Issue One: Al- Qaida Attacks U.S. Marines In Kuwait; One Marine Is Killed As The Global Threat Of Terrorism Intensifies

Issue Two: Who Should Receive Smallpox Vaccinations?

Who Should Receive Smallpox Vaccinations?

     Ever since 9/11, the Bush Administration has repeatedly warned about the dangers of future terrorist strikes upon U.S. soil, including the very real threat of bio-terrorism. One specific danger is the possibility of a smallpox attack that could possibly infect and kill thousands of American citizens. In short, without vaccinations, the death toll would be substantial (roughly one-third of smallpox victims die from the disease and another third would become blinded or disabled). Traditionally, the health recommendation by the CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Ga.) on how to contain smallpox outbreaks is the "ring vaccination" technique, whereby anyone who came in contact with an infected individual would be quarantined in the hope that an epidemic could be contained. However, this strategy assumes that smallpox outbreaks would occur in only a few areas. A planned terrorist strike might involve the use of smallpox viruses in multiple metropolitan areas/airports. Hence, ring vaccination approaches could be overwhelmed by the rapid spread of the disease beyond the quarantined "firewalls". The Bush Administration has speculated that Iraq might have ample supplies of the smallpox virus (the only confirmed, official stockpile locations for the virus are the CDC and Siberia, Russia) and would be willing to use it against the U.S. population as a form of retaliation for a future American invasion aimed at toppling Saddam Hussein from power. Immunizations against smallpox ended in the 1970s and the last known case occurred in 1977. The official eradication of the disease was announced in 1980. Therefore, virtually no one in the nation has full protection against the dreaded disease. The question remains whether the Bush Administration should begin anew immunizations not just for the military (soldiers being sent to the Gulf will be inoculated) or health personnel (these individuals would be on the frontline trying to contain the epidemic in its earliest stages) but for all Americans. Critics of mass immunization point out that an individual exposed to smallpox does have a four to five day period to receive the vaccine and still be protected. But, would this be enough time to inoculate millions of citizens, especially in the midst of a generalized panic and long waiting lines at hospitals, clinics, and emergency rooms around the country? Would it not be preferable to protect the American people well in advance, thereby substantially reducing casualties and perhaps even deterring terrorists from launching such bio-terrorist strikes?

     But, on the other hand, smallpox shots do carry risks, including life-threatening side effects (possible death, paralysis, encephalitis, gangrene, eczema, blindness, among others), especially for those citizens with impaired immune systems (estimated at some 50 million citizens who may be HIV-infected, had organ transplants, undergoing chemotherapy, on long-term drug therapy programs, etc.). Current Bush Administration policy has wavered, reflective of changing views from the CDC and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Last summer, a CDC advisory team recommended that roughly 20,000 Americans be inoculated, consisting of "state smallpox response teams" whose goal would be to detect victims and staffers at designated hospitals who would treat the infected. But in September of 2001, the HHS embraced the idea of 500,000 vaccinations, thereby protecting medical staffers at nearly every hospital across the nation. Then, early in October of this year, the HHS upped the ante by proposing to the White House expanding vaccinations to 10 million citizens (hospital, police, fire, and emergency personnel) and perhaps even to the entire population. In general, major newspapers/prominent national legislators have supported the public's right to receive the vaccine. Public opinion polls show a majority favoring vaccination. But important medical groups such as the American Medical Association and many state health officials oppose the idea, fearing that the side effects of the vaccine outweigh the risks of a terrorist-caused epidemic. Unlike vaccines for mumps or chickenpox, the smallpox vaccine contains a "live virus" that can cause infection (the virus in the vaccine is not actually smallpox but the related virus Vaccinia). The individual builds up an immunity as his/her body responds, but the live nature of the virus means that it can be transmitted through open sores to other body parts or even to other people. Hence, CDC estimates are that administering this vaccine to the entire U.S. population might result in over 300 deaths and the serious health-impairment of thousands of others. In conclusion, the controversy continues. By the end of this month, the CDC/HHS may be reexamining their policies and sending any proposed changes to the White House once again.

     Discussion Questions

1. Why is a massive smallpox vaccination program being considered?
2. What are the risks associated with the smallpox vaccination program?
3. What have been some of the previous smallpox proposals from the CDC and HHS?

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Al- Qaida Attacks U.S. Marines In Kuwait; One Marine Is Killed As The Global Threat Of Terrorism Intensifies

     The U.S. global war against terrorism intensified this month as 150 American Marines, on military maneuvers in urban warfare on Failaka Island, northeast of and about 20 miles from Kuwait City, suffered a fatality from al-Qaida snipers. On October 8, two young Kuwaiti men in a pick-up truck armed with AK-47's and dressed in civilian clothes, fired at those U.S. marines, killing one, (Lance Cpl. Antonio J. Sledd of Hillsborough, Fla.) and seriously wounding another (Lance Cpl. George R. Simpson). Both assailants were themselves killed by U.S. soldiers when they attempted another attack upon a second cluster of troops. The identities/motivations of the attackers were acknowledged by Kuwait's interior minister, Sheik Muhammed Kahled al-Sabah, who further stated that a terrorist group of 15 people (several of whom had been trained in Afghanistan) operating inside of Kuwait had been planning other terrorist operations against both U.S. personnel (about 8000 American civilians and 9,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Kuwait) and miscellaneous targets, including oil tankers, American teachers, and even entertainment parks frequented by Americans. The two Kuwaitis, Anas Ahmad Irbrahim al-Kandari and his cousin, Jassem al-Hajiri, had confessed in a previously videotaped message that the attack had been dedicated to Osama bin Laden (Kandari was described by a brother as a Islamic zealot who was angry over the mistreatment of Palestinians and Muslims throughout the world). As a response to the killing, the Kuwaiti government announced that it has intensified security at American installations and U.S.-affiliated schools.

