-races, it is necessary for a person in such a case to have light arms, and not to run holding what has a weight. Now the lightness of bows and arrows seems to be fitted (for this). All these therefore have been adopted by us in war; and all this has the legislator, as it appears to me, looking to this point, ordained; especially since he nearly seems to have instituted the joint feasts, through perceiving how all persons, when engaged in war, are then compelled by the thing itself, for the sake of their own defense, to feast I at that time together. In truth, he appears to me to have condemned the multitude of stupidity, for their not learning that there is constantly through life a war to all with all states. Now if during the time of war it was necessary to feast in common for the sake of defense, and for certain persons, both rulers and ruled, to be drawn up as their defenders, this should be done in the time of peace likewise. For that, which most men call peace, is only a name; but in reality there is a war, not proclaimed by a herald, according to nature, to all against all states. For by thus considering, you will almost discover, that the Cretan legislator has, looking to war, ordained for us all institutions both public and private, and ordered us to guard the laws in such a manner, as if nothing else were useful, either of possessions or pursuits, unless one became victorious in
war, and all the goods of the vanquished became the property of the victors.

Athen. You appear to me, O guest, to have been well practiced in seeing through the laws of Crete. But tell me still more clearly this. For by the definition you have laid down of a well-regulated state, you seem to me to say that one ought to administer it, so arranged in order, as to be victorious over the rest of states in war. Is it not so?

Clin. Just so; and I think it will seem so to this person here.

Megil. For how can any Lacedaemonian whatever, O thou divine man, answer otherwise?

Athen. Whether, then, is this right in the case of states towards states, but otherwise in the case of one village towards another?

Clin. By no means otherwise.

Athen. But it is the same?

Clin. Yes.

Athen. What then, is it the same in the case of one family towards another family, and in the case of one man towards another?

Clin. The same.

Athen. But in the case of a person towards himself, shall we consider him in that of an enemy towards an enemy? Or, how shall we say?

Clin. Athenian guest, for I am not willing to call you Attic, because you appear to me rather to deserve to be called after the name of the goddess Minerva, you have, by correctly carrying back the reasoning to its principle, made it clearer; so that you will more easily discover that it has just now been rightly said, that all persons are enemies to all, both publicly and privately, and each individual to himself.

Athen. How hast thou, O wonderful man, said this?

Clin. And these, too, guest; it is the first and best of all victories for a man to conquer himself; but to be vanquished by himself is of all things the most shameful and vile. For these words signify that there is a war in each of us against ourselves.

Athen. Let us then turn back our discourse. For, since each of us is one
better and another worse than himself, shall we say that a family, and a village, and a state, have this same thing in them, or not?

Clin. Do you mean that (one) is better than itself in some things, and the other worse?

Athen. Yes.

Clin. Concerning this too you have rightly inquired. For a thing of this kind occurs very and much, not the least in states. For, in the case of those, in which the better conquer the multitude and the worse, such a city would be correctly said to be better than itself, and be most justly praised for such a victory. But the contrary where the contrary (occurs).

Athen. Now the question, whether the worse is at any time more excellent than the better, let us lay aside; for it would be a long discussion; but for the present I understand what is asserted by you; that sometimes citizens of the same family and of the same city, being unjust and numerous, will, by coming together, forcibly attack the just, fewer in number, and enslave them; and that, when they conquer, the city may be justly said to be inferior to itself, and at the same time de praved; but, when they are conquered, better than itself, and good.

Clin. What is now said, guest, is very strange; but yet it is most necessary to confess it.

[ .] Athen. Hold then, and let us again consider this. Many brothers may surely be born from one man and from one (woman)! Nor is it at all wonderful that the greater part of them should be unjust, and the lesser just.

Clin. It is not.

Athen. Nor will it be proper for me and you to investigate this, that, when the base vanquish, both the family and every kind of relationship may be called inferior to themselves, but better than themselves, when the base are vanquished. For we do not investigate these things at present for the sake of some elegance or inelegance in words, according to the dis course of many, but for the sake of discovering what is a natural rectitude and error in the case of laws.

Clin. You speak most truly, O guest.

Megil. To me too so much appears to be well said.

Athen. Let us look into this likewise. Can any one become a judge of the
brothers just spoken of?

Clin. Doubtless.

Athen. Which then will be the better judge? He, who cuts off such of them as are bad, and orders the good to govern themselves? or he, who causes the good to govern, but suffers the bad to live, being willing to be governed? But let us mention a third judge, if such there be, with respect to virtue; who, receiving a single clan at difference with itself, will not destroy any person but, after having reconciled the parties, will lay down for them laws relating to each other, and be able so to guard them, that they may be on friendly terms.

Clin. Such a judge and legislator would be the better by far.

Athen. And he would frame laws for them, looking to a purpose contrary to war.

Clin. This indeed is true.

Athen. But what is he, who brings a state together? Would he, by looking to external war, better put in order its life than (by looking) to the wars produced constantly within itself, which is called sedition? which every one would particularly wish not to occur in his own state; and when it has occurred, to be released from it as quickly as possible?

Clin. (By looking), it is evident, to this (the latter).

Athen. Whether would any one choose that peace should result from sedition, through one party being destroyed, and the other victorious, or that, by peace and friendship resulting from a reconciliation, they should necessarily direct their attention to external wars?

Clin. Every one would rather wish it to happen to his own state in this way than in that.

Athen. Would not a legislator too in a similar manner?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Would not every one lay down all laws for the sake of that which is best?

Clin. How not?

Athen. But neither war nor sedition is the best of things, for to be in want
of these is a thing to be prayed for but peace with, and kindly feelings towards, each other. More over, for a state to vanquish itself, is not, it seems, one of the best, but of necessary things; just as if any one should think a body in sickness would, when meeting with medicinal cleansing, be then doing the best, but should pay no attention to the body, which needed (the cleansing) not at all. Should any one in like manner have his thoughts directed to the happiness of a state or an individual, he will never become correctly a statesman, while looking only and primarily to external war; nor will he be an accurate legislator, unless he lays down laws respecting war for the sake of peace, rather than laws respecting peace, for the sake of war.

Clin. This reasoning, guest, appears somehow to have been stated correctly. But still, I wonder whether the institutions existing with us, and still more those relating to Lacedaemon, have not given rise to all care for the sake of those things.

Athen. This may perhaps be the case. We ought not, however, to contest the matter at present in a harsh manner; but quietly to ask questions, as both we and they have especially an interest in things of this kind. Do ye then keep pace with my discourse. In the first place, we will place before you Tyrtasus who was by birth an Athenian, but afterwards a fellow-citizen with these persons here; and who has the most of all men been engaged on these points where he says, "I would not bear in recollection the man, nor hold him in any account, not though he were the most wealthy of men, and possessed many good things," and he enumerates nearly all, "who is not always the best in the affairs of war." For you have surely heard of his poetry. For this person here is, I think, saturated with them.

Megil. Entirely so.

Clin. And they have reached us likewise, having been brought from Lacedaemon.

Athen. Come then, let us interrogate in common this poet somehow in this fashion. Thou, most divine poet, Tyrtseus, for you appear to us to be wise and good, because you have celebrated excellently well those, who excel in war, and as myself, and this person here, and Clinias the Cnossian, hap pen, as we seem, to agree very much with you in this particular, we wish to know clearly, whether we are speaking about the same men or not, do tell us, whether you too think, as we do, that there are two kinds of war? Or how (say you)? To this I think that a man, much inferior to Tyrtseus, would say the truth, that there are two kinds; one, which we now call sedition, which is the most grievous of all wars, as we just now asserted; but the other kind of war, which we employ in our differences with those out of the state, and of a different tribe, we will lay down, as being milder than the other.
Clin. How not?

Athen. Come now, (inform us) what men, and for what kind of war, have you so transcendently praised (some)! and blamed others. For you appear to have praised those (engaged) in a foreign (war). For you have said in your poems thus that you by no means endure those,

Who dare not upon gory slaughter look,

Nor with the hand, close standing, clutch the foe.

Hence, as an inference, we should say that you, Tyrtseus, are praising, it seems, those, who have been eminently conspicuous in a foreign and external war. Surely he would say this and confess it.

Clin. How not?

Athen. But we, although these are good, assert that those are far better, who are conspicuously the best in the greatest war. We have too the poet Theognis as a witness, a citizen of Megara in Sicily, who says, The man, who, when the strife of party's.high, is faithful, is in gold and silver worth His weight.

Now, such a one we say is in a more difficult war altogether superior to the other, by nearly as much as justice, temperance, and prudence, when coming to the same point, are superior l to fortitude (by itself alone). For no one can be found faithful and sound in seditions, without the whole of virtue. But, as Tyrtaeus says, there are a great number of mercenaries who fight standing firmly with their legs apart, and die willingly in battle among whom are the most bold, and unjust, and insulting, and nearly the most thoughtless of all (men) except some very few. But to what does this story tend? And what did he wish to render clear, when he said this? It was evidently this above all; that both he, who laid down laws here from Zeus, and every one else, from whom there is even a little advantage, will lay down his laws, while always looking for the most part to nothing else than the greatest virtue. But it is, as Theognis says, a faithfulness in things of dread, which a person may denominate perfect justice; but that, which Tyrtaeus has praised so highly, is indeed beautiful, and opportunely celebrated by the poet, yet it may most rightly be called the fourth in number and in the power of being in honour.

Clin. Shall we, guest, throw our legislator away amongst the remote legislators?

Athen. Not (him) indeed, most excellent man, but our selves, should we imagine, that both Lycurgus and Minos laid down their laws in Lacedemon
Clin. What then, (and) how ought we to say?

Athen. As truth and justice, I think, require those to speak, who discourse about a divine (republic). Not looking to some part of virtue, and that the most trifling, but to the whole of virtue, he laid down, and according to their species to seek the laws, not what those seek who place species before those now for that, of which each person is in want, does he laying aside seek; one, the laws about inheritances; an other, those about sole heiresses; another, those about an assault; and others, about ten thousand other matters of a similar kind. But we assert that the inquiry about laws is the business of those, who properly inquire, as we have just now begun (to do). And I am in every way delighted with your attempt to give an explanation on the subject of laws. For it is right to begin from virtue, by asserting that for its sake a person has laid down laws. But when you said that the legislator had laid down all (laws) with reference to a part of virtue, and this too the least, you did not appear to me to speak correctly any longer; and on this account did I speak all this subsequent speech. Do you, then, wish me to say in what manner I am still willing for you to speak in detail, and myself to hear.

Clin. Entirely so, guest.

Athen. It is proper to assert that the laws of the Cretans are not vainly held in very great esteem by all the Greeks. For they are in a correct state by their making those, who use them, happy; for they impart every good. Now there are two kinds of good; one human, and the other divine; and the former hangs upon the divine; and if any state receives the greater, it possesses likewise the lesser; but if not, it is deprived of both. But the lesser are those, of which health is the leader, beauty the second in order, and strength for running, and all other movements of the body, the third; but the fourth is, Plutus, (wealth,) not blind indeed, but seeing acutely, if it follows prudence. Now that which is the first good (and) the leader of the divine, is prudence; but the second, after intellect, is a temperate habit of the soul; from these (two) mixed up with fortitude, the third in order will be justice; and the fourth, fortitude. Now all these are naturally arranged before those, and so must they be arranged by the lawgiver; and after these he must enjoin upon the citizens the other ordinances that look to these. But of these the human look to the divine, and all the divine to their leader intellect. I And he ought to have a care respecting marriages contracted by each other, and after these in the procreation and education of children, such as are male and female, and likewise of those still young, and of those advancing in years to old age, and to hold correctly in honour and dishonour; directing, in all the inter course of these persons, his attention to their pains, and pleasures, and desires, and eagerness in all
matters of love; and acting as a guard over them to blame and praise correctly through the laws themselves. In the case of anger and fear, and what perturbations soever in the soul arise through misfortune, and whatever escapes from them exist in prosperity; and whatever sufferings happen to men through disease, or wars, or poverty, or the contraries to these, in all such occasions he must teach and define what is beautiful, or not, in the arrangement of each. And after this, it is necessary for the legislator to watch over the property and expenditure of the citizens, in whatever way it may take place, and the unions with and separations from each other in all persons (acting) with their free will or without it; and to have an eye to what is just or not, and in what things it exists or is wanting, and to distribute honours to those who obey the laws, but to inflict upon those, who do not obey, punishments ordained (by law); until, having reached the end of all polity, he shall perceive in what manner it is meet for the burial of the dead to take place, and what honours to pay to them. And after perceive in, he who has laid down the laws shall place over them all, as guardians, some persons on account of their prudence, and some who have gone through a truthful reputation; so that intellect, binding all these together, may exhibit them as following temperance and justice, and not riches or ambition. In this manner, guests, I did wish, and still do wish now, that you would explain how all these particulars exist in the laws said to be from Zeus, and in those of the Pythian Apollo, which both Minos and Lycurgus laid down; and how, after they have assumed a certain order, they become evident to a person skilled in the business of law, either through art or certain customs; while to us, the rest of mankind, they are by no means apparent.

Clin. How then, guest, ought we to speak of what comes after these?

Athen. It appears to me that we ought to go through again from the beginning, as we have begun (in part), in the first place, the pursuits of fortitude; and afterwards we will go through another species of virtue, and again another, if you are willing; and that we may go through the first subject, we will endeavour, by laying down a pattern, and conversing about the others in this way, to make for ourselves a beguilement of the road; and afterwards we will show, if god is willing, that the things relating to the whole of virtue look thitherward.

Clin. You speak well. Endeavour then, in the first place, to sift for us this praiser of Zeus.

Athen. I will endeavour likewise (to sift) both you and my self. For the discourse is common. Speak therefore. Shall we say that the joint-feasts and gymnastic exercises were invented by the lawgiver for the purposes of war?
Megil. Yes.

Athen. And that a third or fourth thing (was invented)? For perhaps it is necessary for a person thus to make an enumeration respecting those of the rest of virtue, whether it is right to call them of parts, or any thing whatever, only showing clearly what he means.

Megil The third thing, as I and any Lacedaemonian what ever likewise would say, he discovered was hunting. And a fourth, and even a fifth, thing let us try, if we can, to mention. I then would endeavour to mention the fourth thing, namely, that which takes place to a great extent with us, in the endurance of pain, which occurs constantly in fighting with hands against each other, and in certain snatchings in the midst of many blows. There is, moreover, what is called a concealment, wonderfully laborious as regards endurance (of pain); and the being in winter without shoes and without a bed, and waiting without servants upon themselves, while wandering night and day through the whole country. Still further, in the exercises of naked persons, there is a severe endurance amongst us when contending with the violence of intense heat; and there are very many other things '(of this kind), in detailing which a person would nearly never cease.

Athen. You speak well, O Lacedaemonian guest. But come, whether shall we put down fortitude as a contest merely with fears and pains? or with desires likewise and pleasures, and certain vehement fawnings of flattery, which soften the minds of those, who deem themselves objects of worship, and mould them like wax?

Megil. I think thus, (that it is) a contest with all these.

Athen, If then we call to mind the previous discourse, this person here said, that both a state is inferior in some things to itself, and a man (to himself). Was it not so, Cnossian guest?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Now then, whether shall we call him the inferior, who is subdued by pain, or him rather, who is subdued by pleasure?

Clin. Him, it appears to me, who is subdued by pleasure. And surely we all much rather say that he, who is vanquished by pleasures, is disgracefully inferior to himself, than he, who (is vanquished) by pains.

Athen. Surely the legislator through Zeus and he through Apollo did not lay down by law that fortitude is lame, and able to march against things only on its left hand, but unable (to do so) against elegancies and flatteries on its right hand? or (is it able to march against) both?
Clin. Against both, I think.

Athen. Let us, then, mention again what those pursuits are, in both of your states, which give a taste of pleasures, and do not avoid them in the same manner, as they do not avoid pain, but bring persons into the midst of them, (pleasures,) and induce them, partly by force, and partly by honours, to vanquish them. Now where is the same thing ordained in your laws respecting pleasures (as respecting pains)? Let it be stated, what is that, which in your case causes the same per sons to be similarly brave, both with respect to pain and pleasures, while they are victorious over those things, in which they ought to be victorious, and to be by no means inferior to enemies the nearest to them and the most difficult (to contend with).

Megil. In the same manner, O guest, as I had the power to mention many laws opposed to pains, I should not thus perhaps possess the means of speaking about pleasures according to their great and conspicuous parts; but according to their small I might perhaps have the means.

Clin. Nor should I be able myself to do anything of this kind clearly in the case of the laws of Crete.

Athen. This, ye best of guests, is by no means wonderful. But should any one of us, who is desirous of seeing what is true, and at the same time the best, find fault with any thing in the laws of our respective countries, let us receive (the words) I from each other not harshly, but with mildness.

Clin. You speak well, O Athenian guest; and we must obey you.

Athen. For no other conduct than this would become men of our age.

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. Whether then a person finds fault rightly or not with the Laconian and Cretan polity, is another question. But perhaps I can better tell what is said by the multitude than either of you can. For although the laws are regulated even moderately well, yet there would be with you one law the most beautiful, not to permit any youth to inquire which laws are well ’or ill established, but (to ordain) all to proclaim, with one voice, and with one mouth, that they are all beautifully laid down, since the gods were the parties who gave them; and that, if any one says otherwise, persons should not endure to hearken to him: and that if any old man has any thoughts respecting them, he shall place his reasons before a ruler and his equals in age, but not in the presence of a young man.

Clin. You speak most properly, O guest: and, like a seer, although you were absent from the then thoughts of the party who laid them down, yet you
appear to me to have made a conjecture reasonably correct, and to have spoken what is very true.

Athen. There is then a freedom now from the presence of young men; but we, on account of our old age, are permitted by the lawgiver to speak about the laws among our selves, without doing any wrong.

Clin. Such is the case. Do not then be remiss at all in reproving our laws. For it is not dishonourable to know aught of what is not beautiful; but by this means it happens that a remedy exists to a party receiving what is said with not an envious feeling, but with a good will.

[ . ] Athen. (You speak) correctly. I shall not however speak in reprehension of the laws before diligently considering them to the utmost of my power; or rather, (I shall speak) doubtingly. For upon you alone of all the Greeks and Barbarians, of whom we hear, the legislator has enjoined to abstain from the greatest pleasures and sports, and not to taste them; but on the question of pains and fears, which we have lately dis cussed, he was of opinion, that if any one should avoid them thoroughly from his infancy, he would, when he came to endure necessary labours, and fears, and pains, avoid those, who are exercised in them, and would become their slave. The same lawgiver ought, I think, to have thought the same respecting pleasures, and to have said to himself that, if the citizens shall from childhood be inexperienced in the greatest pleasures, and be unpracticed in bearing up against pleasures, so as I not to be compelled to do any thing base for the sake of the sweetness arising from pleasure, they would suffer the same as those, who are vanquished by fear, and become the slaves in a different and still baser manner to those, who are able to bear up against pleasures, and are the masters of what relate to pleasures, although they are sometimes the worst of men; and they would have their soul partly a slave, and partly free, and be unworthy to be called wholly brave and free. Consider therefore whether aught of what has been now said appears to you to be according to reason.

Clin. It appears so to us somehow, on the speech being spoken. But immediately (and) readily to be confident about questions of such moment would be the act rather of young and senseless persons.

Athen. But if, O Clinias and Lacedaemonian guest, we discuss some one point of those, which we proposed for after fortitude let us speak of temperance what difference shall we find between these polities and those, which are laid down at random, as the things relating to war just now?

Megil. It is nearly not easy. But it seems that the joint feasts and gymnastic exercises have been well invented for both.
Athen. It appears then, O guest, to be a difficult thing for what is incontestable on the question of polities to exist in deed as well as in word. For it seems almost that, as in the case of bodies, it is not possible to order any one regimen for any one body, because the very same thing would be seen to do an injury to some of our bodies, and a benefit to others, (so too in a state); since these gymnastic exercises and joint feasts are on many other grounds now beneficial to states, but in seditions are hurtful. This do the children of the Milesians and Boeotians and Thurians make evident. And in truth this very institution, legalized of old, appears to have perverted the natural pleasures of Venus, not only in the case of men, but of beasts. And of such things a person may accuse your cities the first, and such others, as have chiefly adopted gymnastic exercises. And whether one ought to consider things of this kind in a jocose or serious manner, still we must consider that, to the male and female sex, proceeding to a participation in production, the pleasure arising from the act seems to have been imparted according to nature; but, that the copulation of males with males, or of females with females, is contrary to nature; and that the daring attempt of those who first did so, arose from the non-mastery over pleasure. We all of us indeed bring an accusation against the Cretans, as having invented the story respecting the fable of Ganymede. (For), since their laws are believed by them to have been from Zeus, they have put together this fable against Zeus, in order that they may enjoy this pleasure, by following forsooth the example of the god. But let us bid farewell to the fable; but of those, who direct their attention to laws, nearly the whole consideration is with regard to pleasure and pain, in the case of states and the morals of individuals. For these two fountains are permitted to flow by nature; from which he who draws at what place and at what time and what quantity he ought, is happy; and so is a state, and an individual, and every animal: but he, (who draws) unskillfully and at an improper time, will live in a manner the contrary to that person.

BOOK II.

Athen. AFTER this, it appears, that point must be considered respecting them, whether this alone has a good, namely, to see how we possess our natures, or whether some greatness of advantage likewise, that deserves much care, is inherent in the proper use of wine-parties. What then do we assert? It is inherent, as our reasoning seems "desirous to point out. But when, and how, let us hear by giving our attention, lest per adventure we are shackled by it.

Clin. Speak then.

Athen. I am desirous therefore of again recalling to memory what we stated a correct education to be. For its preservation, as I now conjecture, consists in this employment being properly directed.
Clin. You speak largely.

At/ten. I say then, that the first "puerile" perception of children is pleasure and pain; and that these two exist in those, to whose soul vice and virtue are present for the first time. But (as to) reflection and opinions true (and) firm, that man is happy to whom they are present even to old age. And that man is perfect, who possesses these and all the goods in them. Now I call the virtue, which is first present to children, education; but should pleasure, and friendship, and pain, and hatred be correctly produced in the soul of those not yet able to understand a reason; but of those, who have understood reason, should they agree with the reason, to have been correctly accustomed by fitting customs. This very consent is the whole of virtue; but its proper nurture is relating to pleasures and pains, so as to hate what it ought to hate, immediately from the beginning to the end, and to love what it ought to love, after having cut off this very thing by reason, and calling it education, you would according to my (mind) rightly call it.

Clin. Both formerly, guest, and likewise now it seems to have been correctly spoken by you on the subject of education.

Athen. Correctly indeed. For of these pleasures and pains, after having been rightly brought up by existing education, the greater part is relaxed and corrupted by men during life; but the gods, pitying the naturally laborious race of man, have ordained for it, as remissions from labour, the returns of feast-days in honour of the gods, and have given the Muses, and Apollo, the leader of the Muses, and Dionysus, as fellow-feasters, in order that they may correct the nurture that has taken place in the feasts with the gods. It is meet then to see whether the account is hymned by us truly according to nature, or how? For it says that the whole, so to speak, of youth is unable to keep quiet in its body and voice, but is ever seeking to be moved and to speak, at one time leaping and skipping, as if dancing with joy and full of fun, at another uttering all kinds of sounds; and that the rest of animals have no perception of either order or disorder in their movements, to which is given the name of rhythm and harmony; but that the gods, whom we have said were given to us as fellow-choristers, have given to us the perception likewise of what is in rhythm and in harmony in combination with pleasure, by which they excite us and lead the dance, uniting us with each other by means of songs and dances, and given the name of dance from the inherent name of pleasure. Shall we then in the first place receive this? Shall we lay down that the first education was through the Muses and Apollo? or how?

Clin. Thus.

Athen. He therefore, who is uneducated, will be with us one, who has not joined a choir; but him, who has been educated, we must lay down as one, who has sufficiently engaged in a choir.
Clin, Certainly.

Athen. But a choir, as a whole, is dancing and singing.

Clin. It is necessarily so.

Athen. He then, who is properly educated, would be able to sing and dance well.

Clin. It seems so.

Athen. Let us see then what has been now asserted.

Clin. What is that?

Athen. (A person), we have said, sings well and dances well. Whether shall we add that he does so, if he sings what is beautiful and dances what is beautiful, or not?

Clin. Let us add it.

Athen. What then, should a person consider things beautiful, as beautiful, and things base, as base, and use them as such, will such a one be better educated for us, with respect to dancing and music, who may be sufficiently able to minister to the body and voice what is considered beautiful, but yet does not rejoice in things beautiful, nor hate such as are void of beauty? Or he, who, though he is not altogether able to act or think rightly, with respect to his voice and body, yet acts rightly with respect to pleasure and pain, embracing such things as are beautiful, and feeling a disgust at such as are not beautiful?

Clin. You are speaking, guest, of a great difference of education.

Athen. If, then, we three know what is beautiful in singing and dancing, we likewise know correctly the person educated or not educated: but, if we are ignorant of this, we shall not be able to know if there is, and where, a guard of education. Is it not this?