     The 10/8 murder led to another incident the next day, when an American serviceman fired a shot at an unmarked civilian car, after the driver had pointed a gun at the soldier. The car went off the road but the driver regained control and sped away. Both incidents reflected a growing tension not only throughout Kuwait, a country that has been the strongest ally of the U.S. since the end of the Gulf War, but throughout the Middle East and the world as a whole (but other Middle Eastern experts noted that while Kuwait was grateful for the Gulf War liberation from Iraqi forces, there was still a growing level of support inside the country for Islamic fundamentalism; at the funeral of the two killers, a dozen protesters shouted anti-American epithets; furthermore, there are many Palestinians who reside in Kuwait as guest workers). American officials noted that other probable al-Qaida-sponsored attacks had previously occurred involving a French tanker off the coast of Yemen (disrupting the flow of oil to the West) and the October 2 killing (via the detonation of a bomb) of an American Green Beret in the city of Manila (Philippines). On October 13, another wave of bombings in Bali, Indonesia killed/wounded more than 300 people. Suspicion focused on Jemaah Islamiyah, an affiliated group of al-Qaida. The group wishes to establish a pan-Islamic state involving Malaysia, Indonesia and the southern Philippines. Jemaah is also charged with plans to destroy American and other embassies in Singapore. In short, there were growing fears that the al-Qaida global network was resurfacing with a dangerous intensity (an alleged tape of bin Laden's voice promising this scenario had been played over the Al-Jazeera TV station), perhaps coordinating a new series of strikes upon Americans and/or U.S. allies. Finally, since Kuwait would be an important staging area for any U.S. attack against Iraq, U.S. officials openly speculated that al-Qaeda may wish to disrupt vital military planning essential to such an enterprise.

     Discussion Questions

1. Who attacked the U.S. Marines in Kuwait and why?
2. What was the relationship of Al-Qaeda with the two snipers?
3. How might the Kuwaiti attack be linked to the possible U.S. invasion of Iraq?

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Once Again, Florida's Voting System Falters

     The Democratic Party obviously remembers the infamous "dangling chads" of the 2000 presidential election and the recount issue that eventually was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in favor of Republican candidate George W. Bush. After that electoral debacle, the state of Florida spent 32 million dollars to fix its balloting problems. But, in the first statewide election since 2000, a plethora of difficulties ensued, including (a) defective ballots found on quirky touch-screen voting machines; (b) malfunctions by voting computers in one Miami-Dade County district that recorded nine times more votes then the actual number of eligible voters; (c) the inability of the new machines to record any votes at all in precincts where there were thousands of registered voters or the recording of only Republican votes; (d) hundreds of voters being turned away in Miami-Dade county because poorly-trained poll workers did not know how to "boot-up" the touch-screen machines; (e) the failure of optical scanners to read "flawed" paper ballots due to irregular sizing; (f) fatigued poll workers closing up precincts earlier than the extended 9:00 p.m. time limit set by Governor Jeb Bush upon learning of the voting difficulties; and (f) absentee ballots having to be laboriously read by hand when voters made multiple errors on those ballots.

     The upshot of all this was another flawed election, especially in the case of the Reno-McBride contest for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination. Reno, the former Attorney General of the Clinton Administration, found herself trailing Tampa corporate lawyer Bill McBride by 8,196 votes. Unfortunately for Reno, no automatic state recount was forthcoming, since her trailing margin was actually greater than 0.5% of the total Florida vote. Also, most of the voting discrepancies were in key Miami-Dade and Broward County precincts, two counties where she was revealed great political strength with the electorate. Those "lost votes" clearly hurt her chances of securing the Democratic nomination. Even after rechecking some 80 South Florida precincts, she was unable to overcome the McBride lead, although McBride's victory margin was eventually reduced to around 4800 votes out of more than 1.3 million cast (Reno conceded, deciding not to go to court to challenge the election or seek a recount). Reno charged that the new touch-screen voting machines had cost her the election, and that the failure of those machines was due to Governor Jeb Bush's administration not taking pains to eliminate all of the possible glitches that occurred with the new voter technology and election officials. Governor Bush fired back, arguing that in 65 of the 67 counties, the voting process worked reasonably well, and that Florida's election system was mishandled by incompetent officials (Democrats) in Miami-Dade and Broward counties (however, in Jacksonville/Duval County, optical scanning equipment did malfunction.) "Neutral experts" argued that Florida's voting problems were a result of a combination of factors, including revised and/or new voting laws, procedures, training, equipment, and ballot design/layout.

     It also appeared that state Democrats were going to make an issue of another botched voting system, especially since the 2000 presidential election was anything but a distant memory. These Democrats insisted that under Jeb Bush's "incompetent" leadership, Florida was once again the laughing-stock of the nation. They reminded the media that a substantial amount of taxpayer money had been spent on repairing the state's voting procedures. The result was another disaster. Finally, Democrats asserted that their voter base would be energized by this new electoral debacle. Democrats whose memory of 2000 was slowly fading would now be have reinvigorated motivation to vote against Bush in November. For the Democrats of Florida, the spectre of the disputed 2000 presidential election had been resurrected. Whether these new political sensitivities would spell trouble for Jeb Bush in November remained an open question.

     Discussion Questions

1. What voting problems were encountered in the Florida election?
2. How did the new voting problems in Florida affect Democrats in the state?
3. Why and how did the voting failures affect the Reno-McBride race?
4. What electoral problems occurred in the Florida counties of Broward and Dade?

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The U.S. Again Characterizes Iraq as a Serious Threat to both American Security and the Legitimacy of the United Nations

     Ever since 9/11, the Bush Administration has repeatedly warned about the dangers of Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime. Not only has the Bush team argued that Iraq is a state sponsor of terrorism and has been involved in the planning of previous attacks against the U.S. (one example-the indirect support of the terrorists by Iraq in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; another involves the alleged link, still disputed by some authorities, of the 9/11 hijacker-leader Mohammed Atta-Iraqi intelligence agent Ani meeting in April of 2001 in Prague, six months before America was attacked;), but also that Iraq's leadership is both truly evil and vicious (pointing to Saddam's use of poison gas against the Kurds). Thus, the Bush Administration has repeatedly called for "regime change" and the dismantling of Iraq's "weapons of mass destruction" arsenal. Finally, the U.S. has noted that Iraq is in violation of United Nations resolutions, especially since Saddam has not allowed UN inspectors back onto Iraqi soil for almost four years.

     From the American perspective, Iraq cannot be permitted to add nuclear weapons to its already ample supplies of biological (anthrax, plague, botulism, etc.) and chemical weapons (mustard, sarin nerve gas) which went undetected by UN inspectors after the 1990-1991 Gulf War (according to a study by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, Saddam would have developed a dozen nuclear weapons if his capabilities had not been destroyed during the war). Vice President Dick Cheney has been particularly vocal in declaring that the United States cannot simply wait and allow Saddam to finish his nuclear program. Cheney, in a speech before the VFW (Veterans of Foreign Wars), declared that time was running out. To do nothing would invite potential disaster for not only the United States but for its allies in the Middle East in the relatively near future. A nuclear-armed Saddam could intimidate Kuwait, threaten Israel and Saudi Arabia, and could even take the step of giving a nuclear device to a terrorist network, such as Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda terrorist network. Few American intelligence officials doubt that Al Qaeda would hesitate to use a nuclear weapon against the U.S, a horrific terrorist attack that would kill hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians.. From all indications, Al Qaeda has actively sought to buy a nuclear weapon on the global "black market." In short, the U.S. military must prepare to attack Iraq if that nation does not unilaterally disarm and/or destroy all of its weapons of mass destruction.

     Critics, including America's allies in Europe and the Middle East, dispute the Bush scenario. They argue that while Saddam desires nuclear weapons, he is years away from actually acquiring them, since he and his scientists lack the necessary fissile material (U-235 or plutonium). It is far better, the allies argue, to work through the United Nations and the global community to contain Saddam rather than for the United States to "go it alone," i.e., to act in a "unilateral" fashion. Furthermore, a U.S. attack upon Iraq will be very costly, both in terms of lives lost and funding (President Bush's chief economic advisor, Lawrence Lindsey, has estimated that a U.S. war against Iraq could cost anywhere from 100 to 200 billion dollars!). The necessary number of U.S. troops to topple Saddam could range anywhere from 80,000 to 250,000. Furthermore, Saddam is preparing for "urban warfare," whereby U.S. troops would have to fight inside Baghdad against an entrenched enemy in a "Somalia-Black Hawk Down" debacle. U.S. casualties could reach 30%, since American troops would not only be exposed to brutal sniper fire but even chemical and biological weapons. But the Bush Administration rejects this disaster scenario, arguing that a coordinated air-ground attack will prevail (one plan is to lay siege outside of Baghdad, avoiding the risk to U.S. troops) and that there will be massive defections within the Iraqi military (critics retort that this is a dubious, fragile, and unlikely development). But even if this happens and Iraq is liberated, critics then ask what happens after regime change. Will the U.S. have to occupy Iraq indefinitely with large numbers of troops? Also, how will an U.S. attack upon Iraq affect the Israeli-Palestinian struggle? Will there be new terrorist attacks upon Americans in the Middle East in retaliation for a U.S. attack?

     Amidst all of this controversy, President George W. Bush went to the United Nations, outlining the Iraqi threat, reminding the world body of Iraqi duplicity, and warning that Iraq must recognize the authority of UN resolutions. Otherwise, the UN will become a modern day, ineffectual "League of Nations." World opinion seemed to rally behind the President. However, Iraq subsequently announced that it would allow UN inspectors to reenter the nation. No "conditions" would be placed upon the inspectors. A skeptical U.S. noted that Iraq could still hide its weapons of mass destruction from the inspectors using a clever "hide and seek" technique. Reports surfaced that Iraq's biological weapons had been placed in mobile trailers, chemical weapons were now stored in underground bunkers, and that nuclear facilities were being placed in schools, hospitals, and even private residences. To the U.S., waiting six months or so for a report from UN inspectors would accomplish nothing while moving Iraq ever-closer to nuclear acquisition. Even as the UN diplomats argued over whether a new resolution condemning Iraq was necessary (the Russian and Egyptian foreign ministers argued such a resolution was simply not necessary, given Iraq's acceptance of new inspectors), the U.S. continued its gradual military build-up in the Middle East.

     Discussion Questions

1. Why does the United States consider Iraq to be a threat?
2. Will the U.S. offensive against Iraq be stalled now that Iraq has "agreed" to inspections?
3. Why did President Bush tell the United Nations that its "basic legitimacy" was being tested by Saddam Hussein?