Clin. It is thus.

Athen. We must then in the next place, like dogs on the track, seek out what is beautiful in form, and melody, and singing, and dancing. But if these shall escape us and get away, our discourse about proper education, whether Grecian or Barbarian, will hereafter be in vain.

Clin. Truly so.
Athen. Be it so. What forms then, or melody, is it proper to call the beautiful? Shall we say that the form and the voice of a brave and a timid soul, held fast by the same and equal labours, are similar?

Ciin. How (similar), since neither are their colours?

Athen. Well (said), my friend. But in music there are both forms and melody, since music is conversant with rhythm and harmony; so that it is possible for a person, making use of a resemblance, as the chorus-teachers do, to speak correctly of a melody or form as being in good rhythm or in good harmony, but not as being of a good colour. Now of a timid, and of a brave man, there is a certain form or melody; and (one) has the power to call those properties of brave men, beautiful, but of timid, ugly. And that there may not be to us a great prolixity respecting these matters, let all the beautiful forms and melodies connected with the soul or body be all abstractedly the property of virtue, either of itself or of some image of it; but of vice on the other hand, all that is of a contrary kind.

Clin. You correctly make a call upon me; and let it be decided, for the present, that such is the state of the case.

Athen. But (let us consider) still further this; whether all of us are similarly delighted with all dancing, or it wants much of such being the case?

Clin. It wants it entirely.

Athen. What then shall we say is that, which has caused us to err? Is it because the same things are not beautiful to all of us? Or that some are, but do not appear to be the same? For surely no one will say that the choric movements of vice are more beautiful than those of virtue; or that he is delighted himself with the forms of depravity, but others with music, the contrary to this. And yet the majority assert, that the correctness of music consists in the power which imparts pleasure to the soul. But this is not to be endured, nor is it holy to speak so at all. But this more probably causes us to err.

Clin. What?

Athen. Since the things relating to choric movements are the imitations of manners, that take place in all kinds of actions, and fortunes, and morals, and imitations, each going through. For those then, to whom is suited what is said, or sung, or danced, according to nature or custom, or both, it is necessary to rejoice in and praise those acts, and to call them beautiful; but for those, to whom they are contrary to nature, or manners, or custom, it is possible neither to rejoice in nor praise them, but to call them base. And they, to whom the things of nature happen to be right, but the things of
custom the contrary, or the things of custom right, but the things of
nature the contrary, address their praises contrary to pleasures. For they
say that each of these is pleasant, but wrong; and in the presence of
others, whom they consider to be intellectual, they are ashamed for such
movements to take place in their body, and ashamed to sing! as if making a
display with seriousness of things beautiful; but by themselves they are
delighted with them.

Clin. You speak most correctly.

Athen. Does something then bring any injury to him, who is delighted with the
forms or melodies of depravity? or an advantage on the other hand to
those, who are pleased with the contraries to these?

Clin. It is probable.

Athen. Is it probable, or is it necessary also, for the same thing to take
place, as when any one, associating with the depraved habits of depraved
men, does not hate, but rejoices in and admits them; and yet blames his own
depravity in the way of fun, as if he were in a dream. Surely at that time it
is necessary for the party rejoicing to be assimilated to the things in which
he rejoices, even though he is ashamed to praise them. And yet what
greater good, or evil, can we say, would of every necessity happen to us
than a thing of this kind?

Clin. I think, none.

Athen. But where laws are beautifully established, or will be at some future
period of time, can we think that the instruction touching the Muses and
amusement, will be in the power of poets, so that, whatever delights a poet
in composition, or what is connected with rhythm, or melody, or verse, he
can, by teaching it to the children of the well-regulated, and to young men
formed into choirs, work out whatever may happen with respect to virtue
and depravity?

Clin. This has no particle of reason; for how could it?

Athen. But, now it is in their power to do so in all states, so to say, except
in Egypt.

Clin. But how say you that a thing of this kind has been established by law in
Egypt?

Athen. It is wonderful even to hear. For, as it seems, this doctrine, of which
we are now speaking, has been known of old amongst them, that young men
in cities should be accustomed to occupy themselves with beautiful forms
and beautiful melodies. And after regulating these, as to what they are, and of what kind they may be, they exhibit them in their temples; and except these it is not lawful either for painters or others, who work out forms, and whatever else there may be, to introduce any novelty, or even to think of any other than those of the country; nor is it lawful at present to do this, either in these particulars or in the whole of music; and you will, by observing, discover, that what have been painted and sculptured there ten thousand years ago, I and I say ten thou sand, not as a word, but a fact, I are neither more beautiful, nor more ugly, than those turned out of hand at the present day, but are worked off according to the same art.

Clin. You say what is wonderful.

Athen. It is, however, a matter relating pre-eminently to law and politics. But you would find other things there of a trifling kind. But this respecting music is true, and worthy of consideration, that it was possible for a law-giver upon these points to lay down firmly and with confidence melodies, possessing correctness naturally. But this would be the work of a deity, or of some divine person; as they say there, that the melodies, which have been preserved for such a length of time, are the production of Isis. So that, as I said, if any one is able to understand their correctness ever so little, he ought with confidence to reduce them to law and order. Since the search after pleasure and pain does, through the seeking perpetually to make use of new music, possess scarcely no great power towards corrupting the consecrated dancing, by finding fault with its antiquity. The dancing there at least it does not seem to have been able to corrupt, but the contrary has been entirely the case.

Clin. It appears from what has been just now stated, that it would be so.

Athen. Shall we not then confidently assert that there is in music and sport together with dancing a correct use in some such manner as this? We are glad, when we think we are doing well; and, when we are glad, think on the other hand we are doing well? Is it not so?

Clin. It is so.

Athen. And at such a time in our gladness we are unable to keep quiet.

Clin. It is so.

Athen. Are not then the young amongst us ready to dance? and do not we their elders think we conduct ourselves properly in looking upon them, while we take a delight in their sports and revelry, since elasticity fails us at our time of life, which regretting and loving we thus establish games for those, who are able in the highest degree to carry us by the aid of memory to our
youth.

Clin. Most true.

Athen. Do we then think that the majority give really in vain the account now told of those who celebrate festivals, that it is meet to consider him the wisest, and to decide that he is the victor, who causes us to be delighted and to rejoice in the greatest degree? For since we are permitted to play at this period, it is surely meet, for him, who causes the most in number to be glad in the highest degree, to be honoured the most; and, as I just now said, to bear off the prize of victory. Is not this rightly said? and would it not be (rightly) done, if it took place in this way?

Clin. Perhaps so.

Athen. But, O blessed man, let us not hastily decide upon a matter of this kind; but, dividing it into parts, let us consider it in some such manner as this. If any one should at any time simply establish a certain game but without defining whether it is gymnastic, or musical, or equestrian and, collecting together all those in the city, should make a proclamation, after laying down the prizes of victory, for any one who wished to come and enter the contest for pleasure alone, and that he, who should delight the spectators the most, without receiving any order as to the manner (of contending), I and be victorious in effecting this very thing in the greatest degree possible, and should be adjudged to be the most agreeable of all the competitors, what do we think would result from this proclamation?

Clin. Of what are you speaking?

Athen. It is surely likely that one would exhibit, like Homer, a rhapsody, another guitar-playing; one a tragedy, and some again a comedy. Nor would it be wonderful, if some one, by exhibiting things of wonder, should think that he is especially the victor. Now when these and other competitors without number come together, can we say which of them would justly be the victor?

Clin. You ask an absurd question. For who can answer you on this point, as if he were cognizant of it, before hearing and being himself a hearer of each of the champions?

Athen. What then, are you willing for me to reply to this absurd question?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Now if very little children were to decide, they would decide that he who had exhibited the things of wonder, (was the victor over the others). Is it not so?
Clin. How not?

Athen. But if greater boys (were to decide, they would decide in favour of the party exhibiting) comedies; but the women, who are better educated, and the young men, and perhaps nearly the whole multitude, (would decide in favour of the party exhibiting) a tragedy.

Clin. Perhaps so.

Athen. But perhaps we old men would hear with the greatest delight the rhapsodist, when stringing together in a beautiful manner the Iliad and Odyssey, or some of the works of Hesiod, and say that he was very far the victor. Who then would be rightly the victor? This (must be stated) after these.

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. It is evident that it is necessary for me and you to say that those are properly the victors, who are judged so by persons of our age; for habit seems to us to be by far the best of things at present which are in all states and every where.

Clin. How not?

[ . ] Athen. I grant then thus much to the many, that music ought to be judged of by pleasure, yet not by that of any person one meets with, but that that is nearly the most beautiful music, which delights the best of men, and such as are sufficiently educated; but especially, that which delights one person, who excels in virtue and education. On this account we say that the judges of these things stand in need of virtue; because they ought to be partakers of the rest of prudence and fortitude. For a true judge ought not to learn how to judge from a theatre, being stupefied by the clamours of the multitude, and by his own ignorance; nor on the other hand, while knowing (something), ought lie through unmanliness and cowardice to give from the same mouth, with which when about to judge, he called upon the gods, a decision containing a falsehood, with an easy disposition. For a judge does not sit as the disciple, but, as is just, the teacher rather of the spectators, and as about to oppose himself to those, who do not afford pleasure fitly and properly to the spectators. For by the old law of Greece, it was permitted (to do), what the law of Sicily and Italy (permits) at present; (which) by leaving to the mass of spectators to decide, by the holding up of hands, upon the victor, has corrupted the poets themselves; for they write according to the depraved pleasure of their judges; so that the spectators instruct themselves; and it has corrupted likewise the pleasures of the theatre. For while it is meet that the spectators should, by always hearing of manners better than their own, have a superior pleasure, it happens now
that they do quite the contrary. What then do the matters discussed in the present discourse intend to point out? Consider whether it is this.

Clin. What?

Athen. The reasoning appears to me, after making a third or fourth revolution, to come to the same point that education is the drawing and leading of youth to that, which is called by the law right reason, and which has been decreed by the most reasonable and oldest men through their experience to be really correct. In order then that the soul of a youth may be accustomed not to feel joy or sorrow in things contrary to the law, and to those that are recommended ' by law, but follow in joy and in sorrow after the same things as those which an old man does, for the sake of this, the compositions which we call odes, and which are truly incantations for the soul, are (said) to have been produced, having been carefully adapted to that kind of symphony, of which we are speaking; but on account of the soul of children not being able to bear a serious pursuit, sports and (other) odes (are said) to be played on the pipe and executed. Just as in the case of persons who are sick and have their bodies in a weak state, they, who have the care of them, endeavour to bring useful food in pleasant meats and drinks; but that, which is annoying, in such as are bitter, in order that they may receive kindly the one, and be accustomed to reject rightly the other. In the same way a correct lawgiver will by words fairly spoken and to be praised, persuade, or, not persuading, compel, the poet to present correctly the attributes of men, temperate, and brave, and good in every way, by composing his forms in rhythm, and his melodies in harmony.

Clin. Do persons, by Zeus, seem to you, O guest, to act thus at present in other states? For, as far as I hear, what you are now speaking of I do not know to be done except by us and the Lacedaemonians; but there are certain novelties ever taking place in dancing, and all the rest of music, and changes not through law, but some inordinate pleasures, which are very far from being the same, and in the same manner, as you have said occur in Egypt, but never belong to the same.

Athen. Most excellent, O Clinias! But if I have appeared to you, as you say, to speak of these things as existing at present, I should not wonder, if I have done this through my not clearly stating my meaning. But as to what I mean as taking place with respect to music, perhaps I have spoken of it in such a way as to seem to you to speak of it. For to abuse things which are incurable, and far advanced in error, is by no means agreeable, although it is necessary sometimes. But since the same things appear good to you likewise, come, tell me, do such kind of things exist amongst you and these here, more than amongst the other Greeks?

Clin. How not?
Athen. But if they thus existed amongst others likewise, should we say that they would thus be better than they now are?

Clin. By far better, if they subsisted, as they do amongst these here and with us, and as you just now said they ought to subsist.

Athen. Come then, (say,) should we agree for the present, are the things mentioned by you in every kind of education and music these? Do you compel poets to assert that a good man, if he is temperate and just, is fortunate and happy, and if he is a big man and strong, and if little and weak, and if rich or not? and that, although he is richer than both Cinyras and Midas, but unjust, he is miserable, and lives in sorrow, and, as the poet says, if he says rightly, "I would not mention nor place in account as a man" him, who does not perform all that is called beautiful with justice, and possess it likewise. For being such a one he will stand near and grapple with the foe; but he, who is unjust, will neither dare to look upon gory slaughter, nor will he vanquish in running the Thracian Boreas, nor will there ever be to him any other of the things called good. For what are called good by the many, are not rightly called so. For it is said that health is the best thing; beauty the next; strength the third; and riches the fourth; and numberless other things are called good. Thus, to see and hear acutely, and to possess with a clear perception all that is connected with the senses; and further, to do like a tyrant whatever you wish; and, what is said to be the completion of all happiness, to become, after possessing all these, as quickly as possible, immortal. But you and I surely say that all these are the best possessions for just and holy men; but for the unjust, all the worst, beginning from health. (For to be well), to see, hear, and possess the (other) senses, and, in short, to live, is the greatest evil, when a man is immortal [through the whole of time], and possesses all that is called good, except justice and all virtue; but it is a less evil, should such a person survive for the shortest time. In this manner, I think, you will persuade, and, as I said, compel the poets with you to speak; and moreover, that persons who follow them should, by giving out rhythms and harmonies, thus educate your young men? Is it not so? Look, then. For I clearly assert, that the things that are called evil, are good to the unjust, but to the just, are evil; but that things good are to the good truly good, but evil to the wicked. In what then, I asked, do you and I agree, or how?

Clin. We appear (to agree) in some things, but not in others.

Athen. Is it then in the case of a person possessing health, and wealth, and despotic power completely, and, I add further, superior strength and bravery, together with immortality, and to whom there is none else of the things called evil, but who has only injustice and insolence in his own person, that I do not perhaps persuade you that the person so living is not only not fortunate, but that he is clearly wretched?
Clin. You speak most truly.

Athen. Be it so. What then ought we to say after this? For if he is brave, and strong, and beautiful, and rich, and does through the whole of life whatever he wishes, does it not necessarily appear to you, that if he is unjust and insolent, he will live in a shameful manner?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. What then, and wickedly too?

Clin. This (does) not (seem) equally.

Athen. What then, (would he not do so) unpleasantly, and not conducing to his own interest?

Clin. How can we admit this too?

Athen. How? If, as it seems, some god, my friends, should grant us to agree, as we now nearly dissent from each other. For these things appear to me as necessary, as it is not even for Crete, friend Clinias, to be clearly an island. And if I were a legislator, I would endeavour to compel both the poets and all persons in the state to speak in this manner; and I would impose nearly the greatest of punishments, should any one in the land assert that there are certain wicked men, who lead a pleasant life; or that some things are more advantageous and lucrative, but others more just. And I would persuade my citizens to assert many other things, contrary to what are now advanced, it seems, by the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and, differing from the rest of mankind. For come, by Zeus and Apollo, (say) ye best of men, if we asked the very gods, who laid down laws for us, whether the most just is the most pleasant life, or whether there are some two lives, of which one is the most pleasant, and the other the most just? and if they should say there are two, we should perhaps ask them again, if we inquired properly, Whom ought we to call the most happy, those, who lead the most just life, or those, who lead the most pleasant one? Now, should they say those, who lead the most pleasant life, their answer would be absurd. But I am desirous that an expression of this kind should not be said of the gods, but of fathers and lawgivers rather. Let then the question previously put be asked of a father and a lawgiver, and let him say that he, who lives the most pleasant life, is the most happy. After this, I would say thus Have you not, father, wished me to live most happily? And yet you have never ceased exhorting me to live most justly. He, then, who lays down I in this manner, whether he is a legislator or a father, would, I think, appear absurd, and unable to speak consistently with himself. But if he should, on the other hand, proclaim that the most just life is the most happy, every one, perchance, who hears him, would, I think, inquire What is it, which the law praises in that life as good
and beautiful, and better than pleasure? For what good, separate from pleasure, can there be to a just man? Come, (tell me,) is renown and praise from both men and gods a thing good and beautiful, but at the same time unpleasant? and infamy the contrary? We shall say By no means, O thou dear lawgiver. But neither to do any one an injury, nor to be injured by any one, is it unpleasant, but at the same time good and beautiful? And are the other things pleasant, but shameful and base?

Clin. How can they be?

Athen. The reason, then, which does not separate the pleasant and the just, and the good and the beautiful, is persuasive, if towards nothing else, yet at least towards the wish to live a holy and a just life; so that the language of the law giver will be most disgraceful and opposed (to itself) should one deny that these things are so. For no one will voluntarily wish to be persuaded to do that, on which joy does not follow more than sorrow. But that which is seen from a distance produces upon all, so to say, and especially upon boys, a haziness. But the lawgiver, by dispersing the mist, will establish for us an opinion the contrary to this; and he will persuade the citizens, somehow or other, by customs, and praises, and arguments, that things just and unjust are both painted with shadow-lines; 'that things unjust, appearing contrariwise to that of the just, being viewed by the unjust and depraved man himself, pleasant; but things just, most unpleasant; but by the just man, all the contrary to every one as regards both.

Clin. It appears so.

Athen. But which shall we say is the more decisive truth of judgment? is it that of the worse soul, or the better?

Clin. Necessarily the better.

Athen. It is necessary then that an unjust life should not only be more base and depraved, but, in truth, more unpleasant than a just and holy life.

Clin. It appears nearly so, my friends, according to the present reasoning.

Athen. Would then a legislator, from whom there is even a little benefit, although the fact were not so, as the reasoning has detected it to be, dare, if there were any thing else, to tell an untruth to young persons for their good? knowing that he never would have told a falsehood more advantageous than this, and more able to cause them to do all just things, not by force, but willingly.

Clin. Truth is indeed, O guest, a beautiful thing, and stable. It does not however appear an easy thing to persuade.
Athen. Be it so. And yet that fabulous tale of the Sidonian, although improbable, has been easy to persuade, and numberless others (likewise).

Clin. What fable?

Athen. That, teeth having been sown at one time, armed men were produced from them. Now this is a great example to a lawgiver, that he will persuade the souls of young men to whatever a person may attempt to persuade; so that he ought by considering to find out nothing else, than by persuading to what he may work out the greatest good to a state; and for this to discover every contrivance, after what manner the whole of such fellow-dwellers may speak as much as possible one and the same thing on these points, continually through the whole of life, in odes, and fables, and rational discourses. (So I think). But if it appears to you to be otherwise than in this way, there will be no grudging about contesting these points in our discourse.

Clin. It does not appear to me that either of us can contest them.

Athen. It shall then be my business to speak after this. For I assert, that it is necessary for the choirs, being three, to bring all together an enchantment upon the still young and tender souls of boys, and to say all the other beautiful things we have discussed, and shall still discuss. And let this be the sum of them. By saying that the same life has been pronounced by the gods to be the most pleasant, and the best, we shall, at the same time, speak with the greatest truth, and more persuade those, whom we ought to persuade, than if we assert any thing else.

Clin. We must agree to what you say.

Athen. In the first place then, the boy-choir of the Muses would most correctly enter the first, about to sing in public subjects of this kind, with all earnestness, and for the whole city. And let the second be the choir (of men) up to thirty years old calling upon the god Paean, as a witness in behalf of the truth of what is said, and praying him to be, together with Persuasion, propitious to the youth. And it is necessary for the third to sing, consisting of those who are above thirty, and up to sixty years old; but those after that period for they are no longer able to endure singing I am left as the tellers of stories relating to the same habits through a divine oracle.

Clin. Who do you mean, guest, by these third choirs? for I do not clearly understand what you mean to say about them.

Athen. And yet these are nearly the parties, for whose sake most of the above assertions were made.
Clin. We do not yet understand. But endeavour to speak still more clearly.

Athen. We said, if we remember, at the beginning of our discourse, that the nature of all young persons was fiery, and unable to keep quiet either in body or voice, but that it was always speaking without order, and leaping; and that of the rest of animals not one had a sense of order in both of these things, but that the nature of man alone possessed it; and that rhythm was the name given to the order of motion, but to that of the voice, when the acute and the grave are mingled together, the name of harmony was addressed; ' and that both together are called a choir. We said too that the gods in pity have given us Apollo and the Muses as our associates in, and leaders of, the choir; and we mentioned, if we re collect, Dionysus as the third.

Clin. How do we not remember?

Athen. Now the choir of Apollo and the Muses have been mentioned; and it is necessary for the third and remaining choir of Bacchus to be spoken of.

Clin. How so? Say on. For to a person hearing on a sudden a choir of old men in honour of Dionysus it would seem very absurd, if persons, who have been born above thirty and fifty and up to sixty years old, were to join in the dance for that god.

Athen. You speak most truly. But I think there is need of a reason on these points, to show how this, taking place thus, may take place rationally.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Are then the previous points agreed upon?

Clin. Respecting what?

Athen. That every man and boy, freeman and slave, female and male, and the whole city itself, should never cease singing for the whole city what we have gone through, yet changed perpetually in some manner, and exhibiting altogether a variety, so that there may be to the singers no satiety of hymns and pleasure.

Clin. How should it be not agreed that this ought to be done?

Athen. Where then will the best part of the city, and which by its age together with intellect is the most persuasive of those in the state, effect the greatest good by singing the most beautiful subjects? or shall we thus thoughtlessly omit that, which would be the chief object of songs, the most beautiful and the most useful?
Clin. But it is impossible to omit it, as has been just now said.

Athen. How then would it be proper (to do) this? Consider, if it is in this way.

Clin. In what way?

Athen. Every one on becoming rather old, is full of hesitation with respect to songs, and is less delighted in doing this; and when a necessity arises, is the more ashamed by how much the older and more modest he is. Is it not so?

Clin. It is so.

Athen. He will therefore be still more ashamed to stand up and sing in the theatre, and amongst persons of all kinds; and this too, if like the choirs that, contending for victory, are compelled, after practicing their voices, to sing lean and fasting, such persons should, by singing altogether in a manner unpleasant to themselves and with feelings of shame, perform without readiness their part.

Clin. You speak of what is most necessary (to happen).

Athen. How then shall we soothe them into being ready for singing? Shall we not lay down a law, in the first place, that boys shall not taste wine at all, until they are eighteen years old? (thus) teaching them, that it is not proper to bring by a funnel fire to fire, into the body and soul, before they attempt to proceed to labours, (and) exercising a caution about the mad-like habit of young persons; but afterwards to taste indeed wine in moderation, until they are thirty years old; but that a young man is by all means to keep himself from intoxication and much wine; but on reaching forty years, to indulge freely in convivial meetings, and to call upon the other gods, and especially to invite Dionysus to the mystic rites and sports of old men, in which he kindly bestowed wine upon man as a remedy against the austerity of old age, so that through this we might grow young again, and that, by a forgetfulness! of heart-sinking, the habit of the soul might become from a harder state more soft, just as iron becomes, when it is placed in the fire, and moulded thus more readily. In the first place then, will not each person, who is thus affected, be willing with more readiness (and) with less shame, not indeed amongst many, but a moderate number, nor amongst strangers, but familiar friends, to sing, and, as we have often said, to join in a song?

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. To lead them then to join with us in singing, this method will not be altogether unseemly.

Clin. By no means.
Athen. But what voice, and what music, will these men pour forth? Or is it not evident that it must needs be some one becoming to them?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Now what will be becoming to divine men? Will it not be that of choirs?

Clin. We indeed, guest, and these here, would not be able to sing any other song, than what we have learnt in the choirs, and have been accustomed to sing.

Athen. And reasonably so. For you have not in reality hit upon the most beautiful singing. For you have the polity of an army, but not of those dwelling in cities; and you keep your young men collected together in pastures, like colts, and feeding in herds. And not one of you has taken to himself his own offspring, and dragging from his fellow-feeders one that is very wild and very unmanageable, placed over him a groom, or privately educates him by rubbing him down and rendering him gentle, and giving all that is suited to the bringing up of a boy; from whence he would become not only a good soldier, but able to administer a state and cities, and one who, as we said at the beginning, would be more warlike than the soldiers of Tyrtasus, and would honour always and everywhere the possession of fortitude, as being the fourth, and not the first part of virtue, for the benefit of individuals and the whole state.

Clin. I do not know, guest, why you are thus again holding cheap our lawgivers.

Athen. I do so, if (so I do), by not giving, my good man, my mind to that point. But by what road the discourse may carry us, by that, if you are willing, we will go. For if we possess music more beautiful than that of the choirs and in the public theatres, let us endeavour to impart it to such as we said were ashamed of that music, and to seek that, which is the most beautiful, to share with them.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. In the first place, then, it is meet for this to be presented to all things, which a certain agreeableness follows, that there be either this (the agreeableness) itself alone an object of the most serious attention, or a certain rectitude, or, in the third place, utility. For instance, I say, that agreeableness follows food and drink, and every kind of aliment, and this agreeableness we should call pleasure; but if it contributes to health, we denominate it rectitude and utility.
Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. I And that learning too does an agreeableness follow, (namely,) the pleasure, but that it is the truth which perfects the rectitude and utility, and the well and the beautifully.