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The Democrats Consider Their Presidential Candidates for 2004 as Gore, Lieberman, and John Kerry Maneuver

     The Democratic Party obviously wishes to regain the presidency, especially after the disputed 2000 presidential election when the Al Gore-Joseph Lieberman ticket, despite winning the greatest number of popular votes nation-wide (some 537,000 more than the GOP ticket), lost to the George W. Bush-Dick Cheney Republican duo. A Republican victory ensured when the state of Florida gave the Bush-Cheney ticket its vital 25 electoral votes after the historic Bush v. Gore U.S. Supreme Court decision. Hence, the emerging question for the Democrats in 2004 is simple-- who should be their presidential nominee? Should Democrats overlook Al Gore's lackluster campaign of 2000 and his tarnished image with the electorate? This selection is mired in controversy, especially after Senator Joe Lieberman, in a speech at the Democratic Leadership Council Meeting in New York City (Gore skipped the meeting), criticized Gore for running an excessively "populist campaign," i.e., one that appealed too much to "rich-poor" class differences or a misguided "people vs. the powerful" theme, rather than appealing to the political center. Meanwhile, Gore, in a Washington, D.C. speech and in an op-piece in The New York Times, defended his 2000 campaign tactics, arguing that the Bush Administration remained truly oblivious to the vast majority of hard-working Americans. The recent disclosures about accounting shenanigans of corporate America, such as the infamous "cooking of the books" from Enron and WorldCom executives, represented further proof, at least to Gore, that his populism of 2000 had not only been right on target but had also been vindicated by post-2000 events as well.

     However, while a plurality of Democrats still viewed Gore as the most likely nominee in 2004, the former vice-president confronted a growing groundswell of detractors. To this group, Gore had indeed run a clumsy campaign, refusing to use President Clinton's ample campaign skills, failing to even win his home state of Tennessee (that would have given him the election, no matter what happened in Florida), and squandering the political appeal of the Clinton-Gore Administration's accomplishments, especially the presence of a growing, prosperous economy. Furthermore, Gore's financial supporters and former campaign workers have become disillusioned with the former vice-president and have increasingly observed, publicly, that another Gore try for the presidency would also certainly be doomed. Although Gore has observed that he would run a far better, more effective campaign in 2004, skeptics observe that Gore simply does not resonate with voters. That is why millions of voters chose a candidate who while admittedly a political lightweight, ranked far higher on the trust index. Another Gore campaign would once again be plagued by those same feelings of mistrust and boredom, i.e., in the words of one pundit during 2000, "Al Gore is a snore." But conversely, supporters argue that Gore was cheated out of the presidency by a conservative, partisan Supreme Court and is deserving of renomination. Furthermore, who else in the Democratic Party would be a better presidential nominee in 2004? To Gore devotees, Senator Lieberman lacks charisma (he was out-debated by Dick Cheney in 2000). Senator John Kerry of Mass., while a decorated Vietnam veteran (and antiwar protester) and articulate critic of Bush's foreign policy, is perceived as being too far to the political left, i.e., another liberal from Massachusetts ala Michael Dukakis. Senator John Edwards of North Carolina, while a fresh voice in the party, is inexperienced and not well known nationally. House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt has already experienced unsuccessful runs for the nomination. Yet, on the other hand, those candidates have been actively campaigning/fundraising in other states, while constructing political networks essential to a 2004 presidential run. By comparison, Gore has been largely absent or even perceived by Democratic insiders as aloof. On balance, Gore may be able to gain the nomination once again, but he will have to wage an all-out campaign against a number of determined opponents who will obviously remind voters in the Democratic primaries of Gore's performance in 2000. In short, Gore's opponents will argue that a "new face" has the best chance of defeating George W. Bush in 2004.

     Discussion Questions

1. What charges did Joe Lieberman, Gore's running mate, level at Al Gore regarding the vice-president's 2000 campaign strategy?
2. What is the difference between a "populist" and a "centrist campaign"?
3. Can Al Gore gain the 2004 nomination-why or why not?
4. Who are other Democratic hopefuls for the 2004 presidential nomination? What are their respective political strengths and/or weaknesses?

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A Florida Judge Rules That the State's Voucher Law is Unconstitutional

     On August 5, a Leon County (Tallahassee) Circuit Judge, P. Kevin Davey, ruled that the state's voucher law violated the Florida Constitution. Davey's legal rationale was that the state's constitution explicitly forbade (it was "clear and unambiguous") the funding of students to religious schools through the use of public tax dollars. Vouchers represented this type of illegal funding. As Davey put it in his ruling, "while this court recognizes and empathizes with the . . . purpose of this legislation-to enhance the educational opportunity of children caught in the snare of substandard schools-such a purpose does not grant this court authority to abandon the clear mandate of the people as enunciated in the constitution (David Royse, "Judge rules school voucher law violates Florida Constitution," USA TODAY, 8/6/02, p. 7D)." The aim of the Florida voucher law was ostensibly to rescue children from failing schools in the state, i.e., to take them out of those schools and allow them to go into private non-sectarian or religious schools via the public treasury. But Davey had underscored the constitutional illegality of such an action. As noted by Royse, 50 students were already attending private schools through vouchers, with approximately another 340 Florida students intending to use those vouchers in the upcoming school year. Furthermore, nearly 9000 students from some 10 public schools were now eligible for vouchers in 2002-2003. Given the fact that Davey's ruling had placed Florida's statewide voucher program in legal disarray, it was not surprising that Governor Jeb Bush immediately announced his intention not only to appeal the Davey ruling but also to raise private funding for those children attending failed schools in the state. The Governor argued that the Davey's ruling endangered the education of hundreds of schoolchildren; hence, an appeal to a higher court was vital. Equally expected was the reaction of Maureen Dinnen, head of the Florida Education Association or the state's teacher's union. Dinnen asserted that she had expected a favorable ruling outlawing Florida's voucher system. In her words, "it is absolutely wrong to divert tax money to private schools. Now we can focus on public schools again." (Royse)