Clin. It is so.

Athen. But what, in the working out of things similar, should such arts as are productive of resemblances effect this, namely, for pleasure to result from them, would it not be most just to call it, should it by following be produced, an agreeableness?

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. But the equality rather of the so great, and of the such kind, would, to speak universally, effect the rectitude of such things.

Clin. Right.

Athen. Hence that alone can be rightly judged of by pleasure, which works out and affords neither a certain utility, or truth, or similitude; nor, on the other hand, a hurt; but which subsists for the sake of that very thing alone, (namely,) agreeableness, which follows the other things, and which a person may most beautifully denominate pleasure, when none of those follow it.

Clin. Are you speaking of innoxious pleasure alone?

Athen. Yes; and I say that this very same (agreeableness) is sport, when it does neither an injury or a benefit worthy of serious consideration or mention.

Clin. You speak most truly.

Athen. Shall we not then assert, from what has been now said, that all imitations, and moreover all equality, ought to be judged of the least by pleasure and false opinion? For equality would not be equality, or symmetry wholly, although it appears so to some one, or some one is [not] delighted with it; but they are so from truth, the most of all things, but from any thing else the least.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Do we not therefore say, that all music is productive of resemblances and is imitative?
Clin. How not?

Athen. When therefore any one asserts that music is to be judged of by pleasure, we must receive such an assertion the least of all, and seek in the least degree such music, as a serious thing, if, perchance, it exists any where; but that music (rather) which possesses a resemblance to the imitation of the beautiful.

Clin. Most true.

Athen. By those then, who are inquiring after the most beautiful singing and music, there ought, as it seems, to be sought not that which is pleasant, but that which is right. For the rectitude of imitation, as we said, was then, when the thing imitated is exhibited, as great and such as it is.

Clin. How not?

Athen. And surely every one will allow this with respect to music, that all its poetry is an imitation and resemblance. And this will not all poets and auditors and players allow?

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. It is meet then, as it seems, for a person to know in the case of each poem, what it is, if he is about not to err in that point. For he who does not know its being, what it means, and of what it is the resemblance, will scarcely understand the rectitude or errorieousness of its intention.

Clin. Scarcely indeed; how not?

Athen. But would he, who does not know, ever be able to decide upon what is well or ill (done)? But I aru not speaking very clearly; and perhaps it will be thus said more clearly.

Clin. How?

Athen. There are surely numberless resemblances, as regards the sight.

Clin. Yes.

Athen. What then, if any one in these cases does not know what each of the imitated bodies is, would he ever know whether it is worked out correctly? I speak of some such thing as this, for instance, whether it has the joints of the body, and the positions of each of the parts of the body, and how many are (the joints), and of what kind, when placed near to what kind, have (the parts) received their fitting arrange ment, and moreover their colours and
shapes; or whether all these are worked out in a confused manner. Do you think that any one can at all know these particulars, who does not know what is the animal imitated?

Clin. How should he?

Athen. But what, if any one knows that the thing painted, or modelled is a man, and that it has received all its parts, colours, and shapes from art, is it not necessary for a person knowing these facts, to know readily that too, whether it is beautiful, or whether it is in any respect wanting in beauty?

Clin. We should all of us, so to say, guest, have known the beautiful points in animals.

Athen. You speak with perfect propriety. Is it not then necessary for a person who is about to be an intelligent judge, to possess these three things, as regards every representation both in painting and music and every where? In the first place, to know what the thing is; then that it is rightly; and then thirdly, that whatever it be of representations, it is worked out well in words and melodies and rhythms?

Clin. It appears so.

Athen. Let us then be not faint-hearted in speaking of music in what point it is difficult. For since it has been bruited beyond the other representations, it requires of all represent ations the greatest caution. For a person erring in this, will be injured in the greatest degree by receiving kindly de praved manners; and it is most difficult to perceive them, through poets being inferior to the Muses themselves. For these would never err so much as, in composing the words of men, to give the figure and melody of women; and on the other hand in putting together the melody and gestures of freemen, to fit them for the rhythms of slaves and the not free; or, in taking as a subject the rhythms and gestures of a freeman, to assign a melody or words contrary to the rhythms. Moreover, they would never place together the voices of beasts and men, and instruments, and every kind of noise, as imitating one certain thing. But human poets, interweaving things of this kind very much, and mixing them together irrationally, would produce a laugh amongst men, such, as Orpheus says, " have obtained by lot the season of delight." For the poets perceive all these things mingled together; and moreover they tear away rhythm and figures apart from melody, putting naked words into measures, and, on the other hand, melody and rhythm without words, and employing the playing the harp and the hautboy nakedly; I from which it is very difficult to know what rhythm and harmony mean without words, and to which of the imitations, worthy of mention, they are similar. But it is necessary to understand that every thing of this kind is full of rusticity, as much as it loves swiftness and not stumbling, and the voice
of wild beasts, so as to make use of playing on the hautboy and the harp, except for dancing and singing. But to use either of those instruments unaccompanied with words, would be wholly a non-musical education, and a wonder-exciting act. In this way such assertions have a reason. And we are considering not only that persons of thirty years old, and those even beyond fifty, ought to make use of the Muses, but in what they ought. This then, for such reasons, does the discourse seem to me to point out to us respecting the music of choirs, that those who are fifty years old, and for whom it is suited to sing, ought to be better instructed (than the others). For they must necesarily possess a proper sensation and knowledge of rhythms and harmonies. Or how shall any one know the rectitude of melodies, and for what the Doric harmony is proper or improper, and of rhythm, which the poet has united to it, whether it is right, or not?

Clin. It is evident he cannot by any means.

Athen. But the numerous common people are ridiculous in thinking that they sufficiently know what is well harmonized, and in proper rhythm, and what is not so; such (at least) as have been compelled to sing and walk in rhythm. But as they do each of these things ignorantly, they do not reason upon them. Now every melody, when it has what is fitting, is in a proper state; but (when it has) what is not fitting, it is in an erring one.

Clin. Most necessarily so.

Athen. What then, will the person, not knowing what it possesses, know, as we have said, how it is in a proper state in any way and at any time?

Clin. What plan is there (for so doing)?

[ . . ] Athen. This then, as it appears, we have now again discovered, that those singers, whom we are now calling upon, and, after a fashion, compel to sing voluntarily, ought from necessity to be disciplined thus far, as to be able each of them to follow the progressions of the rhythms, and the chords of the melodies, in order that, by perceiving the harmonies and the rhythms, they may be able to choose such as are fit to be sung by persons of such an age, and of such a kind, and who may sing thus, and by singing may themselves be immediately in nocently delighted, and become the leaders to an adoption of good manners, suited to younger persons; and being educated to this point, they would take into their hands a share of that more accurate discipline, which has reference to the multitude, and is conversant about poets themselves. For, it is by no means necessary for a composer to know the third point, whether the imitation is beautiful or not. But it is nearly necessary (to know) that which relates to harmony and rhythm; but for those (the elders) to know all the three, for the sake of choosing the most beautiful, and the second, or else never to become a sufficient
enchanter of young persons towards the acquisition of virtue. And thus, what our discourse intended at the beginning, namely to exhibit a well-spoken support in favour of the choir of Bacchus, it has spoken to the best of our power. But let us consider whether this has taken place in this manner. For such an assembly does of necessity ever happen to become tumultuous through the drinking going for ward to a higher point, as we supposed at the beginning of our discourse it would necessarily do, as regards those of the present time.

Clin. It is necessary it should.

Athen. And every one becoming lighter than himself is elevated and joyous, and is filled with a freedom of speech, and with the not-listening at such a time to his neighbour, but considers himself sufficient to have a command over himself and the rest.

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. Did we not say, that, when this takes place, the souls of the drinkers, becoming warmed, are rendered, like iron, more soft and juvenile? so that they are easily led by a person able and knowing how to instruct and mould them, as when they were young, and that this moulder is the same as he, who was then said to be a good lawgiver, from whom there ought to be laws for convivial drinking, competent (to restrain) the person who had become full of confidence and bold and more impudent than is proper, and unwilling to endure a regulation, and the turn for silence and talking and drinking and music; (and so to instruct him,) that he is willing to do every thing the contrary to those acts; and (laws) also competent to send, together with justice, a fear the most honourable, which is to fight against a confidence not honourable, whilst it is advancing; which divine fear we have denominated modesty and shame.

Clin. It is so.

Athen. [And we said] that there are guardians and fellow fabricators of these laws, the cool and sober leaders of those not sober; without whom it is more difficult to fight against drunkenness than against enemies without cool leaders; and that the person unable to be willing to obey these and the leaders of Dionysus, upwards of sixty years old, suffers an equal or even a greater disgrace than the person, who disobeys the leaders of Mars.

Clin. Right.

Athen. If then there were such drunkenness and such sport, such fellow-drinkers, by being benefited and friends more than before, would not be separated from each other, nor enemies as at present; but having
formed their whole association according to law, they would follow, whenever the sober should I come and lead I the not sober.

Clin. Certainly; if the (sport) were such as you now speak of.

Athen. Let us then not blame that part of the gift of Bacchus simply, that it is an evil, and not worthy to be received into a state. For one might go on and say much more still, since it is the greatest blessing which he gives. There is a fear of speaking before the many, through men improperly taking it up, and knowing it when spoken.

Clin. What is that good?

Athen. A certain tale and rumour is somehow floating secretly, that this god had the intellect of his mind scattered by his step-mother Juno; on which account he did, to avenge himself, introduce the Bacchic rites, and the whole of the mad choir; from whence he gave for this purpose likewise wine. But things of this kind I leave for those to say, who think they can assert them with safety respecting the gods. But thus much I know, that every animal is not born with such and so much intelligence as is suited to it, when perfectly grown; but that, during the time in which it has not yet obtained its proper intelligence, every animal is inad, and cries out in no order; and I when any one slays it rapidly, it again leaps without order. But let us recollect that we said these were the principles of the musical and gymnastic arts.

Clin. We recollect it. How not?

Athen. And did we not say too, that this principle imparted to us men the sense of rhythm and harmony, and that Apollo, the Muses, and Dionysus were the causes of gods?

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. And wine too, it seems, the account of the others says, was given as a punishment for men, in order that we might become mad. But what has been now stated by us shows, on the contrary, that it was given as a medicine, for the sake of the soul acquiring shame, and the body health and strength.

Clin. You have brought, very beautifully, O guest, the story to our recollection.

Athen. And now let the half of the subject respecting the choir be held to be gone through. Shall we go through the (other) half, how it seems to be, or omit it?
Clin. What parts are you speaking of; and how do you divide each of them?

Athen. The whole of the choir was with us the whole of education. But of this one part consists in rhythms and harmonies according to the voice.

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. But the other, according to the movement of the body, had a rhythm in common with the movement of the voice, but a figure peculiar to itself; but there (in the former part) melody is the movement of the voice.

Clin. Most true.

Athen. The things then pertaining to the voice, (and extending) as far as the soul, for the discipline of virtue, we have, I know not after what manner, denominated music.

Clin. They were rightly called so.

Athen. But the things pertaining to the body, which we called a dancing of those in sport, if such a movement should extend as far as the virtue of the body, we denominated the artistic leading of it to a thing of this kind, the gymnastic art.

Clin. Most rightly.

Athen. I Let then that portion of the musical art, Which we have just now said we have gone through, as the half of dancing, and has been brought to an end, be held to have been spoken of. But of the other half shall we speak? Or, in what manner and by what road must we proceed?

Clin. O thou most excellent man, who art conversing with Cretans and Lacedaemonians, (say,) since we have gone through the subject relating to the musical art, but are deficient in that relating to the gymnastic, what do you think either of us ought to reply to this question?

Athen. I would say that you have by putting this question nearly answered it clearly; and I understand that this, although a question, is for the present, as I have said, both an answer, and moreover a command to go through the points relating to the gymnastic art.

Clin. You understand me excellently well; and now act in this way.

Athen. And act I must; for it is not very difficult to speak about things known to both of you; for in this very art you have a greater share of skill than in that (of music).
Clin. You speak nearly the truth.

Athen. Is not then the principle of this very sport, that every animal is naturally accustomed to leap? But man, as we have said, receiving a sense of rhythm, has begotten and brought forth dancing; I but melody, putting him in mind of, and exciting, rhythm, these two have, by their connection with each other, brought forth dancing and sport.

Clin. Most true.

Athen. One portion of this, we say, we have already gone through; but the other we will endeavour to go through in order.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Let us then first put a Colophon (finish) to the use of drunkenness, if it seems good to you likewise.

Clin. Of what kind of person, and whom are you speaking?

Athen. If any state shall make use of the pursuit lately mentioned, as being a serious thing, by law and with order, employing it as an exercise in behalf of temperance, and shall not keep itself from the rest of pleasures, in like manner, and for the same reason, by devising a plan for the sake of subduing them, after this manner it may use all these. But (if it uses them) as a sport, and it shall be lawful for any one to drink, both when he pleases, and with whom he pleases, in combination with any other pursuit whatever, I would not give my vote in this way, that it is meet for that state, or that individual to make use at any time of drunkenness; but I would give it much more to the law of the Carthaginians than to the custom of the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, namely, that no one, when in camp, is to taste of that drink, but to exist upon water during all that period; and that in the city neither a male or female slave should ever taste it, nor magistrates during the year of their office, nor pilots, nor judges, engaged in business, should taste wine at all; nor any one, who goes to any council to deliberate upon any matter of moment, neither in the day-time at all, unless for the sake of bodily exercise or disease; nor at night, when any man, or even a woman, are thinking of begetting children. And many other cases a person might mention, in which wine ought not to be drunk by those, who possess a mind and correct laws; so that, according to this reasoning, there is to no state any need of many vineyards, but other kinds of field-works should be ordained, and the whole of diet: but those relating to wine should be nearly of all the most moderate in kind and the least in number. And let this, if it seems good to you, guests, be held to be said as the Colophon to the discourse relating to wine.
Clin. It is beautifully (said), and it does seem good to us.

BOOK III.

Athen Thus much then on this point. But shall we say what was the commencement of civil government? Would not any one see it from hence in the easiest and best manner?

Clin. From whence?

Athen. From whence he might behold the progress of states marching continually to virtue and to vice.

Clin. From whence do you say?

Athen. I conceive, from a length and infinity of time, and from the mutations in it.

Clin. How say you?

Athen. Come (tell me), do you seem to have ever conceived what a length of time has elapsed, since cities and men have been formed into polities? I

Clin. This is by no means easy.

Athen. It would however be something endless, and impossible (to be told).

Clin. Yes, this very much so.

Athen. Have not myriads upon myriads of states existed during this period? and, through the same ratio of the length (of time) have there not been destroyed no fewer in number? and have they not every where been often under every kind of polity? and at one time become greater from less, and at another less from greater, and worse from better, and better from worse?

Clin. It is necessary.

Athen. Let us then lay hold, if we can, of the cause of this change; for perhaps it would show us the first birth of polities, and their altered state.

Clin. You speak well. It is then necessary for you to be ready to show, what you are thinking about them, and for us to follow.
Athen. Do the stories of old appear to you to possess any truth?

Clin. Of what kind?

Athen. That there have been frequent destructions of the human race through deluges and diseases and many other events, in which some small family of mankind was left.

Clin. Everything of this kind must be very probable to every one.

Athen. Come then, let us consider one (of these destructions) out of many, (namely) that which took place through a de luge.

Clin. Considering what about it?

Athen. That those, who then escaped the destruction, were nearly some 'hill-shepherds, preserved on the tops (of mountains), like some slight fire-preserving (embers) of the human race.

Clin. It is evidently so.

Athen. Now such as these must surely of necessity have been ignorant of the rest of the arts and contrivance of those in cities towards each other, with respect to cupidity and a love of quarrel, and whatever other deeds of ill they had in their thoughts against each other.

Clin. It is likely.

Athen. Let us suppose then that the inhabited cities, which were in the plains and on the sea-coast, were at that time entirely destroyed.

Clin. Let us suppose it.

Athen. Shall we not say then, that all instruments were destroyed, and that, if any thing connected with art, either in politics or any other wisdom, had been carefully discovered, all such were lost at that period?

Clin. For how, most excellent man, if these things had remained through the whole time, as they are placed in order at present, could any thing new whatever have been invented by any one whatever? Because ten thousand times ten thousand years lay hid from persons then. But there have been a thousand or twice as many years, since some things have been, made known by Daedalus, others by Orpheus, and others by Palamedes; while those relating to music have become so by Marsyas and Olympus, and, as regards the lyre, by Amphion; and very many other things by others, so to say, but yesterday and the day before.
Athen. Know you not, Clinias, that you have omitted your friend, who was really of yesterday?

Clin. Do you mean Epirnenides?

Athen. Yes, him. For he has leaped far over all amongst you in his contrivance, which Hesiod had formerly, my friend, divined in word, but he has in reality accomplished, as ye assert.

Clin. We do assert it.

Athen. Let us then assert, that, when that destruction took place, human affairs had then a solitude infinitely terrible; that there was a very great part of the earth ungrudged; and that the other animals having perished, there were some herds of oxen, and a race of goats, if perchance it happened to have survived, and these too rare to live for those feeding then at the commencement.

Clin. How not?

Athen. But of a state, and polity, and legislation, to which our conversation has now turned, do we think there was any, so to say, any recollection at all?

Clin. By no means.

Athen. From those people then so situated all the present things did not arise, namely, cities and polities and arts and laws and much of vice and much of virtue.

Clin. How say you?

Athen. Think we, O wonderful man, that the persons of that time, who were inexperienced in many beautiful things relating to cities, and many too of a contrary kind, had be come perfect as regards either virtue or vice?

Clin. You speak well, and we understand what you say.

Athen. As time then went on, and our race multiplied, all things advanced to [all] their present state.

Clin. Most right.

Athen. But, as is probable, not suddenly, but by little, during some very long period.
Clin. And this too is very likely.

Athen. For there was a fear, I think, tingling in all, of coming down from their high ground to the plain.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Did they not with delight behold each other, through the fewness in things about that time? For the means of going to each other at that period by land or sea, were nearly all, so to say, lost together with the arts; hence it was not, I think, very possible for them to mingle with each other. For iron and brass and all metals had disappeared confused together; so that there was every want of means for them to be purified, and they had a scarcity (of means) in felling timber. For if any instrument had by chance been preserved in the mountains, these had by rapidly wearing away disappeared; and no others were about to be made, before the art of metallurgy had returned again to man.

Clin. How could it?

Athen. But in how many generations afterwards think we did this take place?

Clin. It is evident, in a great many.

Athen. Would not then the arts that require iron and brass, and all things of that kind, have disappeared for the same and even a longer time at that period?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Dissension then together with war was at that time dead everywhere.

Clin. How so?

Athen. In the first place, they loved and had a friendly feeling towards each other, on account of their solitude; and then their food was not an object of contention; for of pastures there was no scarcity except perhaps to some at the beginning on which they lived for the most part at that time; for they were not at all in want of milk and flesh; and be sides, by hunting they obtained food, neither indifferent (in kind) nor little (in quantity). Moreover, they had plenty of clothing, and beds, and dwellings, and utensils, for fire or not. For the earth-moulding and weaving arts did not require iron at all. And a god gave to man these arts to procure all those things, in order that, when at any time they might fall into a difficulty of this kind, the race of man might have a shooting up and an improvement. Through some such
means persons at that time were not very poor, nor had they, compelled by poverty, any differences with each other. But neither would they ever have become rich, being without silver and gold, which was then present in them. Now in any association, where neither riches nor poverty dwell, in this manners nearly the most just will exist. For neither insolence nor injustice, neither emulation nor envy, are produced there. Through these causes, and their so-called simplicity, they were good. For whatever they heard to be beautiful or base, they thought, through being of simple manners, it was said so most truly, and were persuaded. For no one, through his wisdom, knew to suspect an untruth, as at present; but, conceiving all that was said about gods and men to be true, they lived in this manner; and hence they were altogether such, as we have just now described them.

Clin. Both to me and to this person here such seems to be the case.

Athen. Shall we then not assert, that many generations, both of those prior to the deluge and of those at present living in this manner, are likely to be less skilful and less learned as regards the other arts, and those too of war, such as exist at present by land and sea; and such, as in the case of a city being called only there law-trials and seditions, contrive both by words and deeds every plan for doing evil and injustice towards each other? but that they were more simple and brave, and at the same time more temperate, and in every respect more just? Now of these things we have already detailed the cause.

Clin. You speak correctly.

Athen. Let then this be held to have been said by us; and let all that still follows upon this be said for the sake of understanding what need of laws there was to persons of that period, and who was their lawgiver.

Clin. You have spoken well.

Athen. Were they then neither in want of legislators, nor was there wont to be any matter of such a kind at that time? For surely to those existing at that portion of the period there were not writings, but they lived following the customs and the spoken laws of their ancestors.

Clin. It is probable. But the manner of their polity do you know well what it was?

Athen. This.

Clin. What?

Athen. All appear to me to call the polity subsisting at that period, a
dynasty, which even now exists in many places, both amongst the Greeks and Barbarians. And even Homer speaks some where of it as taking place in the administration of the Cyclopes, saying, (Od. ix. ,)

"Meetings, that counsel bring, to them are not, Nor legal judges. On the high hill-tops They dwell, or in the hollow cave; and each To wife and children gives the law, nor care Aught have they of each other."

Clin. This poet of yours appears to have been a graceful one; for we have gone through some other pieces of his, very clever, but not many of them; for we Cretans do not make a very great use of foreign poems.

Megil. But we do on the other hand make use of them. And he seems to excel poets of this kind; although he does not de scribe everywhere a Laconic, but rather an Ionic, life. At present indeed he appears to testify fairly to your language, mythologically referring the ancient state of mankind to a savage life.

Athen. So he does testify; and let us receive him, as point ing out that polities of this kind did once upon a time exist.

Clin. Well (said).

Athen. Is it not then from those, who were dispersed by single families and races through the want arising from those destructions, amongst whom the oldest bears sway on account of the authority having come from the father and mother, that following them, as birds do, persons will form one herd, and under their fathers' laws be governed by kingly rule, which is the most just of all?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. And after this, more of them come together to a common spot, and form larger cities; and betaking themselves to agriculture, first at the foot of hills they make certain en closures of thorns, as defensive walls against wild beasts, and thus establish one common and large dwelling.

Clin. It is probable that this occurs.

Athen. But is not this also probable?

Clin. What?

Athen. That, while these larger dwellings are increasing from the less and original ones, each of the small would remain, having, according to the race, the oldest person as its ruler, and, through living separate from each other,
its own peculiar customs, and different from different parents and bringers-up, and which have been accustomed to be, as regards the gods and themselves, the more modest in the case of the more modest, and more manly in that of the more manly; and thus according to reason, each one, after stamping his own edicts on his children and children’s children, would come, as we said, to the greater community, bringing their own peculiar laws.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Moreover it is surely necessary for each to be pleased with their own laws (first), and afterwards with those of the others.

Clin. It is so.

Athen. We appear then to be unconsciously walking, as it were, in the commencement of legislation.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. After this then, it is necessary for those, who thus come together to choose some among themselves in common, who, after inspecting the laws of all, shall lay open such of them as they most approve of in common before the rulers and leaders of the wards, as before kings, and enable them to make a choice; and these would be called legislators; and after appointing their magistrates and making out of the dynasties an aristocratic or kingly government, they would dwell in such a change of polity.

Clin. This would in this way take place in due order.

Athen. Let us then speak of a third form of polity as occurring, in which all the forms and accidents of polities and at the same time of cities happen to exist together.

Clin. Of what kind is this?

Athen. That, which Homer likewise has pointed out, as having taken the third place after the second (II. xx. ).

" He built Dardania; for Ilion holy Was in the plain, not yet a city made For voice-dividing men; but still they dwelt Below Mount Ida with its many rills.

For he pronounces these verses, and those which he said respecting the Cyclopes, as having been spoken somehow divinely and naturally. For the race of poets being divine does enthusiastically handle the hymnings on many events which have truly happened, in conjunction with some of the
Graces and Muses.

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. Let us then now proceed onwards, a fable having just now come upon us; for, perhaps, it will make some sign respecting our wishes. Is it not proper?

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. We say I then that Ilion was colonized down from elevated places to a large and beautiful plain, upon a hill not very lofty, and having many rivers which rush from Mount Ida.

Clin. So they say.

Athen. Do we not think that this occurred at some long time after the deluge?

Clin. How not a long time?

Athen. A dreadful oblivion then it seems has taken place of the destruction just mentioned, since they thus placed a city under rivers many and flowing from high ground, and put their trust in hills not very high.

Clin. It is then quite evident that they were distant some considerable time from that event.

Athen. And many other cities, I think, were at that time inhabited as mankind multiplied.

Clin. How not?

Athen. And these perchance fought against it; and perhaps by sea, all of them now fearlessly using the sea.

Clin. It appears so.

Athen. But the Achaeans, after remaining ten years, over threw Troy.

Megil. Entirely.