     The Davey ruling occurred less than two months after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a Cleveland, Ohio voucher program to be constitutional, i.e., not violating the establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution. In the Cleveland program, the high Court found that since parents had a "choice" in sending their children to privately-funded religious schools, there was no apparent violation of the "church-state separation" principle. But conversely, scores of state constitutions have stricter statutes regarding that principle. In this sense, pro-public school advocates consequently argued that such "strictness" was proper and necessary. To these advocates, vouchers were destroying the public school system by diverting precious tax dollars to private educational institutions. It would be far better to avoid vouchers, using those public funds to improve existing schools and their overall academic accountability. These funds would help to reduce class size, modernize school buildings, improve summer school programs, and hire high-quality, well-paid new teachers. Why waste money on driving students away from public schools and subsequently involving them in unconstitutional and unwarranted educational alternatives? On the other hand, voucher advocates insisted that too many public schools around the country had already failed their students and were essentially unsalvageable. Parents should have a "choice" in providing the best educational experience possible for their children. Consequently, proponents of vouchers confidently predicted that the United States Supreme Court would overturn Judge Davey's ruling. In so doing, the "Supremes" would likely rule that state constitutional statutes that discriminate against religious educational alternatives in education are actually violating the U.S. Constitution's concept of "neutrality" toward organized religion. To advocates, the constitutionality of vouchers was a given, representing the educational "wave of the future." The Florida ruling was, in this sense, a legal blessing.

     Discussion Questions

1. Which individuals and groups hailed Judge Davey's ruling and why?
2. What is the difference between a "populist" and a "centrist campaign"?
3. What was the difference in the Florida ruling vs. the Supreme Court's ruling involving the Cleveland, Ohio voucher program?
4. How many Florida students were affected by the Judge's ruling?
5. Why did voucher advocates consider the Davey ruling a "legal blessing" in disguise?

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The Bush Administration's Plan for Attacking Iraq

     On July 10, the U.S. House of Representatives, by an overwhelming vote of 310-113, unexpectedly passed legislation permitting over 70,000 commercial airline pilots to bring guns aboard their planes. What was surprising was that the original proposal being considered by the House was essentially a "trial-training program" of two years duration involving only 1,400 pilots. This somewhat tentative plan was designed to test the feasibility of a broader, more comprehensive policy, and was consistent with legislative guidelines that had been passed by Congress last year in the aviation security bill. In that law, Congress had given permission for pilots to have both lethal (regular firearms) and non-lethal weaponry (stun guns as one example) in the cockpit. However, the power to actually authorize pilot gun use was left up to the newly-created Transportation Security Administration (part of the Department of Transportation). Officials of the TSA have consistently rejected the gun-use idea (so has Transportation Secretary Norman Y. Mineta), arguing that reinforced cockpit doors and the expansion of the federal marshal corps (these undercover, highly-trained, armed individuals would be on a large number of flights, ready to foil any attempted hijacking). In addition, the White House had previously voiced its objection to the idea, fearing that pilots firing shots aboard a plane would jeopardize the lives of passengers and perhaps even the stability of the aircraft (despite this dissent, White House spokespersons did not categorically state that President Bush would veto this bill if it got to his desk). Nevertheless, House supporters argued that pilots were the last defense for a hijacked airliner, and that the gun-use program should include all pilots who could pass a TSA-run security course. In other words, why only arm 2% of all pilots if your ultimate aim was to achieve a heightened sense of security throughout the airline industry, especially after 9/11 and the endless revelations about airport/airliner "insecurity"? By successfully completing the course, pilots would in effect become federal law-enforcement officers. Furthermore, the House bill mandates self-defense training for flight attendants and establishes a 90-day time frame whereby the TSA must react to any airline request for pilots/flight attendants to be given non-lethal weaponry. What may have prompted the House to expand the breadth of the bill was the solid support from key interest groups, including the Air Line Pilots Association (representing some 62,000 pilots), the Allied Pilots Association (13,600 pilots represented), and the National Rifle Association. Polls also revealed that well over 70% of members from both pilot groups endorsed guns in the cockpit. Interestingly enough, the Association of Flight Attendants, while welcoming the self-defense training included in the bill, objected to the fact that the legislation specifically forbids the cabin crew from carrying either handguns or stun guns (House supporters argued that a passenger could overpower a flight attendant and gain access to the weapon).