Athen. During then that period of ten years, in which Troy was besieged, the affairs of the besiegers happened to each of them to turn out very ill at home through the seditions of the young men, who received the commanders, when returning to their cities and homes, neither in a
becoming nor just manner, but so that deaths and murders and very many banishments occurred to those, who, after being exiled, returned with a change of name, and were called Doriens instead of Achasans, through Dorieus being the person who collected together the exiles of that period. And hence you Lacedaemonians turn all these things into a fable, and go through them.

Megil. How not?

Athen. To the same point from whence, while discoursing at the commencement about laws, we turned aside through falling upon music and drunkenness, we have now arrived again, as it were, through some god; and our discourse gives us, as it were, a handle. For it has come to the colonization of Lace daemon, which you said was properly governed by laws fraternal to those in Crete. For the present then we obtain something additional to this extent from the wandering of our discourse, while passing through certain polities and colonizations. For we behold a first, a second, and a third city connected with each other, as we think, by their colonizations during a boundless length of time. But now this fourth city, or, if you please, nation, presents itself to us, 'which was formerly colonized, and is so now. From all which, if we are able to understand what has been colonized well or not, and what laws of theirs preserve, what is preserved, and what corrupt, what is corrupted, and what being changed for what will render, Megillus and Clinias, a state happy, (we shall think that enough has been done). But all these matters must be discussed by us, as if from the beginning, unless we have any fault to find with what has been said.

Megil. If, O guest, a god had promised us that, if we put our hands a second time to the inquiry respecting legislation, we should hear discourses neither worse nor fewer than those already spoken, I would go a long road, and the present day would appear to me to be short, although it is nearly that of the god, when he is turning from the summer to the winter (solstice).

Athen. It is meet then, as it seems, to consider these matters.

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. Let us then be present in thought at that time, when Lacedaemon, and Argos, and Messene, and the places which with them were, Megillus, under the power of your ancestors. For then, it is said, (according to) the story, that after having divided their army into three parts, they colonized three cities, Argos, Messene, and Lacedaemon.

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. And Temenus became king of Argos. and Cresphontes of Messene,
but Procles and Eurysthenes of Lacedaemon.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Now, all of those then (present) swore to assist them, if any one should destroy their kingly rule.

Megil. How not?

Athen. Now (say), by Zeus, is kingly rule destroyed, or has any government whatever been destroyed by other parties than by themselves? Or after having just now [a little before] met with these words, did we suppose so, but have now forgotten it?

Megil. How so?

Athen. Now then, we will more confirm this kind (of assertion). For meeting with deeds, as it seems, which have occurred, we have arrived at the same discourse; so that we shall not seek the same discourse respecting a vain thing, but one that has occurred and possesses truth. Now this has occurred. Three kingdoms have made an oath with three cities under a kingly government, each with each other, according to the laws which they had laid down, about governing and being governed in common, that one party (the rulers) should not make for itself a government of violence, as time and race progressed, and the other, (the ruled,) that, while the rulers observed these (conditions), they would not at any time themselves destroy the kingly rule, nor permit others to destroy it, but that the kings would defend both kings and the people when injured, and the people, both kings and the people. Was it not so?

Megil. It was so.

Athen. Was not then that, which is of the greatest moment in the establishments of polities, present to these three cities, regulated by law, whether the kings laid down the laws, or some other person?

Megil. What was this?

Athen. That two cities should always assist against the one, which happened to be disobedient to the laws laid down.

Megil. It is evident.

Athen. And yet this do the many order the lawgivers, that they are to lay down such laws as the wards and the masses will willingly receive; just as if any one should order the exercise-masters, or physicians, to take care of,
and cure, the bodies under their direction in an agreeable manner.

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. It is however often a desirable thing, should any one with no great pain be able to render bodies of a good habit and in health.

Megil. How not?

Athen. This too, which is not a small matter towards making easy the laying down of laws, was present to those of that period.

Megil. What was that?

Athen. There was not to the lawgivers, while preparing an equality of property, the greatest blame, and which exists in many other cities regulated by laws, when any one endeavours to disturb the possession of land, or to wipe out debts, through perceiving that equality can never sufficiently exist without such measures. For to the lawgiver, who endeavours to disturb any thing of this kind, every one on meeting cries out, Do not move things to be not moved; and utters curses upon him, who introduces the distributions of land, and the cutting off debts, so that every man is thrown into a difficulty. But to the Dorians even this happened successfully and without any finding fault, that both the land was divided without causing disputes, and the debts were not large and of long standing.

Megil. True.

Athen. How then, ye best of men, did the colonization and legislation turn out so badly to them?

Megil. How do you mean? and for what do you blame them?

Athen. That when three administrations had been established, two parts of them quickly corrupted their polity and laws, and one alone, belonging to your city, remained.

Megil. You ask a question not very easy (to answer).

Athen. And yet it is requisite for us, while considering now and examining into laws, and playing a game suited to old men temperately, to go through the journey without annoyance, as we stated, when we began to enter upon it.

Megil. How not? and we must do as you say.
Athen. What inquiry can we make to ourselves relating to laws (in general), more beautiful than respecting those (individually) which have adorned cities of this kind? or shall we make an inquiry about any cities and colonizations more illustrious and larger than these?

Megil. It is not easy to speak of others in preference to these.

Athen. It is then nearly evident, that the persons of that period conceived this arrangement would be an assistance sufficient not only for the Peloponnesus, but for all the Greeks, if any of the Barbarians should do it any injury; just as those, who dwelt then about Ilion, were, when trusting to the power of the Assyrians, as it existed in the time of Ninus, emboldened to excite war against Troy. For the showy appearance of its government, still preserved, was by no means small. (And) as we at present fear the great king, so the people then feared the combination (of power) standing together. For the taking of Troy a second time became a great accusation against them; because the Trojan power was a portion of that (the Assyrian) government. On all these accounts then, the unity of the arrangement of the army at that time, divided into three states, under the brother kings, the offspring of Hercules, appeared surely to be beautifully planned and put into order, and superior to that which went against Troy. For, first, they conceived that the descend ants of Hercules were better commanders than those sprung from Pelops; and, next, that this army far surpassed in valour that which came against Troy; for that these were the victors, but those vanquished by these, the Achaeans by the Doriens. Do we not then conceive, that the persons of that period made their arrangements with this very view?

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. Is it not probable then, that they thought their affairs would be in a firm state, and endure for some lengthened period, through their having shared in many dangers and labours, and in being orderly governed by one race of brother kings; and in addition to this, through having made use of many other prophets, and the Delphic Apollo likewise?

Megil, How is it not probable?

Athen. But all these expectations so great flew away, as it seems, at that time quickly, except, as we just now said, a small part around your region; and this has never ceased warring against the two other parts, even to the present day.

Since the policy then 'existing would, by agreeing for one object, have possessed a power in war not to be overturned.
Megil. How not?

Athen. How then, and why was it dissolved? Is it not worthwhile to consider, what accident destroyed a constitution of such a standing, and of such a kind?

Megil. Scarcely would any one, looking elsewhere, be hold either laws or other polities, conservative of doings beautiful and great, or on the contrary destructive of them, if he neglects these.

Athen. It seems, then, we have by some good fortune come upon a sufficient consideration of this question.

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. Do not, then, all persons, thou wondrous man, and we too at the present moment, unconsciously fancy perpetually that they see some beautiful thing existing, and which would effect wonders, if a person knew how to use it properly. But now we should ourselves, perhaps, neither think correctly about it, nor according to nature; and moreover all men (err) respecting all the other things about which they think in a similar manner.

Megil. What do you mean? and about what especially shall we say this speech has been spoken?

Athen. My good man, I have been just now laughing at myself. For upon looking to that very expedition about which we have been conversing, it appeared to me to be very beautiful, and that a wonderful possession would have fallen accidentally to the Greeks, if, as I said, any one had at that time made a proper use of it.

Megil. Did you not say all correctly and with a fixed mind; and did not we properly praise them?

Athen. Perhaps so. But I think that every one, who be holds any thing great, and having much power and strength, has immediately this feeling, that if he knew as its possessor how to use it, being of such a kind, and such an age, he would do many and wonderful things, and be happy.

Megil. Is not this correct? or how say you?

Athen. Consider now, by looking to what does he, who gives this praise to each thing, speak correctly. Now first, as regards what has been said just now, how would the persons of that period, even if they had known how to draw up an army properly, have, by a complete marshalling, met with 'the opportunity somehow?! Would it not have been, had they put it together
securely, and preserved it for ever, so that they might be free themselves, and rule over others whom they pleased, and do in short, both themselves and their descend ants amongst all men, both Greeks and Barbarians, whatever they desired? Would they not for the sake of these things have felt a desire?

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. Has not he too, who, on seeing great wealth, or superior honours arising from a family, or any thing else of this kind, would have said the very same thing, said so, looking to this, as if through this there would come to him all he de sires, or the greater part of them, and such as are the most worthy of mention?

Megil. It appears so.

Athen. But there is certainly one common desire to all men, which is signified by our present discourse.

Megil. What is it?

Athen. That the things which do take place, should take place at the command of his own soul, all for the most part, but, if not (all), at least human affairs.

Megil. How not?

Athen. Since then all of us when children, and men, and grown old, perpetually wish a thing of this kind, we should of necessity pray for that very thing to the end (of life).

Megil. How not?

Athen. And we would pray for our friends that which they do for themselves.

Megil. How not?

Athen. Now a son, being a boy, is a friend of his father, being a man.

Megil. How not?

Athen. And yet many of the things which the boy prays may happen to himself, the father would pray the gods that they may not happen according to the prayers of his son.
Megil. When, you mean, (the son) prays, being thought less and still young.

Athen. Yes; and when the father, being old, or with very youthful feelings, shall, although he knows nothing of what is honourable and just, offer up a prayer with great fervour in the midst of sufferings, akin to those that happened to Theseus, in the case of the unfortunate Hippolytus, when dying, will the boy, think you, who does know, join in prayer with his father?

Megil. I understand what you mean. For you appear to me to assert, that a person ought not to pray, nor be urgent for all things to follow his wishes, but for wishes rather (to follow) his prudence; and that both a state and each of us ought to pray for and hasten to this, how to possess intellect.

Athen. Certainly. And, moreover, that the statesman (and) lawgiver ought always to lay down the ordinances of your recollection, what, if we remember, was said, at the commencement, that it was your advice, that a good lawgiver ought to lay down all laws for the sake of war; but it was mine, that this would enjoin him to make laws for one virtue out of four existing; that he ought to look to every virtue, but especially the first, which is the leader of the whole of virtue, and that is prudence, and intellect and opinion together, with love and desire attendant on them. But our discourse has now re turned again to the same point; and I now say again, what I then said in jest, if you please, or in earnest, that I assert then, that it is dangerous for a person not possessing intellect to pray; but that (it is better) for the contrary to his wishes to happen to him. If you are willing to suppose that I am in earnest, suppose it. For I now fully expect to find you following the reasoning we produced a little before, that timidity was not the cause of the destruction of kings, and of the whole of their policy; nor was it because the rulers and they, whom it was meet to be ruled, did not know what relates to war; but they were destroyed by all the remaining depravity, and especially by their ignorance respecting the greatest of human affairs. That these things thus happened at that time, and (must so happen) now, if they happen any where, and will hereafter happen not otherwise, I will endeavour, if you wish it, to find out, by proceeding according to a discourse in due order, and to show, as far as I can, to you, who are my friends.

Clin. To praise you, guest, in words, would be rather offensive; but we shall mightily praise you in deed. For we shall cheerfully follow what is said, by which (acts) he, who praises as a free-man or not, is most apparent.

Athen. You speak most excellently, Clinias; and let us do as you say.

Clin. These things will be so, if god pleases. Only speak.

Athen. We say then, proceeding along the still remaining road of our discourse, that the greatest ignorance destroyed that power at that time,
and that it is naturally able to do the same thing now. So that, if this be the case, the lawgiver must endeavour, as far as he can, to infuse prudence into states, and destroy to the utmost thoughtlessness.

Clin. It is evident.

Athen. What then may be justly called the greatest ignorance? Consider whether you agree with me in what I am going to say. For I lay it down to be such as this.

Clin. Of what kind?

Athen. When any one does not love, but hates that, which seems to him to be beautiful, or good; but loves and embraces that, which appears to him to be base and unjust, I assert that this discordance, respecting pain and pleasure, with opinion founded on reason, is the extreme of ignorance; and it is the greatest, because it belongs to the mass of the soul. For that part of the soul, which feels pain and pleasure, is what the common people and the mass are in a city. When, therefore, it is opposed to science, or opinions, or reason, the natural rulers, I call this ignorance; and it is the same as that of a city, when the multitude will not obey the rulers and the laws; and likewise in the case of one man, when although beautiful reasons reside in his soul, yet they do not produce any good effect, but every thing the contrary. All these kinds of ignorance I would lay down as the most inordinate, in the case of a state and each individual citizen, but not as applied to handicraftmen, if, guests, you understand what I mean.

Clin. We do understand you, friend, and assent to what you say.

Athen. Let this then be laid down as determined upon, and said, that to citizens, who are after this manner ignorant, no thing connected with government is to be committed, but they are to be reproached as ignorant, even though they are very skilful in argument, and have laboured at all that is elegant (in language), and whatever relates to a quickness of intellect; but that those, who possess qualities contrary to these, are to be called wise, although they should, according to the saying, know neither their letters, nor how to swim, and that power is to be given to them as being prudent persons. For how, friends, can the smallest form of prudence subsist without symphony? It is not possible. But the most beautiful and greatest of symphonies may be most justly called the greatest wisdom; of which he participates, who lives according to reason; but he, who is deficient, is a family-destroyer, and in no respect a saviour as regards the city, but, quite the contrary, he will appear to be always ignorant on these points. Let this then, as I just now said, be laid down, as having been spoken of in this manner.
Clin. Let it be laid down.

Athen. But it is surely necessary for rulers and ruled to exist in states.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Be it so. But of what kind, and how many, are the axioms respecting the ruling and being ruled in the case of great and small states, and similarly in that of families? Is there not one relating to a father and mother? and universally would it not be a correct axiom every where that parents should rule over their offspring?

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. And the next to this, that men of high birth should rule over those of low birth? and the third, that the more aged should rule, and the younger be ruled?

Clin. How not?

Athen. And the fourth, that slaves should be ruled, and their owners rule?

Clin. How not?

Athen. And the fifth, I think, that the better person should rule, and the worse be ruled?

Clin. You speak of a ruling very necessary indeed.

Athen. And one that exists the most in all animals, and is " according to nature," ' as the Theban [Pindar] says. But the greatest axiom, as it seems, would be the sixth, which commands the ignorant to follow, but the prudent to lead and rule. And yet, O thou most wise Pindar, I should almost say, that this at least is not contrary to nature, but according to it, for the rule of law to be over willing (subjects), and not by an act of violence.

Clin. You speak most correctly.

Athen. Let us then in speaking of the seventh rule, as being god-loved and fortunate, bring it to a lot-drawing, and say, that he, on whom the lot falls, is most justly the ruler, but he the ruled, who goes away, after being unsuccessful in the lot.

Clin. You speak most truly.

Athen. We will say then, playing with some one of those who go on with
facility to the laying down of laws Dost thou, O lawgiver, see how many axioms there are relating to rulers, and how they are naturally contrary to each other? For now we have discovered a certain fountain of seditions, to which it is necessary for you to attend. First, consider with us, by erring how and in what point, contrary to these axioms, did the kings of Argos and Messene destroy themselves, and the power of the Greeks, which at that time was wonderful. Was it not through their not knowing that Hesiod had said most truly, that "the half is often more than the whole?" (For), when to receive the whole brings a damage, but in the half is moderation, he held in that case the moderate to be more than the immoderate, as being better than the worse.

Clin. Most correctly so.

Athen. But whether think we that this, when it occurs, destroys on each occasion what relates to kings before what exists amongst the people?

Clin. It is probable that this is mostly the disease of kings, who live proudly in luxury.

Athen. Is not this evident then, in the first place, that the kings of that time had a power above the established laws? and (as) to what they had praised both by word and an oath, they did not accord with themselves. But discordance, as we have said, being the greatest ignorance, although appearing to be wisdom, has destroyed all those things through error and a sad want of education.

Clin. It appears so.

Athen. Be it so. But why was it meet for the lawgiver then laying down laws to be cautious about the generation of this disease? Is it, by the gods, at the present time, no wisdom to know this, and not difficult to speak of it? but that, if it had been possible to foresee it then, the person, who foresaw it, would have been wiser than we are?

Meqil. What kind of thing are you speaking of?

Athen. For a person looking, Megillus, to what has occurred with you, it is easy to know, and, knowing, to state what ought to have occurred then.

Megil. Speak yet more clearly.

Athen. Some such thing as this then will be most clear.

Megil What?
Athen. If any one gives a power too great to things rather small, by disregarding moderation, as, for instance, sails to ships, food to bodies, and dominion to dispositions all things are overturned; for some, by being full of insolence, run I into disorders, and others to injustice, the offspring of insolence. What then are we saying? Is it not, my friends, of this kind? that there exists not the nature of a mortal soul, which will be able, when young and not under super vision, to bear the greatest rule amongst men, so as, when filled as to its thinking faculty with folly, which is the greatest disease, not to suffer a hate from his nearest friends; which, when it takes place, is wont to corrupt quickly, and to cause all its power to disappear. To be cautious on this point, through knowing moderation, is the province of great law givers. Hence what took place at that time, it is now easy to perceive. It appears to have been this.

Megil. Of what kind?

Athen. Some god, I think, (is) taking care of you; who, through foreseeing future events, and planting for you the two fold generation of kings descended from one, has contracted you rather to a moderate state; and after this a certain human nature, mixed up with a certain divine power, did, perceiving your government to be still in an inflamed state, mingle the temperate power of old age with the self-willed strength of noble birth, and made equal with the power of the kings the vote of twenty-eight old men in matters of the greatest moment. But your third saviour, perceiving your government swelling with desire and passion, placed upon it the power of the Ephori, as a bit, and led it near the power which is chosen by lot. And by this arrangement the kingly power with you, being mingled with such things as were proper, and possessing moderation, was both preserved itself, and became the cause of preservation to others. For under the rule of Temenus and Cresphontes, and the lawgivers of that time, if indeed they were lawgivers, not even the portion of Aristodemus would have been saved. For they were not then sufficiently skilled in legislation; for, (had they been so,) they never would have thought to moderate by oaths a youthful spirit, when receiving a power from which it was possible for a tyranny to arise. But now the deity has shown what kind of government it was and is necessary to be, that is about to continue the longest. But that these things should be known by us, as I said before, now that they have happened, is no feat of wisdom. For from a model already existing, it is not difficult to see. But if any one had then foreseen these things, and had been able to render governments moderate, and to form one out of three, he would have preserved all the beautiful conceptions of that time, and neither the Persian expedition, nor any other, would have come against Greece, through despising us as being of little account.

Clin. You speak the truth.
Athen. Hence, Clinias, they defended themselves shamefully. Now by shamefully I mean, not that the persons of that time did not conquer by sea and land, and gain honourable victories; but what I call shameful at that time, I say is this. In the first place, that, out of those three states, (only) one fought in defense of Greece, but the other two were so miserably corrupted, that one of them (Messene) prevented Lacedaemon from assisting her, (Greece,) by warring against it with all its strength; but the other, which had the first, share at that period in the distribution, 'that about Argos, did, when called upon to repel the Barbarian, neither give ear nor assistance. But by detailing many things that occurred then relating to that war, a person might bring a charge against Greece by no means of a pleasant kind; nor would he, who should say that Greece defended herself, speak correctly; since, unless the policy in common of the Athenians and Lacedaemonians had warded off the slavery coming against them, there would have been mixed together nearly all the races of Greeks with each other, and Barbarians with Greeks, and Greeks with Barbarians; just as those, over whom the Persians are now the tyrants, are, after being carried away separately or together, and scattered abroad, made to settle down in a miserable state. This, Clinias and Megillus, is what we have to urge against the men of old, called politicians and legislators, and likewise those of the present day, in order that, by seeking out the causes, we may discover what else besides these ought to have been done, as we say for the present, that it is not meet to lay down great or unmixed powers of rule, through considering this, that it is requisite for a state to be free and intellectual, and a friend to itself, and that a legislator ought looking to these points, to lay down laws. And let us not wonder if, after proposing (other) things, we have frequently said that the legislator ought to look to these, while laying down laws, and that what have been proposed do not appear to us to be the same. But it is proper to infer that, when we say the legislator ought to look to temperance, or prudence, or friendship, our design is not different, but the same; and let not many other expressions of that kind, should they occur, disturb you.

Clin. We will endeavour to do so by recurring to your reasoning. But for the present explain, what you mean by saying with respect to friendship, and liberty, and prudence, that a legislator ought to aim at those objects.

Athen. Hear then now. There are, as it were, two mothers of polities, from which he, who says that all the rest are produced, will speak correctly. Now one of these it is right to call a monarchy, but the other a democracy; and to say that the race of the Persians possess the extreme of the one; but we of the other. Now nearly all the rest are, as I have said, variously formed from these. It is proper then, and necessary for (a state) to participate in both these, if there is to be freedom and friendship in conjunction with prudence. Now this our discourse intends to enjoin, by saying that a city is unable to be beautifully governed, while it is destitute of these properties.
Clin. For how can it?

Athen. When therefore the one embraces monarchy alone, but the other liberty more than is proper, neither of them possess what is moderate in these. Your cities however in Laconia and Crete (possess it) more (than others); and so too did the Athenians and Persians formerly, but now less so. Shall we go through the causes of this, or not?

Clin. By all means, if we wish to bring to an end what we have proposed for ourselves.

Athen. Let us hear then. The Persians under Cyrus possessed more of moderation in slavery and freedom. At first they were free, but afterwards the masters of many others. For by sharing as rulers their freedom with the ruled, and leading them to an equality, the soldiers became greater friends with their commanders, and conducted themselves with alacrity in dangers. And if any one among them was intelligent and competent to give advice, as the king was not envious, and granted a liberty of speech, and honoured those, who were able to advise any thing, he brought into the midst of all the common power of intellect; and at that time every thing exhibited an improvement, through liberty, and friendship, and a communion of intellect.

Clin. It appears somehow that what has been stated did so occur.

Athen. How then was (that government) almost destroyed under Cambyses, and again restored under Darius? Are you willing for us, while thinking, to make use, as it were, of divination.

Clin. This at least brings our inquiry to the point, whither we have been hastening.

Athen. Respecting Cyrus, then, I thus divine; that in other respects he was a good general, and a lover of his country, but that he had not laid hold at all of a correct education, nor applied his mind to the regulation of his household.

Clin. How shall we say a thing of this kind?

Athen. He appears from his youth to have passed his life in the army, and to have committed to women the bringing up of his boys. Now these brought them up as persons fortunate immediately from their childhood, and born blessed, and indigent of nothing of these. Hence they forbade any one to oppose them in any respect, as being sufficiently fortunate; and compelling every one to praise what was said or done by them, they brought them up being some such.
Clin. You have detailed, as it seems, a beautiful education.

Athen. At least a feminine one, the women princesses having become recently rich, and bringing up the boys, during a scarcity of men, through the men not having leisure (to do so) in consequence of wars and many dangers.

Clin. So goes the story.

Athen. But their father possessed cattle and sheep and many herds of men, and of many other (animals); but he was ignorant that those, to whom he was to hand down all these things, were not instructed in his country's trade, which was a rough one, as the Persians were shepherds, the children of a rugged land, and competent to render the shepherds very strong, and able to live out of doors, and to be without sleep, and, if required, to become soldiers. But he disregarded the corruption of education by the so-called happiness of Media, and by his sons being instructed by women and eunuchs; from whence they became such as it was likely for those to become, who are brought up in luxury unreproved. Upon the death of Cyrus his sons came into the possession (of power), and being full of luxury and without reproof, at first one of them slew the other, through brooking ill an equality; and subsequently the survivor (Cambyses) becoming mad through drinking and a want of education, lost his power through the Medes and the then called Eunuch, who viewed with contempt his silly conduct.

Clin. These things also are reported, and it seems they somehow happened nearly in this manner.

Athen. And it is said moreover that the power came again to the Persians through Darius and the seven.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Let us then take a view, following out the reasoning. For Darius was not the son of a king, nor brought up in a luxurious manner. But coming to power, and receiving it, he divided it, himself the seventh (sharer), into seven portions, of which there are at present left some small dream-(like) remnants, and he thought proper to live, laying down laws (and) introducing a kind of equality common (to all); and he bound under law the tribute, which Cyrus had promised the Persians, (and) infusing into all the Persians a feeling of interest, he attached to himself the masses in Persia, by money and gifts. I His armies therefore did with a good will add countries to his power not less in number than what Cyrus had left. After Darius (came) Xerxes, who was again brought up with a royal and luxurious education. But it may be most just to say perhaps, " Darius, thou hast not learned the evil conduct of Cyrus, but hast brought up Xerxes in the same manners, as
Cyrus did Cambyses. He therefore, as being a child of the same education, has brought to pass what is very near to the sufferings of Cambyses; and from that time scarcely a single Persian king has become truly great except in name. Now the cause of this was not fortune, but, according to my reasoning, the vicious life, which the sons of those, who were remarkably rich and tyrannical, for the most part lived. For neither boy, nor man, nor old person, will ever become superior in virtue from such an education." And these are the matters which we say should be considered by a legislator, and by us likewise at present. But it is just, Lacedaemonians, to give this praise to your state, that you never distribute any superior honour or food to poverty or wealth, or to a private station or a kingly one, which the oracle from some god has not at the first prophetically enjoined. For it is not proper in a state, to distribute to any one superior honours, because he is superior in wealth; nor because he is swift-footed, or handsome, or robust, without some virtue, and not in the case of a virtue even, from which temperance is excluded.

Megil. How, guest, say you this?

Athen. Fortitude is surely one part of virtue.

Megil. How not?

Athen. Judge then yourself, after hearing my reasoning, whether you would admit any fellow-dweller or neighbour to be very brave, when not temperate, but profligate?

Megil. Speak good words.

Athen. What then, that an artist is wise in things of his art, but unjust?

Megil. By no means.

Athen. But justice could not be produced without temperance.

Megil. How could it?

Athen. Nor could he, whom we just now laid down to be wise, as possessing pleasures and pains, in harmony with, and following right reason.

Megil. Certainly not.

Athen. But let us still consider this too, touching the bestowing of honours in states, of what kind do they take place properly or not on each occasion.

Megil What?
Athen. Whether temperance, if it be alone in a soul with out all the rest of virtue, can justly be a thing either of honour or dishonour?

Megil. I know not what to say.

Athen. You speak with moderation. For had you said either the one or the other, about which I asked the question, you would have appeared to me at least to have spoken beside the measure.

Megil. It would then have turned out well.

Athen. Be. it so. The addition then relating to honours and dishonours will be worthy not of a discourse, but rather of some irrational silence.

Megil. You appear to me to mean temperance.

Athen. Yes. But that which benefits us the most of the others, would, in addition to its being honoured the most, be honoured the most justly; and that which is second (in benefit) would be second (in honour); and thus each thing obtaining, according to the reasoning in succession, its honours in due order, would obtain them justly.

Megil. Such is the case.

Athen. What then, shall we not say that it is the business of the legislator to distribute these?

Megil. And very much so.

Athen. Are you then willing for us to allow him to distribute all things, both pertaining to each work, and to trifling particulars? But with respect to making a triple division, let us endeavour, since we also are somehow desirous of laws, to divide the greatest, second, and third, apart from each other.

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. We say then that a state ought, as it seems, if it is about to be preserved happy to the utmost of human power, necessarily to distribute honours and dishonours in a proper manner. Now (to do so) properly, it is for the good things pertaining to the soul, to be laid down as the most honourable and the first in rank, temperance at the same time being present to it (the soul); and as the second in rank, the things beautiful and good pertaining to the body; and as the third in rank, the things pertaining to property and riches. But if any legislator or state proceeds beyond these, by leading either riches to honours, or by placing by means of honours in the
foremost rank any of the things in the rear, he will do a deed neither holy nor statesman-like. Is this to be held as said, or how?

Megil. Let it be held as said clearly.

Athen. The inquiry into the Persian polity has caused us to speak to a greater length on these points. And we find that they became much worse still; and we say the reason was, that through their taking away too much of liberty from the people, and introducing a despotic power more than was proper, they destroyed the feeling of friendship and of a common interest in the city; and that, when this is destroyed, the deliberations of the rulers are not engaged in behalf of the governed and the people, but for their own power; (and) should they think that something more, even if it were little, would accrue to themselves, they would, by destroying with fire cities overturned, and by (treating) friendly nations in an hostile and unpitying manner, at once hate and be hated. But when they come to the people during a time of need to fight for them, they find in them no such communion of interest, f 'that any one is willing with alacrity to run a risk and to fight; and though they possess myriads, not to be defined in a calculation, yet they are all useless for war; and, as if in want of men, they hire some, and think they will be saved by mercenary and foreign troops; and added to this, they are compelled to act the part of simpletons, proclaiming by their acts, that the things constantly called honourable or beautiful in a state are a trifle as compared with silver and gold.

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. Let then the subject of the affairs of the Persians, which are now administered not correctly through excessive slavery and despotism, have an end.

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. But after this it is proper for us to go through in a similar manner the polity of Attica, I (that it may appear) ' how perfect liberty even, exempt from all rule, is not a little worse than that, which has a moderation in rule under others. For at the time, when the Persian invasion took place against the Greeks, and perhaps against almost all the inhabitants of Europe, our polity had been of long standing; and we had some four institutions framed with reference to a property-census; and a certain modesty too at that time was a despot, through which we were then willing to live in subjection to the laws. In addition to this, the magnitude of the expedition, extending over land and sea, brought on a fear not to be overcome, and caused us to endure a still greater submission to the rulers and the laws. And on all these accounts a violent friendship came upon us towards ourselves. For nearly ten years before the naval battle at Salamis,
Datis had arrived, leading the Persian expedition of Darius, who had sent him distinctly against the Athenians and Eretrians, to reduce them to slavery, and to carry them off; and proclaiming death to him, if he did not do so. And Datis did in a very short time with his many myriads and by main force subdue them entirely; and he sent a certain dreadful report to our city, that not one of the Eretrians had escaped him; for that the soldiers of Datis had by joining hands to hands got, as into a net, the whole of Eretria. This report, whether arriving true or in any way whatever, struck with terror the other Greeks, and the Athenians likewise; and on their sending ambassadors every where, no one was willing to assist them, except the Lacedaemonians; and even they, through the war then raging against Messene, or whether something else, as alleged, prevented them, for we know not, arrived one day later than the battle that took place at Marathon. After this, mighty preparations and innumerable threats are said to have come from the king. But as time went on, Darius was reported to have died, and his son, young and violent, to have received from him the government, and by no means to have desisted from his (father's) undertaking. Now the Athenians were of opinion, that the whole of this preparation was against themselves, on account of what had occurred at Marathon; and hearing of Athos being dug through, and of (the shores) of the Hellespont being united, and of the great number of the vessels, they thought there was no safety for themselves by land or sea; for that none would assist them; as they recollected that, even when (the Persians) had come before, and had done thoroughly for the Eretrians, not one had given them assistance then, or had run a risk by fighting with them; and they expected the same thing would then take place, at least by land; and on the other hand, by sea they saw a want of all means of safety, since more than a thousand ships were being brought against them. They thought, however, upon a single source of safety, slender indeed and dubious, yet the only one, through their looking to what had previously occurred, how even then victory had appeared to spring out of difficulties, as they were fighting. Carried along upon this hope, they found their refuge rested in themselves alone and in the gods. All these things then engendered in them a friendship with each other, both the fear which was then present, and that which had been produced by the laws before, and which they had felt, when they were submitting to their former laws; (a fear) which we have frequently in the preceding discourse called modesty; to which we have said (all) must be subservient, who are about to become good men; (and) of which he who is the slave is free and fearless; whom had not this fear seized, he would never have quickly come and defended himself and aided the sacred places, and tombs, and country, and all the rest of household ties, and friends, as he did aid at that time; but each of us would at that period have been routed in small parties, and scattered one hither and another thither.

Megil. And very much so, guest; and correctly have you spoken, and in a manner becoming both to yourself and country.
Athen. Such is the case, Megillus. For it is just to mention to you, what happened at that time, as being a sharer in the nature of your parents. But do you and Clinias consider, whether we say what is suited to legislation. For I do not go through these matters for the sake of telling a story, but for the sake of what I am saying. For look ye. Since the same circumstance has in a certain manner happened to us, that did to the Persians, while they were leading the people to every kind of slavery, but we, on the contrary, turning the masses to every kind of freedom, how and what shall we say hence forth? The reasons that have previously occurred to us, have in a certain manner been detailed correctly.

Megil. You speak well. But endeavour to point out to us still more clearly what has been said just now.

Athen. This shall be. The people was not, my friends, according to the laws of old, the master of any, but did after a certain manner obey willingly the laws.

Megil. Of what laws are you speaking?

Athen. Those relating in the first place to music as then existing in order that we may detail from the beginning the great progress made in a life of freedom. For music was then divided by us according to certain kinds and figures of itself; I and prayers to the gods was a kind of ode, and they were called by the name of hymns; and the contrary to this was another kind of ode, and a person would have called it lamentations for the most part; and another was Paeans, and another the birth of Dionysus, called, I think, a Dithyramb: and they have called laws by this very name, as being another ode; and they have given the additional name of "harp music." After these and some others had been ordained, it was not lawful to use one kind for another. But the authority to know any of these, and, after knowing, at the same time to judge of them, and to fine the person not obedient, was not the whistle nor certain uneducated noises of the multitude, as at present, nor yet the clatterings that express praise, but it was decreed that persons, who were conversant with education, should themselves hear to the end in silence; but for boys, and boy-leaders, and the numerous vulgar, there was the admonition by a rod putting them in order. These things having been thus ordained, the multitude of citizens were willing to be ruled, and not to dare to judge in a tumultuous manner. After this, as time went on, the poets (themselves) became the leaders of this uneducated lawlessness; being naturally indeed poetical, but ignorant with respect to what is just and lawful in music, they were acting like Bacchants, and possessed with joy more than was becoming, and were mingling lamentations with hymns, and pagans with dithyrambs, and imitated with harp music the music of the hautboy, and by bringing together all things to all they involuntarily, through their ignorance, asserted falsely that music did not
possess any correctness whatever; but that it might be judged of most correctly by the pleasure of the party gratified, whether he were a better person or a worse. Composing, therefore, works of this kind, and adding to them words of this kind, they in fused into the multitude a lawlessness with respect to music, and a daring of their being competent to judge. Hence theatres, from being silent, came to be noisy, as if capable of understanding what is beautiful or not in music; and instead of an aristocracy in it, a certain depraved theatocracy was produced. For if only a democracy of free men had existed, nothing very dreadful would have taken place; but now from music there began an opinion with us respecting the wisdom of all men in all things, and a lawlessness, and after these did a licentiousness follow. For men became fearless, as if endued with knowledge; and this absence of fear generated shamelessness. For through boldness to feel no fear of the opinion of a better person, is almost a depraved shamelessness, (resulting) from a certain liberty that has dared too much.

Megil. You speak most true.

Athen. And consequent upon this liberty, there would arise that of being unwilling to submit to rulers; and following this, to fly from the submission to, and admonition of, a father and mother and elders, and to the being near the point of seeking to be not subject to laws; and (having arrived) at that point, to think nothing at all of oaths and faith and the gods; by exhibiting and imitating the ancient Titanic nature, as it is called, so that, by again arriving at those same things, they led a life of difficulty, and never ceased from ills. On what account then has this been said by us? It appears that I at least ought to pull up a discourse, like a horse, on each occasion and not, by having its mouth without a bridle, to be carried away forcibly, and, according to the proverb, fall from the discourse, as from an ass. But I again ask what was just now said. On what account has this been mentioned?

Megil. Correctly so.

Athen. This then has been said on account of those?

Megil. Whom?

Athen. We have said that a legislator ought in laying down laws to aim at three things, how the state may, by being legislated for, become free, and friendly to itself, and possess a mind. These were the objects. Is it not so?

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. For the sake of this we selected two kinds of government, one most despotic, and the other most free; and we were considering which of these is rightly administered. But on laying hold of each of them, as regards I a
certain moderation, on the part of some to be despots, and of others to be free, we saw that then (in moderation) prosperity resulted to them in an eminent degree, but that when each party was proceeding to the extreme, the one, of slavery, and the other, of the contrary, no benefit had accrued to either these or those.

Megil. You speak most true.

Atken. And moreover, for the sake of these things, we looked into both the Doric army, and the country under the Dardan mountains, and the settlement by the sea, and first those persons who remained after the deluge; and moreover we had a previous conversation about music and drunkenness, and on subjects still prior to these. For all this has been mentioned, for the sake of seeing, how a state may be best administered, and how every one may individually best pass through life. Now, if we have done any thing of importance, what proof of error can be brought, Megillus and Clinias, against us?

Clin. I seem to myself, guest, to have something in my mind. For it appears that the subjects of all the discourse, we have gone through, have arisen through some good fortune. For I have come almost in want of them at the present moment; and both you and Megillus here are by some opportune accident present. For I will not conceal from you what has just now occurred to me, but I will make it a kind of omen. For the greatest part of Crete is attempting at present to establish a certain colony, and orders the Cnossians to take the care of the matter; but the city of the Cnossians (imposes it) upon me and nine others; and at the same time orders us to lay down laws (taken) from this place, if any are pleasing to us, and, if there are any, from elsewhere, making no account of their foreign character, should they appear to be better. Let us then grant this favour to myself and you. After making a selection out of what has been said, let us in our discourse form a state, and colonize it, as if from its commencement; and there will be to us at the same time an inquiry into what we are in search of, and at the same time I may perhaps make use of this formation for the city that is to be.

Athen. You are not, guest, proclaiming a war. And, unless there is some opposition on the part of Megillus, conceive that every thing on my side will be to the best of my power according to your mind.

Clin. You speak well.

Megil. And on my side likewise.

Clin. You both have spoken most beautifully. Let us then endeavour, in the first place, to form in our discourse a state.
BOOK IV.

But why the person who is doing perfectly what relates to his offspring, and kindred, and friends, and fellow citizens, and what relates to the rites of hospitality (laid down) by the gods, and the intercourse arising from all these matters, ought to make his life a shining ornament according to law, the very course of the laws will (show forth); which, by persuading some of our habits and punishing by violence and justice others, that do not yield to persuasion, renders our state blessed and happy. But what it is meet and necessary for a legislator, who thinks as I do, to say, but which when spoken are unfitted to the form of a law, respecting these it appears to me that a person would, by bringing forward a pattern both before himself and those, for whom he is about to give laws, and by going through all that remains to the utmost of his ability, make after this a beginning in the laying down of laws.

Clin. Let then such things be laid in some form especially.

Athen. But it is not a very easy thing to embrace them, as it were in some one form, and to speak of them; but let us in this way take some method, if perchance we may be able to establish any thing of a firm kind respecting them.


Athen. I should wish them to be very obedient as regards virtue; and it is evident that the legislator will endeavour to accomplish this through the whole of his legislation.

Clin. How not?

Athen. What then has been now said appears to me to effect something of moment towards a person listening with a greater mildness and a kinder feeling to what the words re commend, provided they do not come in contact with a disposition altogether savage; so that should what the words say render the person, who has become if not very much, yet a little more kindly disposed, more docile, we must be quite content. For there is no great facility ' nor an abundance of those, who feel a desire to become the best to the greatest degree and in the shortest time; and the many point out Hesiod as a wise person for asserting that the road to wickedness is smooth, and offers itself to be passed through without sweat, as being very short; but (says he)

" Th' immortal gods have before virtue placed The sweat of labour, and the
road is long And steep, that to it leads. At first 'tis rough; But when you reach the top, 'tis easy all, Although it was all difficult before."

Clin. And he appears to be like a person who speaks well.

Athen. Entirely so. But what the discourse has done, as it has been going on, I wish to place in the midst of you.

Clin. Place it then.

Athen. Let us then say to the legislator, while addressing these words to him Tell us, Legislator, is it not evident that, if you knew what we ought to do and say, you would have said it?

Clin. It is necessarily so.

Athen. Did we not hear you saying a little before, that a legislator ought not to suffer poets to say what they please? For they would not know, that by saying what is contrary to the laws, they would injure the state.

Clin. You speak truly.

Athen. If then we should speak in this manner to him in behalf of the poets, would what has been said be in moderation?

Clin. In what manner?

Athen. In this. There is an old story, legislator, which is constantly told by ourselves, and seems correct to all the rest, that a poet, when he sits on the tripod of the Muse, is then not in his right senses, but, like a fountain, readily permits what comes to it to flow out: and as his art is an imitation, he is (often) compelled, when representing persons placed in situations contrary to each other, to contradict himself frequently, and does not know whether of what is told these or the others are true. But it is not possible for a legislator to act in this manner in the case of a law, namely (to say) two (different) things about one thing; but he must always make one assertion about one thing. And do you so consider it from what has been said just now. For in the case of a funeral, one being excessive, and another deficient, and a third moderate, you, having chosen one of these, the moderate, order it, and simply praise it. But if my wife were pre-eminently rich, and should order me to bury her, I would celebrate in a poem her magnificent sepulchre; but on the other hand, a parsimonious and poor man (would praise) a deficient one; but he who possesses moderate means, and is moderate himself (in mind), would praise a moderate one. But you must not talk, as you did just now, when speaking of the moderate; but you must tell us what the moderate is, and of what quantity it is; or do not imagine
that a discourse of this kind is a law.

Clin. You speak most true.

Athen. Whether then will he, who is placed by us over the laws, say nothing of this kind at the beginning of his laws, but immediately state what it is meet to do, and what not, and, having threatened a fine, turn himself to another law, and add nothing of exhortation and persuasion to those, for whom the laws are laid down? I But as in the case of physicians, one is accustomed on each occasion to attend in this way, and another in that, let us call to mind the method of either, in order that we may beg the legislator, as children do a physician, to cure them in the mildest manner. But what are we saying? There are, surely, we say, some persons physicians, and others the ministers of physicians; and these too we somehow call physicians.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. And (this too), whether they are free-men, or slaves, and possess the art through the injunctions of their masters, both according to theory and experience, but not by nature, just like free-men, (who) have both learnt the art in this way themselves, and are teaching it to their children? Would you put down these as two kinds of the so-called physicians?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Do you then not perceive that when there are both slaves and free-men sick in cities, the slaves do for the most part go round and cure the slaves, or remain in the medical shops; and that not one of such physicians either give or receive any reason respecting each of the diseases of each of the slaves, but, as if knowing accurately from experience, orders, as if he were a self-willed tyrant, what seems good to him; and then goes away, bounding off from one sick domestic to another; and by this means affords a facility to his master of attending to (other) patients? But the freeborn physician, for the most part, attends to and reflects upon the diseases of the freeborn; and, by exploring them from the beginning, and according to nature, and communing with both the patient himself and his friends, does, at the same time, learn something himself from the sick, and at the same time teach him, as far as he can, something, and does not order him any thing until he has persuaded him of its propriety; and then, after rendering the patient gentle by persuasion, endeavours to finish the business by bringing him (back) I to health. Which of these is the better physician? he who cures in this way or in that? [and which is the better exerciser? he who exercises in this way or that?] he, who effects his single power in a twofold manner, or he, who works it out in one way, and in the worse and the more rustic of the two?
Clin. The twofold, O guest, is surely the superior.

Athen, Are you willing then for us to look into this two fold and simple method, as it exists in legislation?

Clin. How am I not willing?

Athen. Come then, by the gods, (and state) what law will the legislator first lay down? Will he not, according to nature, regulate by his ordinances first the commencement of generation relating to states?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Is not the connection by and communion of marriages the commencement of generation in all cities?

Clin. How not?

Athen. The laws then of marriage being first laid down correctly, seem to be laid down for correct conduct in every state.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Let us then first speak of the simple law, which would perhaps exist somehow in this way; that a man is to marry when he is from thirty to thirty-five years old; but if he does not, that he should be fined both in money and with the loss of political privileges; in money to this or that amount, and in disfranchisement of this or that kind. Let this then be the simple law respecting marriages; but this the twofold; that a man is to marry from thirty to thirty-five years old, considering that the human race has in some measure partaken naturally of immortality, of which every one has naturally every desire. For to become famous, and not to lie when dead without a name, is the desire of a person of this kind. The human race then is a thing connected with all time, and follows and will follow it to the end, becoming in this manner immortal through that, which is ever the same and one, partaking by generation of immortality, in consequence of its leaving children’s children. Now for a man to deprive himself willingly of this, is by no means holy; and he intentionally deprives himself of this, who has no care for children and a wife. He, therefore, who obeys this law would depart without a fine. But let him, on the other hand, who does not obey it, and does not marry when he is thirty five years of age, be fined yearly so and so, in order that his solitary life may not seem to bring him gain and an easy state; nor let him share in those honours, which the younger in the state pay on every occasion to the elder. It is then in the power of a person, who hears this law compared with that, to form an idea of each particular law, whether it ought to become in this way double, and the longest in length
through its mingling threats with persuasions; or by employing threats alone, it ought to become simple in length.

Megil. It is the Laconic practice, O guest, to prefer ever the shorter method. But should any one order me to become a judge of such enactments, which of the two I would wish to be written and laid down for a state, I would prefer the longer; and as regards every law according to this model, if two such were proposed, I should make the same choice. It is, how ever, requisite that the present legislation should be agreeable to Clinias; for his is the state, which is now thinking of making use of laws of this kind.

Clin. Well have you spoken, Megillus.

Athen. To take any account of enactments either prolix or brief is very silly. For we must honour, I conceive, the best, but not the shortest, nor (look to) their length. But, in the laws which we have just now spoken of, one differs from the other not by the double alone as regards the value of their use; but that, which was said just now, respecting the twofold kind of physicians, was most properly adduced. To this point however no legislator seems at any time to have given a thought, that, when it is possible to make use of two things in legislation, persuasion and force, they employ the other alone, as far as is possible, against the masses unexperienced in education. For they legislate, not mingling a fight with force, but (employing) unmingled violence alone. But I, O blessed men, perceive that a third thing likewise ought to exist with regard to laws, but which does not exist at present.

Clin. Of what kind are you speaking?

Athen. Of something, which has arisen, through a certain god-send, out of the matters we have just now discussed. For from the time when we began to speak about laws in the morning, mid-day has now arrived; and we have been in this very beautiful retreat discoursing upon no other topic than laws. But we seem to me to be just now beginning to speak about laws; and that all before has been a prelude to laws. Now why have I mentioned this? It is because I wished to say, that in all discourses, and whatever else partake of a vocal sound, there are both preludes and, as it were, movements backwards and forwards, that possess some artificial handling, useful to that which is about to be gone through. And, indeed, of the laws, as they are called, of guitar-songs and of every kind of music, preludes are laid down composed with wondrous care. But of laws really so, which we say are political, no one has ever at any time made any mention of their preludes, nor, as being a composer, has he brought it to light, as if it did not naturally exist. But our present discussion, as it seems to me, indicates that it does exist; and the laws, which were just now mentioned as twofold, have seemed to be not surely thus twofold simply, but there (have seemed) to be some two things, law and a prelude to a law; but the tyrannical injunction, which
was spoken of as being similar to the orders of slave-physicians, (has appeared) to be an unmingled law; but that, which was spoken of prior to this, and called persuasive by this person here, (seemed) to be in reality persuasive, but to have the power of a prelude, relating to discourses. For in order that the person, to whom the legislator addresses his law, may receive kindly, and, through his kindness, with more docility, the injunction, which is the law, on this account the whole of this discourse has appeared to me to have been spoken; which the speaker has spoken persuading. Hence, according to my reasoning, this very thing would be properly called a prelude to a law, but not a discussion of it. What then, after saying this, should I wish to be stated subsequently? It is this; I that the legislator ought ever prior to all laws to make them not without a share of preludes; and as regards each law, in so far as they differ from themselves, as much as the two just now mentioned have differed.

Clin. For my part, I would never exhort a man, skilled in these things, to lay down laws in any other manner.

A then. You appear therefore to me, Clinias, to speak correctly, so far that there is a prelude to all laws; and that it is requisite for a person commencing the business of legislation, to prefer to every discourse a preface, that is natural to each. For that, which is to be said after this, is not a thing of little moment, nor is it a trifling difference, whether they are stated clearly or not clearly. However, if we should enjoin upon legislators to make a prelude equally about what are called great and small laws, we should not speak correctly. For this is not to be done either in every song or in every discourse; since, though it naturally belongs to all, yet it is not to be used for all; and a thing of this kind is to be allowed to the orator, the lyric singer, and the legislator.

Clin. You appear to me to speak most true. But let us make a no further exercise of delay, but return to the question, and begin, if it is agreeable to you, from those points, which you did, as a person not preluding, speak of at that time. Again then, as persons say, when playing, since second things are better, let us turn up and back from the be ginning, as finishing a prelude, and not an accidental discourse, as just now. Let us take then their commencement acknowledging that we are preluding. And what has been just now stated, respecting the honours to be paid to the gods, and the attention due to ancestors, is sufficient. But let us endeavour to speak about what is next in order, until it shall appear to you that the whole prelude has been spoken of sufficiently. And after this you will go through detailing the laws them selves.

Athen. About the gods, then, and those that come after them, and parents, both when living and dead, we made sufficiently then a prelude, as we call it now; but the portion that still remains of this kind of a subject, you appear
to exhort me to lead forth into the light.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. And after these matters, how it is necessary for per sons to keep their souls, and bodies, and substance with reference to serious pursuits and remissions (of labour), and fitting too for both the speaker and the hearers to ruminate in common, and to become, to the utmost of their power, successful in attaining instruction. These very matters then must in reality be spoken of and heard by us after those.