     Despite the legislative success in the House, the bill to arm pilots clearly faced serious obstacles in the U.S. Senate. For example the chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee (where hearings on the House bill would normally be held), Senator Hollings of South Carolina, has publicly announced his opposition, arguing that a locked, impenetrable cockpit door is the preferable form of security. Other naysayers in the Senate wondered aloud what would happen if terrorists seized the guns from pilots or pilots shot at a terrorist, missed, and thus killed a innocent passenger? Nevertheless, the fact that the House passed the bill by such an overwhelming margin, representing a coalition of support that transcended party lines and united both liberals and conservatives, was a telling point not totally ignored by some U.S. Senators (Senator Barbara Boxer, D-California, noted that the bill was a matter of great urgency, a necessary weapon in the war against terror; arming pilots was an important step to undertake until a full complement of air marshals could be hired and trained; currently air marshals only ride aboard a small percentage of all flights in the United States). Consequently, Senate sponsors suggested other legislative tactics to get the gun bill to the floor for debate such as bypassing Hollings' Committee by offering the legislation as an amendment to another bill. Finally, the pilot unions and the NRA promised a massive lobbying effort to attract Senate support. To these groups, arming pilots will ultimately prevent hijackings and provide a last-resort defense. Supporters argue that if the pilots of those four hijacked planes of September 11 had been armed, then the terrorists would have been thwarted and the tragedy averted. In short, this is one bill that (a) the Senate cannot easily dismiss and (b) the flying public will not ignore.

     Discussion Questions

1. Why was the rationale of the House in passing this legislation?
2. Why is it unlikely that the U.S. Senate will also pass this legislation? Conversely, for what reasons are some Senate supporters optimistic about passage?
3. Which groups apparently favor airline pilots having guns? Which groups oppose the idea?
4. If this legislation were passed by both houses of Congress, would President Bush sign it into law-why or why not??

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The Bush Administration's Plan for Attacking Iraq

     U.S. planning for an eventual attack against Iraq was apparently gaining momentum according to published news accounts in July. A source in the Bush Administration apparently "leaked" a top-secret battle plan directed at toppling Saddam Hussein and his regime from power in Iraq. As reported in The New York Times (see Schmitt, Eric, "U.S. Plan For Iraq Is Said To Include Attack On 3 Sides, 7/5/02," pp. A1, A6), the plan delineated attacks upon Iraq from the air, land, and sea. As described in the Schmitt source,

The document envisions tens of thousands of marines and soldiers probably invading from Kuwait. Hundreds of warplanes based in as many as eight countries, possibly including Turkey and Qatar, would unleash a huge air assault against thousands of targets, including airfields, roadways, and fiber-optics communications sites. Special operations forces or covert C.I.A. operatives would strike at depots or laboratories storing or manufacturing Iraq's suspected weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to launch them (p. A1).

     Schmitt revealed that President Bush had been briefed by military leaders on the details. Still, the plan was in a preliminary stage and by no means finalized (it appeared that any actual offensive would not begin until "early next year"--p. A1) Nevertheless, the main assumptions underlying the plan were that (a) without a major U.S. combat operation, it was unlikely that Saddam could be driven from power by a political coup or by employing anti-Saddam, indigenous Iraqi forces (such as the Kurds) alone, and that (b) Iraqi weapons of mass destruction had to be destroyed as soon as possible or the U.S. and its allies, both in Europe and the Middle East, might someday face a serious threat posed by them. Hence, the U.S. was already taking steps to prepare for war, from thousands of marines conducting mock combat drills in Camp Pendleton, California to the expansion of a key air base (Al Udeid) in Qatar to the stockpiling of ammunition, bombs, and spare parts at storage sites throughout the United States and the Middle East (likely locations here include the nations of Kuwait, Turkey, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain).

     But the leaked plan did not specifically address other key aspects of an Iraqi invasion (there may be other secret documents relating to the overall war plan that do), such as the probable U.S. casualty rates (as many as 250,000 U.S. troops may be needed for the battlefield), what kind of Iraqi government would be placed in power after Saddam's fall (the Bush Administration's assumption is that anti-Saddam forces, inside and outside of Iraq, would together create a democratic government after Saddam's fall and subsequently become an important U.S. ally, politically and militarily, in the region), the Iraqi use of biological/chemical weapons against U.S. soldiers (chemical weapons could be deployed against Americans in an urban warfare environment within the city of Baghdad in a worst-case scenario), the uncertainty of employing Saudi air bases (the Saudis have placed constraints upon U.S. operations), the impact of the current Israel-Palestinian conflict upon Arab support for the Iraqi operation (some Arab leaders have told President Bush that a solution to the former expedites the prospect of a united Arab front for the latter), and whether the Iraqi opposition could play a similar role to the anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan (i.e., the Kurds and other dissident forces might provide intelligence and target identification for U.S. air and ground forces as did the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan; however, Kurdish leaders have been hesitant on agreeing to this role, remembering their abandonment by President Bush in 1991 and subsequent slaughter by Saddam's forces; they want assurances that U.S. forces this time will march all the way to Baghdad). Interestingly enough, on the day this attack plan was leaked to the media, Iraqi officials were still refusing to readmit United Nations' weapons inspectors back into their country. Those inspectors left in December of 1998. What progress Iraq has made in its quest to develop and/or improve weapons of mass destruction in over three years is a question that not only haunts the Bush Administration but also accelerates its planning for a possible Iraqi intervention.

Discussion Questions:

1. Why does the Bush Administration want to remove Saddam Hussein and his regime from power in Iraq?
2. What specific tactics are contained in the U.S. plan to attack Iraq?
3. Which specific nations in the Middle East is the U.S. counting on to assist in its military campaign against Iraq?
4. In why way does the U.S. want a war against Iraq to resemble the war fought against the Taliban in Afghanistan?