Clin. You speak most correctly.

come to the top, as persons do when digging or ploughing; and the other to the act of ruminating, when an animal throws up the cud from the stomach to the mouth, where it is rolled about and turned over. But as neither sense seems suited to this place, I have translated the word literally, "turn up and back," for the allusion is probably to some sport, of which nothing is known at present.

BOOK V.

Athen. LET every one then hear, who has already heard what we have said respecting the gods, and our dear progenitors. For a man's soul is, after the gods, the most divine of all his possessions, as being most his own. Now the whole of a man's possessions are altogether twofold. The more powerful and the better are the lords, but the weaker and worse, the slaves. Of those then that are his the lord must always be held in honour before the slaves. Hence after the gods, who are lords, and those that follow next to them, I properly exhort a person to honour his own soul by speaking of it as the second in rank. But not one, so to say, honours his soul properly, although he appears (to do so). For honour is somehow a divine good; but of things that are evil not one is honourable. He then, who fancies that he shall enlarge his soul by certain discourses or gifts or certain yieldings, and yet does not make it better from being worse, appears indeed to honour it, but by no means does so. For in stance, every boy on becoming a man thinks himself competent to know all things, and that he honours his soul by praising it, and he freely permits it to do whatever it pleases. But we now say that he, who acts so, injures and does not honour (his soul). And yet it is necessary, as we have said, (to honour) it in the second rank after the gods. Nor, when a man does not consider himself, but others, as the cause of his own errors and of ills the most in number and magnitude, and ever exempts himself as free from blame, is he honouring his own soul, as he forsooth fancies; for he is far from doing so; since he injures it; nor when contrary to reason, and the praise of the legislator, he indulges in plea sures, does he honour it all; but he dishonours it, by filling it with vice and repentance. Nor
yet when, on the contrary, he does not thoroughly labour by bearing up against exertions that receive praise, and against fears and pains, but sinks under them; for I by sinking he then dishonours it; for he causes it to be in dishonour by doing all these acts. Nor does he honour it, when he thinks that to live is altogether a good: for then too he dishonours it. For while his soul imagines that every thing in Hades is evil, he yields, nor does he strive against it by teaching and convincing it that it does not know whether, on the contrary, that, what relates to the gods there is not the greatest of all good to us. Nor yet, when any one honours beauty before virtue, is this any other thing than truly and wholly a dishonour to the soul. For such an assertion falsely proclaims that the body is more honourable than the soul. For nothing born of earth is more honourable than what is in Olympus; and he, who thinks otherwise of the soul, is ignorant that he is careless of this wonderful possession. Nor when a person, who desires to possess wealth not honourably, or when possessing (unjustly), does not bear it ill, does he then honour his soul with gifts? He fails of it entirely. For he sells what is honourable and at the same time beautiful in his soul for a little gold; for all the gold both on the earth and under the earth is of no value against virtue. And, to speak comprehensively, he, who is neither willing by every contrivance to abstain from such things, as the legislator numbers up and ranks amongst the disgraceful and bad, nor, on the other hand, to pursue to the utmost of his power the good and the honourable, does not perceive that, in all these cases, he treats his soul, which is a thing the most divine, with the greatest dishonour, and in the most unseemly manner. For not one, so to say, considers what is the greatest of the so-called I punishment for evil conduct. Now the greatest is in the becoming similar to bad men; and by becoming similar, to avoid good men and good discourses, and to be cut off from them, but to be glued to (the bad), while pursuing according to their intercourse; and sticking close to such persons, he must of necessity do and suffer what such persons naturally do and say to each other. Such a state then is not one of justice, for the beautiful is just [and justice], but of punishment, the attendant on a state of injustice, with which both he, who does meet, and he, who does not meet, are miserable; the one in not being cured; the other in being destroyed, in order that many may be saved. But to us it is an honour, to speak generally, to follow the better and to make the worse, still capable of becoming better, the best possible.

There is not then a possession belonging to a man more naturally fitted, than the soul, to flying from evil, and to tracking out and taking what is of all things the best; nor, when it has taken it, to associate with it for the rest of life. Hence it has been ranked second in honour; but the third every one will understand this at least is the honour, according to nature, of the body. It is however requisite to consider these honours, which of them are genuine, and which with a false stamp. Now this is the business of a legislator. And he appears to me to point out that they are these and some such as these; that the body is honourable, not when it possesses beauty,
or strength, or swiftness, or size, or health although this would seem so to many nor even when it possesses the contraries to these. But those things which, being in the middle, touch upon the whole of this possessing, are by far the most moderate and safe. For the former cause the soul to be puffed up and confident, but the latter humble and Servile. And similarly situated is the possession of money and means, according to the same measure of valuation. For an excess in the bulk of all these things produces enmity and revolts, both in states and amongst individuals; but a deficiency (produces) slavery for the most part. Let not then any one be desirous of riches for the sake of his children, in order that he may leave them very wealthy: for this is better neither for them nor the state. For the substance of the young is not the prey of flatterers; and if it is not in want of the necessaries of life, it is the most harmonious and the best of all. For by its harmony and fitness in all things it renders our life free from pain. It is meet then to leave to children abundance of modesty, not of gold. And we think we shall accomplish this by reproving impudent young men, when they act shamelessly. This, however, is not effected by the exhortation given at present to young men; which persons give by saying that it is meet to be modest in every thing; but a prudent legislator will rather advise old men to feel a shame before the young; and above all things to take care, that no young person, at any time, either sees or hears them doing or saying any thing base; since where old men are shameless, there too must young men of necessity be the most impudent; for the most excellent education both of the young and of themselves is, not in giving advice, but in being seen to do through the whole of life, what a person would say, while giving advice to another. But he who honours and venerates his relationship and the whole communion of family gods, that possess the nature of the same blood, will have, according to reason, the gods who preside over births favourably disposed towards him for the procreation of children. And moreover, he will obtain the kind feeling of friends and associates in the intercourse of life, by considering their attentions to himself as of a greater and more respectful kind than they do; but his own favours to them less than his friends and associates do themselves. As regards, however, the state and fellow-citizens, he is by far the best, who prefers before the contests at Olympia and all in war and peace, to be victorious in the glory of being the servant of the laws at home, [as having been subservient to them]! in a manner the most beautiful of all men through (the whole of) life. We must consider too the laws of intercourse with strangers to be matters of the most holy kind. For nearly all the delinquencies of strangers towards strangers depend more upon an avenging deity than do those in the case of fellow citizens. For a stranger being destitute of companions and kindred, is an object of greater pity both to men and gods. He therefore, who is more able to take vengeance, is more ready to assist. Now the Daemon of each person, and the god of hospitality, are as the attendants upon Zeus, who presides over strangers, powerful in the greatest degree. It is then a matter of much caution for a person, to whom there is even a little portion
of forethought, to proceed on to the end of life, without having committed any error with regard to strangers. But, of all the crimes done by strangers and denizens, the greatest is that which takes place in the case of each towards supplicants. For the god, with whom the suppliant happens to have met, as a witness to agreements made with a suppliant, be comes himself pre-eminently the guardian of the sufferer. So that no one, who injures suppliants, will go unpunished.

Thus then have we nearly gone through the modes of intercourse relating to parents, and to a person himself, and the things belonging to him, and those relating to the state, and friends, and kinsmen, and strangers, and natives. But as to what follows how a person by being what can best pass through life, (it is meet) to detail, not what a law, but what praise and blame may, by teaching individuals, render them more obedient to the rein, and more kindly disposed to the laws about to be established. These then are the matters we must subsequently speak of. Now truth is the leader of every good both to gods and men; of which he, who is about to be blessed and fortunate, should participate immediately from the beginning, in order that for the greatest length of time he may live a person of truth. For he is trustworthy; but he is not trust worthy, by whom a voluntary falsehood is loved; while he, by whom an involuntary one is so, is a senseless person; of which states neither is an object of envy. For he, who is not trust worthy and untaught, is unloved; and as time progresses to wards morose old age, he becomes known, and at the end of life has prepared for himself a solitude complete; so that, whether his associates and children are alive or not, his life becomes nearly equally an orphanhood. He however who does no injury is held in honour; but he, who does not suffer the unjust to act unjustly, deserves more than double the honour of the former person. For the former has a value equal to one man; but the latter to many others, by pointing out to the rulers the injustice of the rest. But let him, who unites with the rulers in inflicting punishments to the utmost of his power, be proclaimed the great man in a state, and the complete victor, if ever one was, in virtue. The very same praise it is meet to proclaim of temperance and prudence; and the person, who possesses other goods, that have a power not only for him to possess them himself, but to share them with others, it is meet to honour, as being at the tip-top (of excel lence); but him, who is unable, although willing, to put aside in the second rank; and to blame indeed the man who is envious and unwilling through friendship to be a sharer of any of his good things with any one; but not to hold a jot the more in dishonour his possession on account of the possessor, but to acquire it with all one’s might. Let then every one contend with us for virtue unstintingly. For such a person advances a state by striving himself, and not cutting down others through calumny. But the envious man, while he thinks to become the superior by detracting from others, tends less himself to true virtue, and makes his competitors disheartened through their being blamed unjustly; and by these means causing the whole state to be untrained for the
contests of virtue, he renders it, as far as he can, of less account as regards its renown. It is proper, moreover, for every man to possess a spirit, and yet to be as mild as possible. For it is not possible to avoid the unjust acts of others, which are harsh and difficult to be cured, or entirely incurable, otherwise than by fighting and conquering, after defending oneself, and by remitting nothing, when in the act of punishing. Now to do this every soul is unable, without possessing a noble spirit.

With respect to the acts of those, who do an injury that admits of a cure, it is requisite to know, in the first place, 'that no unjust man is voluntarily unjust. For no one would at any time willingly possess any of the greatest evils, and least of all in the case of the most honoured belonging to him self. Now the soul, as we have said, is in truth a thing the most honoured by all. No one, therefore, would at any time voluntarily receive the greatest evil in the thing most honoured, and live through the whole of life possessing it. But the unjust man and he who has what are evils, is in every respect an object of pity. It is proper, however, to pity him, who has an evil that is curable, and to restrain and soften down one's anger, and not, like a woman with an excess of passion, to continue embittered against him. But it is meet to let loose one's anger against a person incontinently sinful, and past all exhortation depraved. On which account we have said that the good man ought to be conspicuous for possessing a spirit, and yet to be on each occasion mild.

But of all evils the greatest is implanted in the souls of the major part of mankind; for which, while each one is giving himself a pardon, he devises no plan for avoiding it. And this is what people say; that every man is naturally a friend to himself, and that it is well for a thing of this kind to be necessarily so. But, in truth, the cause of all his mistakes arises to each man, upon each occasion, through the violent love of self. For the lover is blinded with respect to the object loved. So that he judges improperly of things just, and good, and beautiful, through thinking that he ought always to honour what belongs to himself in preference to truth. For it is necessary that he, who is to be a great man, should love neither himself, nor the things belonging to himself, but what is just, whether it happens to be done by himself or by another person rather. From this very same mistake it has come to pass in all cases that his ignorance appears to a person to be a wisdom peculiarly his own. Hence, although we know, so to say, nothing, we fancy we know every thing; but, by not permitting others to do that, of which we ourselves are ignorant, we are compelled to make mistakes through doing it ourselves. On this account every man ought to avoid the vehement love of himself, and ever to follow one better than himself, without placing, in a matter of this kind, a feeling of shame in the foreground. But what are of less importance than these, and mentioned frequently, and not less useful than these, it is proper for a person to remind himself of and to state. For, as something is always flowing away
from us, it is necessary for something on the contrary to be flowing (to us). Now recollection is the influx of thoughts, which had left us. On which account it is meet to abstain from ill-timed laughter, and tears; and for every man to announce to every man that he must endeavour, by concealing all excessive joy and all excessive sorrow, to preserve a decent bearing, each person, while his Dasmon is standing steadily, going on successfully or unsuccessfully to places on high and steep, while Daemons are opposing with certain disturbances; and that it is meet ever I to hope that the deity will, when troubles fall upon the good state, which he has given, make them less instead of greater, and (cause) a change from the present state to a better one; and with respect to [good things] the contraries of these, that they will always be present to them with good fortune. In these hopes it is meet for every one to live, and in the recollection of all these things to be sparing on no point, but ever amidst serious and sportive occupations to remind another and himself clearly.

Now then there have been mentioned nearly (all), as far as divine things are concerned, respecting the pursuits, to which every one ought to attend, and respecting each individual himself, of what kind he ought to be; but matters relating to man have not been at present spoken of. But it is necessary (to speak of them): for we are conversing with men, and not with gods. Now pleasures, and pains, and desires, are naturally in the highest degree human; on which it is necessary for the whole mortal animal to hang, as it were, [and to be suspended] with the greatest earnestness. It is requisite then to praise the most beautiful life, not only because by its form it is superior, as regards fair renown; but because, if any one is willing to taste of it, and not, as being young, to become a deserter from it, it excels in that too, of which we all are in search, (I mean) the possessing more of joy and less of sorrow through the whole of life. That this will be clearly the case, if any one tastes of it correctly, will readily and vehemently appear. Now what is this correctness? This it is requisite to ascertain from the reasoning, and to consider whether it is produced according to nature in this way, or in another, contrary to nature. It is requisite therefore to consider in this manner one life, as compared with another, if it be more pleasant and more painful. We wish for pleasure to be present with us; but we neither choose nor wish for pain. But what is neither the one or the other we do not wish for in the place of pleasure; but we do wish for it to be exchanged in the place of pain. We wish too for less pain with more pleasure; but we do not wish for less pleasure with greater pain. But we can show clearly that we do not wish to possess each of these, equal in the place of equals. All these differ in multitude and magnitude and intensity and equality, and in whatever things are the contrary to all these, with respect to wishing; but! with respect to the choice of each, they do not differ. Since then these things have been thus arranged by necessity, we wish for that life, in which the many and great and intense of each kind exist, but in which pleasures exceed; but we do not wish for that life, in which the contraries to these
exist. And on the other hand, the life in which things few and little and quiet exist, but in which pains exceed, we do not wish for; but we wish for that life in which the contraries to these exist. And again, the life, in which the balance is equal, as we said before, it is meet to consider as an equal-balanced life; since we wish for the life, which exceeds in what is agreeable to us; but we do not wish for that (which exceeds) in what is disagreeable. Now it is necessary to consider all our lives as naturally bound up in these; and [it is necessary to consider] what kind (of lives) we naturally wish for. And if we say, that we wish for any thing except these, we say so through an ignorance of, and inexperience in, lives as they exist.

What then and of what kind are the lives, respecting which it is necessary for a person to know something, while forecasting what is to be wished for and is voluntary, and what is to be not wished for and is involuntary; and, after prescribing a law to himself, to choose what is agreeable and pleasant and the best and the most beautiful, and to lead a life as far as possible, the most happy for man? Let us then call one life temperate, another prudent, another brave, and rank one as healthy; and four others, the contraries to these four, by the name of the imprudent, the cowardly, the intemperate, and the diseased. He, then, who knows the temperate, will lay it down as mild in all things, and exhibiting quiet pains, and quiet pleasures, and placid desires, and loves not insane; but the intemperate as being impetuous in all things, and exhibiting vehement pains, and vehement pleasures, and desires on the stretch and goaded on, and loves the maddest possible; and that in a temperate life the pleasures exceed the pains; but in an intemperate one the pains (exceed) the pleasures in magnitude and multitude and intensity. Hence, the one of these lives hap pens of necessity to be according to nature more pleasant to us, but the other more painful; and it is no longer in the power of him, who wishes to live pleasantly, to live voluntarily in an intemperate manner; but it is evident, if what has been said is correct, that every licentious person is of necessity so unwillingly. For the whole mass of mankind live in the want of temperance, either through the want of teaching, or through incontinence, or through both. The same things are to be considered respecting a diseased and healthy life, that they possess pleasures and pains, but that the pleasures exceed the pains in health, but the pains the pleasures in illness. Our wish however in the choice of lives is not that pain may exceed, but, where it is exceeded, that life we have decided to be the more pleasant. Now the [temperate man], we would say, possesses in both respects things fewer, and less, and slighter than [the intemperate], and the prudent than the imprudent, and the man of bravery than the one of timidity, each exceeding each on the score of pleasures; but on that of pains, the former exceeding the latter, the brave man has the victory over the timid, and in that of the prudent the imprudent; so that of the lives, the more pleasant are the temperate, and the brave, and the prudent, and the healthy, than the timid, and imprudent, and intemperate, and the diseased; and in short, the life which is connected with virtue,
pertaining either to the body or the soul, is more pleasant than the life which is connected with depravity, and is superior even to superfluity in the other points, such as beauty and rectitude and virtue and fair renown; so that it causes the person, who possesses it, to live more happily in every respect and totally, than he (who possesses) the contrary (life).

Let then the prelude of the laws, having been here spoken of, have an end of the speeches. But after the prelude it is necessary somehow for the strain to follow; or rather, in good truth, to write down the laws of a polity. As then it is not possible, in the case of a web, or any other tissue what ever, to work up the weft and the warp from the same materials, but there must needs be a difference as regard their quality in the production of the warp, by being some of it I strong and assuming a firmness through the spindle, and another part of it softer and making use of a just easiness; from whence it is meet that those, who are about to hold great offices in the state, should be judged of separately in this way, and those too, who have been tested in a trifling education, on each occasion according to reason. For there are two kinds of polities, one relating to the appointment of offices to each individual, and the other relating to the laws assigned to the offices. But before all it is requisite to consider things of this kind. A shepherd, and a herdsman, and a breeder of horses, and whatever else there are of this kind of occupations, will, after receiving the whole herd, never attempt to attend to them otherwise than by first applying a purification suited to their individual living together; and having by a selection separated the healthy and diseased, and the well-bred and ill-bred, he will send away one part to some other herds, but attend upon the other part, thoroughly perceiving that his labour would be in vain and non-effective as regards both the body and soul, which after nature and improper aliment had corrupted, they moreover destroy the race of healthy and unmixed habits and bodies in each of the flocks, unless a person purifies what is present in them. The attention, however, which is paid to other animals is indeed less, and is alone worthy to be brought forward for the sake of an example. But the affairs of men (need) the greatest attention on the part of the legislator, to investigate and detail what is suited to each individual, as regards purification and all other actions. For instance, that which relates to the purification of a state should be in this way. Of many existing purifications, some are rather easy, but others more difficult; and he who is both a tyrant and a legislator may be able to use such purifications as are difficult and the best. But the legislator, who without being a tyrant lays down a new polity and laws, would, if he were able to purify with the mildest of purifications, do a thing of this kind contentedly. The best purification is however painful; just as are the remedies of some such kind, which leading for justice to punishment with avenging, put death or exile as the finish to punishment. For it is wont to free the city from those, who have erred the greatest, and who, as being incurable, are the greatest hurt to the state. But with us there is a milder purification of this kind. For upon these, who,
having nothing themselves, do, through the want of food, exhibit themselves as prepared to follow their leaders in an attack upon the property of persons, who possess something, upon such, as being naturally a disease in the state, it imposes a removal, under the name, by way of good omen, of a colony, and sends them away in the kindest possible manner. This then should somehow be done at the very commencement by every one legislating. To us however what is still more strange than this has now happened relating to these. For there is no need to devise either a colony or any selection for a purification; but as if the waters, partly from fountains and partly from mountain torrents, were flowing together into one lake, it is necessary for persons to be on the watch, that, partly by pumping out, and partly by drawing off into channels, and partly by diverting its course, the water flowing together may be the most clear. But labour and danger, as it appears, are to be found in every political establishment. However, since what is now done exists in discourse, and not in action, let our selection be held to be completed, and the purification to have taken place according to our notions. For having by every kind of persuasion and for a sufficient length of time tried by a test those amongst evil men, who were endeavouring to enter our city in order to administer it, let us prevent them from reaching it, and let us introduce the good, (rendering them) well-disposed and propitious to the utmost of our power.

Let not, however, the good fortune, which has happened, lie hid from us, that, as we said that the colony of the Heraclidae was fortunate, because it escaped the dreadful and dangerous strife respecting the division of land and the abolition of debts, in which strife it is impossible for a state, compelled to be regulated by law, to leave any of its ancient institutions undisturbed, nor on the other hand is it possible to disturb them after a certain manner (successfully), (the same thing appears nearly to have happened to us); and there is left merely, so to say, a prayer, and a trifling change to those making a slight alteration cautiously and slowly in a great length of time; which alteration should take place by those persons innovating, who have an abundance of land, and have likewise many debtors, and are willing through a kind consideration to share with those in want, partly by giving up (debts) and partly by distributing (property), and by holding to moderation, and by thinking that poverty does not consist in a diminution of property, but in an insatiable desire to acquire more. For this is the greatest beginning of safety to a state; and upon this, as upon a stable foundation, it is possible to build up whatever political arrangement any one would raise up, befitting a constitution of this kind. But when the change is of an unsound kind, no political movement will afterwards take place easily in a state. From this, as we have said, we fly. It would however have been more correct to have said in what way, if we have not fled from it, we might have made for ourselves the flight. Let it then be said how that through not being fond of money together with justice; but there is no other escape, either broad or narrow, of such a plan. Let this then be laid down by
us as a prop of a state. For it is necessary that (the citizens) should somehow raise up for themselves their property without reproach from each other; or, that they should not be willing to proceed previously to the before of the rest of the constitution, who have accusations of old standing against each other, and to whom there is even a small share of intellect. But for those persons, to whom a god has given, as it has to us at present, to settle a new state, and for no enmities to exist ' against each other, to become themselves the cause of enmities to each other through the division of the land and dwellings, would be a not human want of education, united to every kind of wickedness. What then would be the method of a correct distribution? In the first place, it is requisite to fix the same quantity of the number, how great it ought to be. After this it must be agreed respecting the distribution to the citizens, into how many and what kind of parts it is to be made by them for the mass of people. And for this purpose the land and dwellings must be distributed as equally as possible. Now a sufficient quantity of the mass of people cannot be correctly stated otherwise than with reference to the land and cities of neighbouring nations. As regards the land, how much of it is sufficient to feed how many temperate persons for of more there is no need but as regards the number, how many would be able to defend them selves not altogether without resources against bordering tribes acting unjustly, and to assist their neighbours when injured. Having then viewed these points, we will define both by deed and word the land and neighbours. But now, for the sake of a sketch and outline, that the thing itself may be accomplished, let the discourse proceed to our laying down the laws.

Let the land-owners and those that defend the distribution of the land, be, for the sake of a fitting number, five thousand and forty; and let, in like manner, the land and the dwellings be distributed into the same portions, so that the man and his portion may accord in distribution. And in the first place, let there be of the whole number two parts distributed, and afterwards three of the same; for it is by nature (divisible) into four and five, and so in succession as far as ten. Thus much ought every person, who is legislating, to under stand respecting number, what it is, and what kind will be the most useful to all states. Let us then say it is that, which possesses in itself the greatest quantity of divisions and most in orderly succession. For the whole number does (not) obtain by lot all kinds of divisions for all things. But the number five thousand and forty, in matters relating to war and whatever in peace have to do with conventions and communions, and relating to revenue and distributions, cannot be cut into more than sixty parts wanting one; but there are continuous divisions of it from one up to ten.

These things however it is meet for those to take in hand] firmly at leisure, on whom the law enjoins to take them; for they cannot exist otherwise than in this manner. But it is requisite for them to be mentioned to a person
settling a state for the sake of this; that no one, whether he is making a (polity) new from the beginning, or patching up an ancient one that has been corrupted, will, if he has any mind, attempt to disturb, with respect to the gods or sacred rites, and whatever else ought to be established in the state for each of the gods or daemons, by whatever name they may be called, what ever (has come) ' from Delphi or Dodona or Ammon, or what certain old accounts have somehow persuaded persons on hearing them, when, through visions having occurred or an inspiration from gods having been declared, parties have, through being persuaded, established sacrifices mixed up with mystic ceremonies, (emanating) either from their own country, (or) being exotic from Tyrrhения, or Cyprus, or any other place what ever; and from these ancient accounts and oracles they consecrated statues, and altars, and temples, and made for each of the deities a sacred grove. Of all these not even the least must the legislator disturb; but he must assign to each of the portions a god, a daemon, or some hero. And in the division of the land, he must give up, selected for the first in rank, the groves and all that is fitting, so that the assemblies of each of the portions, taking place at stated times, may furnish resources against their wants, and during the sacrifices kindly entertain, and become familiar with, and recognize, each other. I For there is no greater good to a state than for persons to be the acquaintances of each other. I Since where there is no light to each other in the manners of each other, but a darkness, there no one will properly meet with the honour due to his worth, nor with offices, nor even with the justice which is fitting. It is meet then for every man in all states to be earnest in this matter, compared as one with one, that he never appear to any one to be of a base stamp, but always artless and true, and that no other person of that kind deceive him. But the next movement, as in the case of the pebble-game, from the sacred spot would, as being unusual, cause, in the case of legislation, the person who hears of it for the first time perhaps to wonder. To him however who has reasoned upon, and tried it, it will appear that the state is in a second way settled for the best. Perhaps however some one will not receive the movement, through its not being customary with a tyrannic legislator. It will I however be most correct to speak of the best polity, and of the second and third, and then to leave the choice to each person, who is the lord in the co settlement. Let us act then even now according to this very method, by speaking of a polity the first, and the second, and the third in worth; and let us leave the choice to Clinias at present, and to any one else who may be willing to come to the selection of such polities, and to assign, according to his own method, that which is agreeable to him (with respect to) his own country.

Now the first state and polity and the best laws are there, where the old saying may be most in vogue through the whole state; for it said that, amongst friends all things are really in common. This saying, whether it now is or ever will be (practiced), that women are in common, and children in common, and all possessions in common, has taken away by every means
every where and entirely from life what is called private property; and it has
planned that things even naturally private, as far as possible, become by
some means in common; such as the eyes, the ears, and the hands, in
seeming I to see, and hear, and work, in common; and that, again, all men
taken singly praise and blame as much as possible (the same things),
rejoicing in, and pained by, the same things; and (hence) no one (has) ever
laid down or will lay down a definition more correct and better (than this),
that of such laws as cause a state to be as much as possible one, (there is)
the superiority on the ground of virtue. Such a state will ours be, whether
gods or the children of gods, more in number than one, dwell there, and with
delight save and regulate those living in that manner. Hence it is proper to
reflect upon the pattern of a polity in no other way; but, sticking to this, to
seek that, which is as much as possible of such a kind. But that, which we
have now taken in hand, would, if it existed at all, be the nearest to
immortality; and if it is not in the first rank, it will be at least one in the
second. After this we will, god willing, go through the polity, which is the
third in order. But now let us speak of this polity, what it is, and how it may
be produced.

In the first place, let them distribute the land and houses. But let them not
cultivate the ground in common; since a thing of this kind is spoken of as
greater than is suited to their present birth, nurture, and education. Let
them however distribute land and houses with somehow such an intention as
this, that each on obtaining his allotment ought to consider it as being
common to the whole state; and, as this country is their paternal land, they
ought to attend to it in a greater degree than children do their mother, in
that, being a goddess, she is the sovereign mistress of mortals. The same
conceptions they ought to have of the gods of the place, and likewise of
daemons. But that these things may exist in this manner through all time,
on this too they must thoroughly reflect. As many hearths as are
distributed by us at present, so many must there be always, and neither
more nor less. Now a thing of this kind will be firmly established through
every state in this way. Let the person, who has obtained his allotment,
leave ever the child, who is most dear to him, the only heir of his household,
and his successor, and the attendant upon the gods and family and state,
and of those still living, and of such as their end has already reached up to
the then period. But with respect to the other children, they, to whom there
are more than one, must give their daughters in marriage according to a law
to be laid down; but distribute their male children as sons to those, who have
no family, as an act of kindness conferred; but if there be a lack of
kindness, or if more females are born than some males, or the contrary,
when they are fewer, through barrenness taking place, let the magistrate,
whom we shall lay down as the greatest and most honourable, consider what
is proper to be done with the superabundance and deficiency of children, and
devise a method by which five thousand and forty households alone may
exist always. Now there are many methods. For there are checks to
procreation when it is over flowing; I and, on the contrary, care and an attention to the number of births do, by means of honours, and disqualifications, and the advice of elders to young persons, meet (the difficulty), and are able to effect what we are speaking of [by admonitory discourses]. 'Moreover, should at last every difficulty arise about the inequality of the five thousand and forty households, and an excessive influx of citizens take place through the kind feelings of those, who dwell together, and we come to want, there remains the old contrivance, which we have often mentioned, of friendly colonies being sent out from friends, whithersoever it may appear to be suitable. But if, on the contrary, there should at any time come a wave bringing an inundation, or a destruction arising from plagues or wars, and the people become, through a state of orphan hood, much less than the prescribed number, we must not willingly introduce citizens educated in a not legitimate discipline; but to use force against necessity it is said not even a god has the power.

This then let us assert our present discourse advises, by saying ye best of all men, do not relax in honouring similitude and equality and the same and what is generally acknowledged according to nature and according to number and all the power of things beautiful and good. And now guard, in the first place, through the whole of life the above-mentioned number; next, do not hold in dishonour the height and magnitude of the property, which ye first distributed, as being moderate, by buying from, and selling to, each other. For neither the distributing lot, being a god, is an ally, nor the legislator. For now the law, in the first place, enjoins upon the disobedient, by proclaiming beforehand, that upon these conditions any person, who is willing, may cast lots or not; and that, since the land, being sacred, belongs first to all the gods, and next, to the priests and priestesses, who pray at the first sacrifices, and the second, and even to the third, both the buyer and seller of tenements and farms, which they have obtained by lot) are to suffer what is befitting upon such transactions; and having written memoranda on cypress (tablets), they shall place them in temples written for the time hereafter; and in addition to this they shall invest the guardianship of these, in order that they may be, in that magistrate, who seems to see the most acutely, in order that the matters fraudulently introduced I may not lie hid from them, but that they may punish the per son disobedient at the same time to the law and to the god. For how great a good will what is now enjoined be to all states that are persuaded, when they adopt the following arrangement, according to the old proverb, no person being wicked will know, but being experienced and reasonable in his habits (he will). For in such an arrangement there exists not much of money-making; and there is attendant upon it the being neither necessary nor lawful for any one to make money by any illiberal kind of money-making insomuch as the so-called operative art is reproached as subverting liberal habits nor to think it right to scrape money together at all by such means.
In addition to this a law still follows all these, that no private person be permitted to possess any gold or silver; but that (there be) a coin for the sake of daily exchange, which it is almost necessary for handicrafts to change, and for all, who have a need of such things, to pay the wages due to hired persons, be they slaves or domestic servants. On which account we say that they must possess coin, which is of value amongst themselves, but of no worth amongst the rest of man kind. For the sake of war indeed and of going abroad to other countries for instance in the case of embassies, or some other business of a herald, compulsory on the state should it be requisite to send out the common coin of Greece, it will be necessary on each occasion for the state to possess it. But if there be any necessity for a private person to go abroad, let him, after obtaining leave of the magistrate, go abroad; but the foreign coin, which on his return home he has brought from any place, still remaining, let him put down for the state, and take up that of the country at the rate (of exchange). And if any one is detected in making (the foreign money) his own, such money shall become public property; and let him, who knows the fact, but does not divulge it, be subject to a curse and reproach together with the party bringing it in, and to a fine in addition, not less than the amount of the foreign money so brought in.

And (be it enacted), that a person who is going to marry, or is giving (a daughter) in marriage, is neither to give or receive a marriage portion at all of any kind whatsoever, nor to deposit money with a person, whom one does not trust, nor to lend money upon interest, since it will be lawful for the borrower to repay neither interest nor principal. Now that these pursuits are the best for a state to pursue, a person would decide correctly by considering them in this way, and referring them ever to their origin and intention. Now the intention of the statesman, who has a mind, we say, is not that, which the many would say, that a good legislator ought to wish, how the state, for which he is with correct thoughts legislating, may be the greatest and the wealthiest possible, and possess gold and silver money, and rule over as many as possible by sea and land; and they would add, that the person legislating correctly ought to wish the state to be the best and the happiest possible. Now of these things some can take place, but others cannot. The possible then the arranging party would wish; but the impossible he would not; I nor would he make even an attempt at wishes that are vain. For it is almost necessary for them to be at the same time happy and good. This then he would wish. But it is impossible for persons to be very rich and good, such at least as the many reckon rich. For they reckon rich those, who amongst a few persons have possessions valued at the greatest quantity of coin, which even a bad man may possess. Now if such be the case, I will never agree with them that the rich man, if not a good one, can be truly happy; but that it is impossible for the person pre-eminently good, to be pre-eminently rich. What then? some one would perhaps say. Because, we would say, the possession of what is obtained both justly and unjustly, is
more than double of that which is obtained justly alone; and that the expenditure, which is wont to be made neither honourably nor disgracefully, is doubly less than that which is honourable, and is wont to be made for honourable objects. He, therefore, who acts in a contrary manner, will never be richer than him, who has double the means and half the expenditure. Now of these, the one is a good person, but the other not a bad one, since he is (merely) parsimonious; sometimes, indeed, he is altogether bad; but, as we have just now said, is never good. For he, who receives both justly and unjustly, and spends neither justly nor unjustly, is indeed rich, because he is parsimonious; but he who is altogether bad, as being for the most part luxurious, is very poor. And be, who spends upon honourable objects and acquires only justly, will never at any time become pre eminently rich, nor yet very poor; so that our assertion is right, that the very rich are not good men; and, if they are not good, they are not happy.

With us, however, the laying down of laws looks to that point, that the citizens may become the most happy and in the highest degree friends to each other. But the citizens will never be friends, where there are many lawsuits with each other and much injustice; but (most so) where the least and fewest are found. We have said too, that there ought to be neither gold nor silver in the state; nor, again, much money making through handicraft trades and usury, or ugly cattle, but what agriculture gives and bears, and of these too such as will not compel a person by making money to neglect those things, for the sake of which riches are produced. Now these are the soul and body; which, without gymnastics and the rest of discipline, would never be worth mentioning. Hence we have said more than once, that we must put the attention to money in the last place of honour. For, since all, about which every man is seriously engaged, are three, the last and third is correctly the attention paid to riches, but the middle is that relating to the mind; but that relating to the soul the first. And, indeed, the polity, which we have just now been going through, has been correctly laid down by laws, if it ordains honours in this manner. But if any one of the laws which are ordained in it shall seem to put health in the place of honour in the state before temperance, or wealth before health and temperance, it will appear to be not properly laid down. A legislator, therefore, ought often to point out to himself this. " What do I intend?" and, " If this happens, or I fail in my aim," (what then?) And thus perhaps he would get himself out of legislation, and liberate likewise the rest, but never a single person by any other means. Let then the person, who has obtained by lot his portion, keep it on the conditions we have detailed.

It were a beautiful thing I for each person to come to the colony possessing the rest of things also equally. But as this is not possible, and one will come possessing more means, and another less, it is requisite, for the sake of many things, and of the opportunities in the state, for the sake of equality, that the value of property should be unequal, in order that magistracies, and
contributions, and distributions, (may exist) to each (according) to the value of his worth; (and) that, not according to his own virtue alone, and that of his ancestors, nor yet according to the strength or beauty of his body, but according to the using of wealth and poverty they may receive as equally as possible, by what is unequal, but commensurable, and not differ. For the sake of these things it is requisite that there should be four valuations in the size of property; and that these should be called first, second, third, and fourth, or by some other appellation; and that, when they remain in the same valuation, and when becoming richer from being poor, and poor from being rich, each may pass to the valuation suited to themselves. This scheme of law I would lay down as following after these.

We say then that in a state, which is to have no part in the greatest of diseases, which would be more correctly called dissension or sedition, there should exist neither severe poverty amongst some of the citizens nor (great) wealth: for both these produce both. It is therefore requisite for a legislator to say at present what is the bound of each. Let then the limit of poverty be the valuation of the lot, which ought to remain, and which no magistrate will ever overlook its becoming less to any one, nor any one of the rest of those who in the same way love honour on the score of virtue. Now the legislator, having laid down that limit as a measure, will permit a person to possess the double, triple, and even to the quadruple of it. But, if any one possesses more than these, whether by finding them, or their being given, or by money-making, or by acquiring through any other such like fortune, by giving up what is above the measure to the state and to the gods, who guard the city, he will be in good repute and without damage. But if any disobeys this law, any one may inform against him on condition of receiving half the property, and the delinquent shall pay another portion to the same amount, and the half shall go to the gods. And let the whole property of all, except the allotment, be written down openly before the magistrates, who are the guardians, in order that such of the suits upon all points as relate to money may be easy and extremely clear.

After this it is meet in the first place to build the city as much as possible in the middle of the country, after selecting a spot from those at hand, which possesses what is suited for a city, which it is not difficult to imagine and detail. After this, to divide it into twelve parts; and placing first the temple of Hestia, (Vesta,) and Zeus, and Athene, to call it the Acropolis, and to throw round it a circular (enclosure), and from it to cut the city and all the country into twelve parts. But the twelve parts ought to be equalized by the portions of the prolific land being small, but those of the unprolific large, and the allotments to be five thousand and forty. And again (it is meet) to cut each of these into two; and to unite two sections into one allotment, each having a share of what is near to, and what is remote from, the city, the near portion being added to that one farthest off, making one allotment; and that, which is the second from the city, (to be added) to that, which is
the second from the extremity; and so on with all the rest. And (it is meet) to contrive in the twofold divisions, that what has just now been said (respecting) the badness and goodness of the land, be equalized by the greater and less quantity at the distribution; and to divide the males like wise into twelve parts; and for a person to arrange the whole of the rest of property into twelve parts equal, as much as is possible, a description being made of all particulars. After this, to assign the twelve allotments to the twelve gods, and to call them after their names, and to consecrate to each the portion obtained by lot, and to call it a Phyle; and again to divide the twelve sections of the city in the same manner as they divided the rest of the country; and that each should possess two habitations, one near the centre and the other near the extremity; and thus let the method of settlement have an end. But it is requisite for us to consider by all means a matter of this kind, that alt the points, which have just now been stated, will never concur on such like occasions, so that all should happen to take place according to reason; and that men will exist, who would not feel annoyed at such a method of living together, but would endure to have property fixed (by law) and mode rate through the whole of life; and the procreation of children to be such as we have mentioned; and to be deprived of silver and gold, and other things, which the legislator is clearly, from what has been said, about to forbid; and (endure) further the equalization of the land and the dwelling in a city placed in the centre, as we have mentioned above. Of all which matters a person has been speaking almost as if they were dreams, and moulding a state and citizens, as it were, of wax. Subjects however of this kind have been in a certain manner not badly spoken of. But it is requisite to take up again against himself things of this kind. For the legislator would say again to us this " Do not think, my friends, that what has been now asserted in these speeches has lain hid from me, and that (a person) has gone through in some manner the truth. But I think this will be most just in each of those things about to be, that he, who exhibits a pattern, according to which the thing attempted ought to be done, should omit nothing of what is most beautiful and true; but that he, to whom it is impossible for any thing of this kind to happen, should decline executing that very thing; but that of those which remain, and is nearest to it, and most closely connected naturally with what it is fitting to do, he should devise a plan how this very thing may take place; but permit the legislator to put a finish to his intention; and this being done, then to consider in common with him, which of the matters that have been mentioned are conducive, and which adverse to legislation. For it surely behoves the artist in a matter the most trifling to make by all means his work consistent with itself, if it is to be worthy of mention. But now after the decree relating to the division into twelve parts, we must be ready to look into this too, namely, to show in what manner the twelve parts have the greatest possible number of divisions of the things within them, and what are consequent upon these, and produced from them, up to the five thousand and forty; and from whence (they have) clans, and wards, and villages, and, in addition, the
drawing up and leading out of (troops) in war, and moreover coins, and measures dry and liquid, and weights; all these it is requisite for the law to regulate in measure and in harmony with each other. In addition to these we ought not to feel a fear even on that ground, lest there should be what is considered an attention to trifles, should any one regulate all the chattels which persons are to possess, nor permit any of them to be immoderate, and consider by a reason common to all, that the distributions and variations of the numbers are useful for all things, even such as are various themselves in themselves, and such as are so in length and depth, or in sounds and motions, both those that proceed in a straight direction upwards and downwards, and (those that) move in a circle. For it behoves the legislator, looking to all these points, to enjoin all the citizens not to swerve from this arrangement to the utmost of their power. For no one branch of learning suited to children possesses such a mighty power as regards domestic economy, and state polities, and all arts, as the study of numbers; and, what is the greatest of all, excites even the sleepy person and naturally untaught, and renders him docile, and with a good memory, and clever, while making a progress, by a divine art, beyond his own nature. All these, if a person shall have taken away by other laws and pursuits illiberality and a love of money from the minds of those, who are about to possess them sufficiently and profitably, would become a course of instruction honourable and befitting; but if not, a person would unconsciously, instead of wisdom, produce the so-called cleverness, such as it is in our power to see the Egyptians and Phoenicians, and many other nations pro duce, through the illiberality of their other pursuits and possessions; either because some indifferent legislator of theirs has caused such results, or a severe misfortune has fallen upon them, or some other nature of this kind. For let not this, Megillus and Clinias, lie hid from us respecting places, that some differ from others in producing men better or worse; in op position to which we must not lay down laws. For through all kinds of winds and violent heat, some persons are of an alien disposition, and with feelings of hostility; others through the water; but others through that food from the earth, which not only imparts to bodies (properties) better and worse, but which is no less able to infuse all things of this kind into their soul. But of all the places in a country those excel the most, in which there is a certain divine inspiration, and allotments for daemons, who are either always propitious to the inhabitants, or the contrary; for whom the legislator, who has a mind, would, after reflecting, as much as it is possible for man to reflect upon (all) things of this kind, en deavour to lay down laws; which must be done by you, Clinias; for to matters of this kind must he turn himself, who is about to colonize a country.

Clin. Very beautifully, Athenian guest! do you speak; and so must it be done by me.
BOOK VI.

Athen. BUT, after all that has now been said, there will be almost the appointment of magistrates in your state.

Clin. Such is the case.

Athen. Respecting the proper arrangement of a polity, these two kinds of things happen to exist. First, the appointment of offices, [and of persons about to rule,] how many they ought to be, and in what manner appointed. Next, with respect to the laws that are to be imposed upon each office, what, and how many, and of what kind it will be fitting (to impose) upon each. But, previous to choosing them, let us stop a little, and give some account fitting to be detailed respecting them.

Clin. What account is this?

Athen. This. Something of this kind is surely evident to all, that, since the work of legislation is a matter of moment, by placing a state well furnished with laws well laid down under not suitable magistrates, not only would there be a very great laugh at the (laws) well laid down to no purpose, but there would arise nearly the greatest mischief and bane to states from them.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Let us then consider this, as happening to you, my friend, touching the present polity and state. For you see that it is necessary in the first place for those, who are proceeding in a straight road to the powers of magistrates, to have given, both themselves and their respective families from childhood to the period of their election, a sufficient test. Next for those, who are about to make the choice, to have been brought up and well taught in legal habits, so as to be able to judge correctly of those worthy of either (fate), and to receive, or to reject them with disgust. But how can those, who have recently met together for this purpose, and are unacquainted with each other, and moreover uninstructed, be ever able to choose magistrates in a blameless manner?

Clin. They nearly never can.

Athen. But a contest, as they say, does not readily admit of excuses. This then must now be accomplished both by you and me; since you have with readiness undertaken to settle a colony for a clan of the Cretans, and are, as you say, the tenth commissioner; and I have promised to assist you, according to our present story-telling. I will not therefore willingly leave this discourse without a head. For should it meet us, while wandering in this state, it would appear to be deformed.
Clin. You have spoken, guest, very well.

Athen. Not (spoken) merely, but so I will do to the utmost of my power.

Clin. Let us do by all means, as we have said.

Athen. Be it so, if god be willing; and so far at least let us be victors over old age.

Clin. And it is likely that he will be willing.

Athen. It is reasonable. Following him therefore, let us understand this.

Clin. What?

Athen. In how manly and hazardous a manner will our state have been at present settled.

Clin. Looking to what and whither especially have you thus spoken at present?

Athen. How easily and fearlessly have we laid down laws for persons unskilled, in what way they may receive what has been just laid down. Thus much, at least, is evident, Clinias, nearly to every one, although not very wise, that no one will easily admit these laws at first. But if we wait for the time when those, who in their boyhood had tasted of, and been sufficiently brought up in, the laws, and accustomed to them, shall have taken a common part in them with the whole city in the election, of magistrates, on such an event happening as we are speaking of, if this should take place in a certain manner and skill, I conceive there would be a great security that a state would remain even after the then existing period educated in this way.

Clin. This carries reason with it.

Athen. Let us then look to this, whether we can furnish any means sufficient for this end. For I assert, Clinias, that the Cnossians ought, in a manner superior to the other Cretans, not merely to go through a formal rite respecting the country which is now being colonized, but to strenuously care ful that the first magistrates may stand in the most secure and best manner possible. With respect to others, it is a shorter work; but it will be most necessary for us to choose the guardians of the laws with every care.

Clin. What road then and method can we discover for this?
Athen. This. I assert then, ye sons of Cretans, that the Cnossians, since they take the lead of the majority of cities, ought to choose in common with those who are going to this joint settlement, from themselves, and them, thirty-seven men in all; nineteen from the settlers, but the rest from Cnossus itself; and let the Cnossians give up these to your state, and for yourself to be a member of this colony and one of the eighteen men; and this, either by employing per suasion or moderate force.

Clin. But why do not you, O guest, and Megillus, share with us in this polity?

Athen. Athens, Clinias, has a high opinion of her self, and so too has Sparta, and each have their dwellings far off. But to you and the other settlers there is a care on all points, the same as what we were just now saying respecting you. Let it then be held to have been stated how these things may, from what is at present in our power, take place in the most likely manner. But as time progresses, and the form of polity continues, let the choice of them (the magistrates) be something in this way. In the election of magistrates let all take a share who bear arms, either as horse-soldiers or foot-soldiers, and who have taken a part in war according to their respective ability in age; and let the election take place in whatever temple the state holds in the highest veneration; and let each person bring to the altar of the god a small tablet, on which he has written the name of his father, and parish, and ward where he is a liveryman; and let him write thus his own name in the same manner. But let it be lawful for any one to take away the tablet, which appears to him to be not properly written, and to place it in the Agora, (there to remain) for not less than thirty days. Of the tablets let the magistrates exhibit to the view of the whole city up to three hundred, that have been judged to be amongst the first; and from these in a similar manner let the city vote whomsoever each person pleases; and let (the magistrates) exhibit again to all one hundred of those selected out of them a second time; and out of the hundred let any one vote a third time for whom he pleases, going through cuttings. But the thirty-seven, who may have the greatest number of votes, let some persons de ciding declare to be the magistrates. Who then, Clinias and Megillus, shall appoint all these things for us in the state, re specting magistrates and the testing of them? Do we not perceive, that in states, so united from the first, there must be some; but who they would be, it is not the province of all magis trates? It is however necessary (that there should be some), and these too men of not an inferior kind, but as much as pos sible at the very summit. For the beginning, according to the proverb, is the half of the whole; and all men praise a good commencement. But this, as it seems to me, is more than the half; nor has any one sufficiently praised it, when it has taken place correctly.

Clin. You speak most correctly.
Athen. Let us then, since we know it, not pass it by untold, by making nothing clear to ourselves as to the manner in which it exists. For my part I have it not in my power to say but one word necessary for, and conducive to, the present purpose.

Clin. What is it?

Athen. I assert that to this state, which we are about to settle, there is not, as it were, a father and mother except the city which colonizes it. Nor am I ignorant that often times some differences have arisen, and will arise, between colonies and their parent countries. At present then, as a child, although it is about to be at variance with its parents, through its present want of instruction, loves and is beloved by them, and is constantly flying to its relations, finds allies in them alone, which I assert has now taken place readily to the Cnossians through their care for the new city, and to the new (city through their care) for the Cnossians. I repeat then, as I have just now said, for what is well said it does no harm (to say) twice that the Cnossians ought to have a care over all these particulars in common, by selecting from those, who are departing for the colony, the oldest and best possible, not less than one hundred, and let there be another hundred from the Cnossians themselves. I say too, that these should, on coming to the new city, be careful how the magistrates are appointed according to the laws, and after being appointed undergo a scrutiny. And on this taking place, let the Cnossians dwell in Cnossus; and let the new city endeavour to preserve itself and become prosperous. Let then those numbered amongst the thirty-seven men be held to have been chosen both now and for all time to come for these purposes. First, let them be guardians of the laws; next, of those writings (in) which every one shall write down for the magistrates the amount of his property, except the person who has the greatest valuation of four mina, and the second of three, and the third of two [minae]; but the fourth of (one) I mina. But if any one shall be shown to possess any thing else beyond what has been written down, let all this become public property; and, besides this, let him undergo a punishment, through any one bringing him to trial, neither honourable nor with a good name, but disgraceful, should he be convicted of despising the laws through the love of gain. Let then any one indict him for being addicted to a disgraceful love of gain, and follow up the charge by a trial before the guardians of the laws. And if the defendant is condemned to pay a fine, let him have no share in the public property; and when any distribution takes place in the state, let him be without a share, except as regards his (first) allotment; and let him be written down, where any one who wishes may read it, as a person condemned, as long as he lives. Let not the guardian of the laws be in office more than twenty years; and let him not be inducted into his office, if he is less than fifty years of age. But if he is sixty years old when he is inducted into it, let him hold it for ten years; and according to this ratio let it be, that he, who has passed beyond seventy years, shall not imagine that he holds an
office of such importance amongst those who are holding it.

Let then these three ordinances be considered to have been stated, touching the guardians of the laws. But as the laws progress, each one may enjoin upon these men, what matters they ought to attend to, in addition to what have been detailed already.