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The Bush Administration and its Position on Global Warming

     The controversial issue of global warming resurfaced for the Bush Administration in June. President Bush had previously announced his opposition to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement that asks the industrialized nations to reduce their production of greenhouse gases. The President's opposition has traditionally been based on several assumptions-(a) the division in the scientific community about the causes and true dangers of global warming, i.e., that increasing global temperatures are mainly a naturally-occurring climatic variation, rather than a result of human activity; (b) the impact upon the American economy if the U.S. ratified the Protocol (Bush contends it will harm economic productivity); (c) that Kyoto unfairly discriminates against industrialized nations while asking developing nations to do relatively little to reduce greenhouse emissions; and (d) that the world cost of implementing Kyoto is way too high-new forms of energy will replace fossil fuels long before the true impact of Kyoto would be felt by the nations of the planet. Given this standing policy position, it was somewhat surprising that a written report, coordinated by the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) and representing the scientific opinions of experts in six other federal agencies (among them, the President's own Council on Environmental Quality), partially refuted Bush's policy on global warming. Essentially, the report, entitled "U.S. Climate Action Report 2002," acknowledged that humanity is behind global warming and that the main culprit is the combustion of fossil fuels which in turn disseminates heat-trapping greenhouse gases into the upper atmosphere. The report also predicts major changes (global warming-related) in the U.S/planetary ecological systems during the next few decades, such as drought, the disappearance of coral reefs and barrier islands, damage to buildings/roads in coastal and arctic areas due to a rise in sea levels, more air pollution, an increase in diseases transmitted by insects, ticks, and rodents, and the melting of snowpacks in Alaska and the western states, leading to the disruption of water supplies. Conversely, global warming may have some positive impact, such as a possible increase in crop yields and the more rapid growth of new forests.

     However, this report does not invalidate all of the basic tenets of the Administration's global warming policies. For example, the report does not advocate Kyoto's mandated cuts in emissions, but rather accepts the Bush position that only voluntary measures to slow the growth of those emissions are necessary. Little can be done to eliminate the large amounts of carbon dioxide and other heat-trapping gases already in the atmosphere according to the report. Hence, President Bush, when asked his reaction to the report, dismissed it as just another product of the "bureaucracy." Still, environmental groups pointed to an inherent contradiction in the Bush Administration's position on global warming-the Administration's own bureaucracy was predicting dire, potentially disastrous environmental changes in the future stemming from the now acknowledged, man-made threat of global warming-and yet refusing to adopt any real proactive solutions that might head off the problem. Environmental critics further pointed out that the report was a requirement of signatories to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and that it had been forwarded to that international body. How could the U.S. persist in its policy of rejecting Kyoto when it had produced a study for the United Nations acknowledging that global warming and its adverse implications were all too real? After all, Kyoto was recently ratified by both Japan and the 15 nations of the European Union. A total of 74 nations have now approved Kyoto. As the world's greatest polluting nation (the U.S., with 4 percent of the world's population, produces 25% of the world's greenhouse gases), did the United States and its political leadership not have an obligation to the American people and the global community? Despite the reaction of the environmental lobby, the Administration responded by reiterating that the President's voluntary approach to greenhouse gas emissions was still preferable to the mandated reductions of Kyoto. Ironically, in the same week, NASA scientists reported in the journal Science that the glaciers of Greenland were moving far more quickly toward the ocean than expected, hence accelerating the threat of rapidly rising world sea levels. In addition, other press reports revealed that Antarctica's fringe of ice shelves was disintegrating at a record pace.

Discussion Questions:

1. What has been the general position of the Bush Administration regarding the causes and significance of global warming?
2. How did the new report coordinated by the EPA both refute and support the President's position on global warming?
3. What was the reaction of environmental critics to the report? How did they use the report to attack the Bush Administration's policies on global warming?

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President Bush Proposes a Solution to the Problems Plaguing Tom Ridge and "Homeland Security": A New Cabinet Department Is Needed

     As reported last month, Tom Ridge's Office of Homeland Security has grappled with endless problems stemming from the war against terrorism in the aftermath of the horrendous September 11 attacks. Ridge's planned anti-terrorist policies have been affected by innumerable political, bureaucratic, and budgetary obstacles. In short, his organizational mission was compromised. Despite the president's confidence in the former Pennsylvania Governor's abilities, Ridge has been undercut by other cabinet officers and federal agency heads who are also involved in the fight against terrorism. As previously noted, there have been so many government agencies involved in the war against terrorism that any attempt by Ridge to coordinate their activities through bureaucratic centralization became a virtual impossibility. Hence, as a response to this bureaucratic problem and the publicity surrounding FBI/CIA intelligence failures prior to September 11, President Bush, in a move that surprised many members of Congress, proposed a new Cabinet Department of Homeland Security, involving an extensive reorganization that would place most domestic security/anti-terrorist agencies under one bureaucratic umbrella. Approximately 169,000 government employees from some 100-plus federal entities (among them, the Customs Service, Secret Service, the INS, and Coast Guard) will be transferred into this new Cabinet post. As planned by Bush, the Department of Homeland Defense (hereafter abbreviated as DHD) will then be the third-largest Cabinet department after Defense and Veterans Affairs. It will also have an impressive budget of $37.5 billion.

     To the Bush Administration, creating DHD will have a number of advantages. First, it may make it easier to control the overall homeland security budget, since it will now be consolidated rather than being dispersed through multiple agencies. Second, DHD symbolizes to both Congress and the American people the resolve of the Bush Administration to find a better way of fighting terrorism, especially in the light of revelations that (a) the FBI and CIA each had information about the hijackers of September 11, but failed to share that information appropriately (the President's evening speech proposing DHD occurred at the same time that Minneapolis FBI agent and whistleblower Coleen Rowley testified before Congress, asserting that senior FBI officials had bungled available terrorist information prior to 9/11) and (b) new government warnings about a plethora of terrorist threats from biological attacks against subways to sabotage of nuclear power plants to the use of a "dirty bomb" (radioactive material mixed with a core of conventional explosives) against a major American city were both serious and potentially catastrophic. Consequently, the planned internal "divisions" of DHD will handle border and transportation security, responses to terrorist attacks (led by the Federal Management Agency and supported by the Department of Energy's NES--Nuclear Emergency Search Teams-apparatus), and countermeasures against chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear attacks.