And now we will speak in order about the election of other magistrates. For after this it is necessary to elect Generals, and such as minister to them in war, such as the Hipparchs and the Phylarchs, and those who drill the foot-soldiers of the Phyle, to whom would be very fitting the name of Taxiarchs, as the common people call them. Of these let the guardians of the laws propose for Generals from this very state itself; and from those so proposed let all, who have taken a part in war at their proper age, or are in the act of doing so on each occasion, make the selection. But if it shall appear to any one that some one of those, who have not been proposed, is superior to some of those, who have been proposed, let him name the person, whom he proposes, in the place of some one, and, taking an oath touching this very matter, let him bring forward the other party; and which ever shall be voted by a show of hands, let him be decreed as belonging to the selection. And let the three, who have the greatest number of votes for them to be Generals and to have the care of the war department, undergo a scrutiny, as the guardians of the law (underwent). And let the twelve elected Generals propose twelve Taxiarchs for themselves, for each tribe one; and let there be a preference nomination, as occurred in the case of the Generals, done in the same manner, respecting the Taxiarchs, and a second show of hands and a decision. And let the guardians of the laws, after they have brought together an assembly at a place the most holy and most convenient, cause to sit, before the Prytanes and Council have been chosen, the heavy-armed apart, and apart too the cavalry, and the third in order after these the whole of those employed in war. And let all hold up their hands for the Generals and Hipparchs; but for the Taxiarchs those who carry shields; but let all the cavalry choose for itself Phylarchs; but let the Generals appoint for themselves the officers over the light-armed soldiers, or archers, and the rest of those employed in war. There still remains for us the appointment of the Hipparchs. These then let those propose, who proposed the Generals; and let the election and the preference nomination take place, as it occurred in the case of the Generals. And let the cavalry hold up their hands for them in the presence of the infantry looking upon them; and let the two, who have the greatest show of hands, be the commanders of all the cavalry; and let the disputes about the show of hands take place up to twice; but if any one doubts about them a third time, let those determine the votes, whose province it is to fix the measure of voting.

The Council shall consist of thirty dozen; for three hundred and sixty would
be suited to the distributions; and by dividing that number into four parts, (each) ninety, from each portion of the census ninety counselors would give (their vote.) And in the first place let all those of the largest valuation give their vote; or the person who disobeyes (the law) will be fined according to the fine decreed, and "when they shall have been carried in, let a person put a mark against them. On the following day let those of the second class give (their vote), as on the former (day); and on the third day let any one of the third class bring (his vote). In the case of those belonging to these three classes, let it be compulsory to give (a vote); but let the fourth and smallest class be dismissed exempt from fine, should any one belonging to it be unwilling to give (a vote). On the fourth day let all belonging to the fourth and smallest class give (their votes); but let him, who belonging to the third and fourth class, is unwilling to give (a vote) be exempt from a fine. But let him, who, belonging to the second and first class, does not give a vote, be fined; he, who belongs to the second rank, be fined the triple of the first fine; and he, who belongs to the first, quadruple. On the fifth day let the rulers bring out for all the citizens to see the names that have a mark against them; and let every man of them give (a vote) or be fined with the first fine. And after selecting one hundred and eighty out of each class, let them, after choosing by ballot one half of them, make a scrutiny of them, and these shall form the council for one year.

The election taking place in this manner, would be a medium between a monarchy and a democracy; which medium a polity ought always to preserve. For slaves and masters can never become friends, nor the depraved and worthy, when proclaimed with equal honours. For through things, that are unequal, those that are equal will become unequal, unless they partake of moderation; for, through both of those (in equalities) polities are filled with seditions. For the old saw, being true, that equality produces friendship, has been asserted very correctly and carefully. But through its not being very evident what the equality is, which is able to effect this, it throws us into great trouble. For, as there are two equalities, of the same name, but in reality nearly contrary to each other on many points, every state and every legislator is competent to introduce one of these in the case of honours by regulating, as regards the distribution by means of the ballot, the equality consisting in measure, weight, and number; but it is not easy for every one to perceive the most true and the best equality. For it is the decision of Zeus; and it furnishes but little at all times to men; although as much as it does furnish to states or private persons, it works out every good. For it distributes more to the greater, and less to the smaller, imparting to each what is moderate according to its nature. Moreover it distributes greater honours to those who are even greater in virtue, but to those who have (less) of virtue and education (it distributes) less (honours), as being suited to each according to reason. For this surely is justice itself even in politics, at which we ought at present to grasp, and, looking to this equality, Clinias, to settle our now rising state. And should
any one settle any other (state), he ought to give laws, with his mind turned to this point, and not to a few tyrants, or one, or to any power of the people, but always to justice itself. And this is what has just now been stated, namely, the distributing what is according to nature, equal to unequals.

It is necessary however for every state to make use of these (two) equalities in name, if it is about not to have a share in seditious in any degree. For the easy and lenient temper of what is perfect and accurate contrary to justice the correct is improperly broken down when it takes place. Hence it is perhaps necessary to make use in addition of the equality by ballot, on account of the moroseness of the multitude; and after wards to invite by prayers a god and good fortune to direct the ballot to what is most just. In this manner then it is necessary to use both the equalities; but the one which is in need of good fortune on the very fewest occasions.

These things, and in this way, and for these reasons, it is necessary, friends, for that state to do, which is about to be preserved. But since both a ship, while sailing on the sea, requires constantly a watch both night and day, and in like manner a state dwells, while driven along by the storm of other states, and running the risk of being caught by all kinds of plots, it is requisite through the day to night, and from night to day, for the rulers to join with rulers, and watchers with watchers, and to succeed each other constantly, and never to cease handing over (their power). But the multitude is not able to do any of these things quickly. And it is necessary to permit the majority of the counselors to remain for the greatest part of their time properly managing their own private affairs; but that a twelfth part of them should distribute themselves over the twelve months, so as to furnish a watch, one part for one month, and to be in readiness for anything in the case of any one coming from any where else, or from the city itself for any purpose, whether a person should be desirous of telling or hearing aught respecting what it is fitting for one state to give an answer to other states, or by putting questions to others to receive replies; and moreover for the sake of those innovations of all kinds which are wont to happen perpetually, in order especially that they may not occur; or, if they have occurred, that the consequences may be cured as quickly as possible, after the state shall have become acquainted with them. Hence that portion, which presides over the state, ought to be the master of public meetings and their dissolutions, which take place both according to law and on a sudden. All these matters it should be for the twelfth part of the council to arrange, who are to be at rest for eleven parts of the year. But this part of the Council ought always to keep these watchings over the state in common with the other magistrates.

Such then being the state of affairs as regards the state, they may be put into order with moderation. But what care, and what order, will there be in
all the rest of the country? Must there not, since all the city, and the whole country, is distributed into twelve parts, be shown to be Commissioners of the roads, and dwellings, and buildings, and harbours, and of the market-place, and fountains, and moreover of sacred groves, and temples, and all other things of this kind belonging to the state?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Let us say then, that there ought to be persons to cleanse the temples, and priests and priestesses; and that it is meet to choose three kinds of officers over roads and buildings, and the ornaments belonging to things of this kind, and over human beings that they may do no injury, and over the rest of wild beasts, in the very encircling enclosure and suburb of the city, in order that every thing may take place befitting cities; and that as regards the duty just now stated, it is meet to call them City Stewards, but as regards the market, Market Stewards, and as regards the temples, Priests. But let us not disturb those, with whom, as priests or priestesses, the sacred office is hereditary. But if, as is likely to happen to those first settled, nothing has been laid down respecting holy things of this kind in favour of any body or only a few, one must appoint priests and priestesses to be the cleansers of the temples of the gods. But of all these things some are to be in their appointment by election, and some by lot, through those that are and are not Wards men mingling in a friendly manner with each other in every district and town, in order that they may be as much as possible of one mind. To commit then what relates to sacred rites to the god himself, let it be an act of gratification to him, and to allow divine fortune to settle by lot. But the party who has happened to obtain the lot, (it is meet) to subject to a scrutiny first, whether he is of a sound body and lawfully begotten; next of a family as pure as possible, and unpolluted himself by blood and all crimes of such a kind against the gods, and whether his father and mother have lived in a similar manner. And it is meet to bring from Delphi the laws relating to all divine things, and, after appointing interpreters for them, to make use of them. And let the priestly office be for a year, and not longer; and let the person be not less than sixty years of age, who is, according to holy laws, to attend for us sufficiently to divine matters. And let there be the same laws relating to priestesses. And let the thrice four tribes bring (to the vote) thrice four interpreters, each (one) from them selves; and after scrutinizing the three who have the greatest number of votes, (it is meet) to send the other nine to Delphi, for the god to designate by an oracle one out of each triad; and let the scrutiny relating to these, and their age, be as in the case of the priests, and let these be interpreters for life; and let the four wards elect in the place of him, who may have left (life), (another) from the ward where there is a deficiency. (It is meet) too to choose Stewards for the sacred money in each of the temples, with full powers over the sacred groves and their produce, and the leasing (of the property), and three for the largest temples out of those
with the largest estates; but two for the smaller temples, and one for the most moderate; and let the choice and scrutiny of these be in the same manner as the election of the Generals was made. And let what relates to sacred things take place in this way.

But let nothing be as far as possible without a guard. Let the guards of the city be in this way, through the Generals, and Taxiaruchs, and Hipparchs, and Phylarchs, and the Prytanes, and moreover the City Stewards and Market Stewards, attending to their (respective) duties, after they have been chosen and appointed sufficiently; but the whole of the rest of the country (it is meet) to guard in this way. The whole country has been divided by us into twelve parts as nearly as possible equal. Let then, one Phyle (ward), after being allotted to each portion, furnish for the year five, as it were, Rural Stewards and Phylarchs. And let it be for these to choose, each of the five, out of their own Phyle, twelve from the young men not less than five-and-twenty years of age, and not more than thirty. To these let there be allotted portions of the country during a month, each for each, so that all of them may have a practical knowledge of every part of the country. But let the government and guardianship continue to the guards and governors for two years; and let those, who first obtain by lot their respective portions, the guard officers lead out, changing the places of the country constantly, (by going) to the place next in order towards the right in a circle, and let the right be that which is in the east. But as the year comes round, in the second year, in order that the greatest portion of the guards may become acquainted with the country, not only during one season of the year, but that as many as possible may know thoroughly, in addition to the country, at the same time what occurs relating to each spot in the country at each season, let the then officers lead them out again to the left, constantly changing the place, until they go through the second year. In the third year, (it is meet) to choose other Rural Stewards and guard officers as the five curators of the twelve young men; and in their occupations attention should be given of some such kind as this to each place. First that the country may be as much as possible well fortified against the enemy, by trenching and digging out wherever it is requisite, and with buildings restraining, as far as they can, those endeavouring to injure in any way the country and its possessions; and by making use of animals under the yoke, and the servants in each place, for these purposes, doing through them, standing over them, selecting as much as possible their own employment in their own works, to render every place difficult for the enemy to pass, but as easy as possible for friends, and animals under the yoke and cattle; and by taking care of the roads that they may be in the most quiet state, and of the waters from Zeus, that they may not injure the country, but benefit it rather, when descending from high grounds into hollow places in the mountains, and by restraining the outlets of the waters with buildings and ditches, such hollows may, by receiving and drinking up the waters from Zeus, produce streams and fountains for the fields below them and for all
places. and thus cause the most dry places to possess water plentiful and good. And let them, by ornamenting the water from fountains, whether it is a river or its source, with plantations and buildings, render it more beautiful, and bringing all the streams together make them abundant by means of mine-like tunnels and surface irrigations, according to each season, if perchance there may have been a grove or sacred precinct about those very streams dedicated to a deity, and by sending which to those spots they may adorn the holy places of the gods. By all means too in spots of this kind it is necessary for youths to fit up places for naked exercises for themselves, and old men's baths, and making them warm for the aged, by placing wood! dry and dry for the benefit of those labouring under diseases, and receiving kindly bodies worn down by rustic labours, and a habit (of body) much better than that of a medical practitioner not very skilful.

All these things then, and of this kind, would be to such places an ornament and use, in conjunction with sport by no means unpleasant. But let the serious attention relating to these things be this. Let the sixty defend, each their own place, not only on account of enemies, but for the sake of those, who call themselves friends. But if any one, whether he is a slave or a free-man, injure his neighbour, or any other citizen, let those five rulers act as judges in the case of the party asserting that he has been injured, with respect to trifling matters; but where one person brings a charge against an other on greater matters, let the seventeen, together with the twelve, on questions up to three minae. No judge or magistrate ought to be exempt from giving an account of his conduct as judge or magistrate, except such as, like kings, put the finish to suits. Moreover as regards the Rural Stewards if they behave insolently to those, of whom they are the guardians, by enjoining unequal tasks, or by attempting to seize and carry off any thing from those, employed in agriculture, not having previously persuaded them (to give it up); and if they receive aught from those, who offer it to curry favour; or if they give their decisions unjustly, through yielding to adulation; let them bear off as their reward the reproach of the whole state. But for the other wrongs, which they may do to those in their district, let them voluntarily undergo a fine, as far as one mina, imposed by the villagers and neighbours. But for greater or smaller injuries, on each occasion, if they are not willing to pay, through their trusting to being removed monthly to another place, and thus escaping, although pursued by law, in such cases the injured party is to have the chance of a trial at common law; and if he obtains a verdict, let him demand of the defendant to pay! a double fine, and having been unwilling, to undergo punishment willingly.

And let the rulers and the Rural Stewards have their dietary for the space of two years in some such manner as this. First let there be in the different places a common table, [at which they must all make a common table]. And let the person, who is absent from table, and sleeps out for one day or night, without orders from the rulers, or some every necessity falling upon
him, if the five inform against him, and, after writing the indictment, place it in the market-place, to the effect that he has broken through his guardianship, let him bear the disgrace of having on his part betrayed the constitution, and be chastised with stripes by any one, who meets him, and is willing (to do so) with impunity. And if any one of the rulers themselves is doing anything of this kind himself, it is necessary for all the sixty to direct their care to such a person; and let him who perceives or hears of it, but does not bring him to trial, be amenable to the same laws (as the party offending); and let him be punished with a greater fine than the young men, (and) be held dishonoured with respect to all the rule over young men.

Of these doings likewise let the guardians of the laws be the inspectors, in order that either they may not take place at all, or, taking place, meet with condign punishment. Now it is meet for every man to bear in mind touching all men, that he, who has never been a servant, will never be a master worthy of praise; and it is requisite to pride oneself rather upon acting properly the slave, than on acting properly the master, first towards the laws, since this is being a servant to the gods; next towards elders and the young persons who have lived with honour. After this it is meet for the person, who has been one of the Rural Stewards, to taste during these two years daily food of a humble and poor kind. For, after the twelve magistrates shall have been enrolled, let them come together with the five and take counsel, that, like domestics, they will not have other persons to be domestics and slaves to them, nor will they from the household of other farmers and villagers use their attendants for their own concerns, but only so far as relates to the public at large; but in other matters let them consider that they are to live, dependent themselves on themselves, and ministering to, and ministered by, themselves; and in addition to this, searching through the whole country, summer and winter, in arms, for the sake of guarding and knowing thoroughly all places, that successively present themselves. For it appears that for all to know accurately their own country is a piece of learning inferior to none. For the sake of which it behoves a person at the period of youth to attend to hunting by dogs and to other kinds of catching wild beasts, no less than for the sake of any other pleasure and profit at the same time, which results through these means to all. These very pursuits then let every man to the utmost of his power readily pursue, whether a person delights to call them concealments, or rural stewardships, or by any other name, if they are about to preserve sufficiently their own state.

After this there follows the subject relating to the election of those acting as rulers, both Market Stewards, and City Stewards. Upon the Rural Stewards, sixty in number, there should follow three City-Stewards, dividing the twelve parts of the city into three; and in imitation of those (the Rural Stewards) they should have the care of the path-ways, and of the city, and the public roads, that respectively stretch from the country to the city, and
of the buildings likewise, so that all of them are made according to law; and moreover of the streams of water, which those, who watch them, send to them and deliver, after being attended to, in order that they may pass on to the fountains, sufficient in quantity and clear, and adorn at once and benefit the city. These too ought to be persons of influence, and at leisure to pay attention to public affairs. On this account let every man propose as a City Steward whomsoever he wishes out of those with the largest property. And when (all) have had hands held up for them, and those are reduced to six, to whom the most (votes) have been given, let those, who are to have this charge, select by ballot the three, and after they have undergone a scrutiny, let them be in office according to the laws laid down for them. Next in order after these (it is meet) to choose Market Stewards, five in number, out of those with the valuation of the second and first class; but in other respects let their election be in the same manner as for the City-Stewards. (For it is meet) that ten out of all the rest, having had hands held up for them, should ballot for the five, and declare them, after undergoing a scrutiny, to be the persons in power. And let every one hold up his hand for ten in all. But let him, who is unwilling to vote, if informed against before the rulers, be fined fifty drachms, in addition to his being held to be a bad man. And let any one who wishes go to the public assembly and common meeting; and let it be compulsory on him, who belongs to the second and first class of property, to be fined ten drachms, if he is not present and mustered at the conventions; but it shall not be compulsory on the third and fourth class of property; but let such a person be dismissed without a fine, unless the rulers give an order for all to be present in consequence of some (urgent) necessity.

And (it is meet) for the Market Stewards to preserve the orderly arrangement enjoined by the laws relating to the market-place; and to take care of the temples and fountains in the market-place, so that no one injures them; and to punish the party so injuring with stripes and bonds, if a slave and a stranger; but if a native acts in a disordered manner with respect to things of this kind, let them be authorized, after a trial, to fix a fine up to one hundred drachms in money, but to fine up to the double of this sum the offending party, it they are sitting in judgment in common with the City Stewards. Let there be the same power to fine and punish allowed to the City Stewards in their own department, so as to fine offenders up to a mina themselves, but the double of this sum in conjunction with the Market Stewards.

After this it will be proper for the leaders in Music and Gymnastics to be established, two kinds of each; some of them for the sake of instruction, and others for the sake of contesting. Now in the case of instruction, the law relating to Gymnasia and schools means to speak of those, who have the care of orderly arrangement and instruction to boot, and of the attention paid to such matters, and of the frequenting and staying at schools on the
part of young persons, both male and female: but in the case of contesting, (it means to speak of) those who assign the prizes to competitors in Gymnastics and Music; and these two are two-fold; one employed on Music, and the other on Gymnastics. Now in the contests of men and horses, it would be proper for the same per sons to assign the prizes; but in those of Music, for some to do so in the case of solo-singing and the imitative art, such as the rhapsodists, and all of this kind; but others over chorus singing and players on the harp and hautboy. First then with regard to the amusement of the choirs of boys and men, and girls (exercised) in dancing, and in the whole order of music, it is surely requisite to elect their leaders. Now one leader, not less than forty years old, will surely suffice for these. One too not less than thirty years old will suffice for solo-singing, and to be the introducer of, and to give a judgment sufficiently upon, the competitors. Now the leader and regulator of the choir it is requisite to choose in some such manner as this. Let those, who have a friendly feeling towards such matters, go to the meeting, subject to a fine if they do not go, and of this let the guardians of the law be the judges; but upon the rest, if they are not willing, let there be nothing compulsory. And let the person, who makes the nomination, select one out of those who are skilful; and in the scrutiny let there be only this one charge and denial, on the part of some, that the person, who has obtained the lot, is unskilled, but on the part of others, that he is skilled; and let the person who, out of ten previously voted for, has obtained singly the lot, be, after under going a scrutiny, the leader of the choirs according to the law for one year. In the same manner as these, let him who, out of those that come to a trial, in this way obtains the lot, be the leader for that year of the solo-singing, and concert singing, after giving, as the party so obtaining the lot, to the judges the power to decide. After this it is necessary to choose from the persons belonging to the third and even second class of property, the assignors of prizes in the contest relating to the exercises of horses and men. Now to the election let it be compulsory upon the three classes to go, bat let the smallest class be dismissed without a fine; and let there be three who obtain the lot, twenty having previously had hands held up for them, but three of the twenty obtaining the lot, whom the vote of the examiners shall approve of. But if any one is rejected through any balloting or decision what ever of a magistrate, let another be chosen in his stead, and the scrutiny take place in the same manner respecting him.

There remains now the ruler relating to what has been mentioned by us before, namely, the party to take care amongst those conversant with education. And let him, for whom the most votes come together, after he has been scrutinized by the other magistrates, who, with the exception of the guardians of the laws, have chosen him, enter upon his office for five years; but in the sixth year, let another be chosen to the office in a similar manner.
But if any ruler dies while employed in a public situation before the term of office shall have expired, wanting more than thirty days, let those, to whom this duty belongs, appoint another in the same manner to the office. And if any one, who is a guardian to orphans, dies, let the relations on both the father's and mother's side, as far as the cousins, who may at that time be in the country, appoint another within ten days, or let each be fined a drachma day, until they shall have appointed the guardian for the children.

Now every state will surely become no state, in which courts of justice are not properly established; and on the other hand a voiceless judge, and who, in the preliminary proceedings, does not speak more than the litigants, as in the case of arbitrators, will never be sufficient for the purpose of deciding justly. On this account, it is not easy, when there are either many or few indifferent characters, to have a fair trial. But it is necessary for the matter in dispute to be clearly stated by each party; and time too and the sifting slowly and frequently a question conduce to the rendering a doubtful point clear. On this account it is meet for those, who complain of each other, to betake themselves first to their neighbours and friends, and those the most conversant with the subject of dispute. But if a party is unable to obtain a satisfactory decision from them, let him go to another tribunal; but if those two cannot bring about a reconciliation, let the third put an end to the suit. In a certain respect, indeed, the establishment of courts of justice depends on the choice of magistrates; for every magistrate is necessarily a judge of certain things; but every judge! is not a magistrate, although, in a certain respect, during the day in which he is deciding a suit, he is no mean a magistrate. Considering, then, the judges likewise as magistrates, let us state which of them would be proper, and of what matters they are to be the judges, and how many for each suit. Let then that tribunal be of the highest authority, which each show forth, themselves to themselves, after having chosen certain persons in common. But as regards the rest, let there be two tribunals; one, when a private person accusing another private person of doing him a wrong, shall bring him to trial, and be willing for the suit to be decided; the other, when any one conceives that the public has been injured by some of the citizens, and is willing to aid the community at large. Let us state then of what kind are the judges, and who.

In the first place then, let a tribunal common to all, who are contending for the third time, as private persons with each other, exist in this manner. All the magistrates that are in office for a year, and those for a longer period, ought, when the new year is about to commence in the month that succeeds the summer solstice, to come on the day, before that very day of the month, together to one temple, and, swearing by the god, to take, as it were, for the initiatory rite of every office, one judge, who shall be deemed to be the best in each office, and appear likely to decide in the best and most holy manner lawsuits amongst his fellow-citizens during the ensuing year. When the judges are chosen, let a scrutiny take place by the very
persons who have chosen them; and if any one is rejected, let them choose another in the same manner; but let the persons approved of act as judges in the case of those, who have fled from the other courts of justice, and let them give their vote openly. The Counselors, however, and the other officials, who chose them, must of necessity be the hearers and spectators of these decisions; and other persons too, who ever wish it. But if any one accuses any person of having willingly decided a suit unjustly, let him go and make the accusation before the guardians of the law; and let the party found guilty undergo a punishment of this kind, namely, to pay half of the damage done to the injured party; but if he shall appear to deserve a greater fine, let those, who tried the suit, fix what additional punishment he ought to suffer (in person), or to pay either to the public treasury, or to the person who has suffered the injury. But with respect to public accusations, it is necessary in the first place for the multitude to participate in the decision. For all are injured, when any one does wrong to the state; and hence the multitude would justly take it ill, if they had no share in such decisions; but both the beginning and the end of such a suit it is requisite to refer to the people; but the inquiry into it, to the three greatest magistrates, whom both the defendant and plaintiff agree in acknowledging; but if they are unable to participate in such agreement themselves, let the Council decide upon the choice of each of them. It is meet moreover for all to have a share as far as they can in private suits. For he, who has no share in the power of acting as a judge with others, conceives that he has in no respect a share in the state. On this account then it is necessary for the courts of justice to be according to the wards, and for the judges to give on the instant, uncorrupted by entreaties, their decision by ballot; and that of all such matters that tribunal is to give the final decision, which we say is established, as far as is possible by human power, the most incorruptible in the case of those, who are unable to come to terms either through their neighbours or the tribunals belonging to the wards.

Now in truth, respecting courts of justice, of which we said that a person speaking could not easily assert indubitably that they are offices of rule or not, this description, painted, as it were, in outline, has asserted some things, and nearly left out others. For the exact laying down and at the same time the division of laws relating to suits will take place by far the most correctly at the end of legislation. Let it then be told to those subjects to wait for us. For the appointments relating to other magistrates have taken up nearly the greatest part of legislation. But the totality and exactness relating to one and all of the subjects connected with a state, and the whole of a state administration, cannot become clear, until the digression shall arrive at the end, after having embraced from the beginning portions of itself, the second and the middle and all. At present, however, as far as the choosing of magistrates has taken place, this would be a sufficient finish to what has been previously mentioned; while the commencement of the laying down of laws is requiring no longer a putting
off and doubts.