     However, while Congress appears generally ready to approve DHD (but with some modifications), there are congressional representatives and federal agencies that may resist DHD within the original Bush "reorganization" blueprint. For example, agencies will be placed into DHD whose functions do not relate to the anti-terrorism goal. Thus, the Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service that prevents birds from attacking crops and oversees horse shows would become part of DHD. Then there is the objection to having important specific bureaucratic functions that are already being implemented under other Departments from being moved to DHD. Thus, Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-Connecticut) argued that the beleaguered Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) functions of processing tourism visas and temporary foreign-worker permits are best left to the Justice Department, the place where the INS is currently housed. Another problem is moving the Secret Service out of Treasury where it has traditionally investigated counterfeiting, credit card and Internet fraud. To critics, those functions seem out of place in DHD. Third, there is the problem of the precise relationship of the FBI/CIA to DHD. Critics argue that the DHD job of "synthesizing" intelligence information from the FBI/CIA may simply be adding another layer of distortion to the intelligence analysis process. Furthermore, DHD will not have access to raw intelligence data nor will it assemble intelligence information on its own (in short, any intelligence info DHD does receive may be "watered down," inhibiting real and meaningful analysis). But in spite of these objections, President Bush reiterated his belief that the sooner DHD becomes reality, the better the nation will be protected from future terrorist attacks. He expressed hope that DHD would be "operational" by January 1, 2003.

Discussion Questions

1. Why did President Bush propose a new Department of Homeland Security?
2. What bureaucratic problems are associated with this new proposed reorganization?
3. What role will "turf fights" play in the planned reorganization?
4. Will American intelligence analysis of potential terrorist threats be improved by DHD? Why or why not?

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The Bush Administration Proposes a Reinterpretation of the Second Amendment (Gun Control)

     The issue of gun control and its legal relationship to the U.S. Constitution's Second Amendment was raised once again in May by key members of the Bush Administration, i.e., Attorney General (AG) John Ashcroft and U.S. Solicitor General (USSG) Theodore Olsen. Traditionally, both Democratic and Republican Administrations have accepted the 1939 U.S. v. Miller Supreme Court ruling that explicitly linked gun ownership not to an unfettered, constitutionally-protected individual right, but rather as a privilege of bearing firearms only within the Amendment's specified "well-regulated militia" context. AG Ashcroft has promulgated the contrary view. In 2001, he wrote a letter to the National Rifle Association in which he stated that the current Supreme Court interpretation was wrong (Ashcroft noted in the letter that a majority of constitutional scholars also believed in this interpretation; however, other scholars disputed Ashcroft's assertion). In his opinion, the Second Amendment conferred upon individuals the constitutional right of gun ownership and that only narrowly-based, state-mandated restrictions upon that right were permissible. This year, a lower federal appeals court also questioned the Supreme Court's long-standing position on Second Amendment "militia" exclusivity (U.S. v. Emerson), finding that the Second Amendment did indeed protect individual rights to own guns and that only relatively narrow or limited exceptions to this principle could be enacted by government (see Greenhouse, "In Shift, Justice Dept. Tells Court Individuals Have a Right to Guns, New York Times, May 8, 2002, pp. A1, A25). Subsequently, Ashcroft directed all federal prosecutors to adopt the Bush Administration's view that gun ownership was an individual right regardless of the "state militia" legal standard. Hence, USSG Olsen then filed legal briefs for two gun control cases being appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court in which he argued that governments must prove a "compelling interest" if restrictions on individual gun ownership are to apply (Olsen did suggest that laws preventing criminals or unfit persons from obtaining firearms were still appropriate).

     Gun control advocates charged that Ashcroft and Olsen's "extremist reading" of the Second Amendment, if eventually accepted by the Supreme Court, would undermine existing gun control laws such as the Brady Act's background checks prior to gun purchases or even the ban on assault weapons. Furthermore, they charged that the AG and USSG's conception of historical precedent was incorrect. The constitutional framers had never envisioned the Second Amendment as guaranteeing individual gun ownership (Madison's draft of the Amendment had only stressed the "state militia" focus). Finally, Democrats/gun control advocates argued that the Ashcroft/Olsen strategies stemmed not so much from personal conviction, but rather from the Bush Administration's need to solidify its support from its right-wing, conservative base. In the words of one gun-control spokesperson, "the Justice Department Ôhas shown its willingness to throw red meat to the gun lobby and put its political agenda over its institutional interests and obligations' (Greenhouse, p. A25)." In doing so, the Administration was again ignoring the dangers of unchecked gun ownership, from the roughly 29,000 gun-related homicides annually to the issue of school gun violence to the harm inflicted upon the nation's law-enforcement personnel.

     Conversely, gun control opponents and the National Rifle Association reiterated that both Ashcroft and Olsen were rectifying a long-standing, but erroneous constitutional standard. They cited numerous historical quotes from the Framers indicating their approval of individual gun ownership (example-Thomas Jefferson's assertion that "no free man shall ever be debarred from the use of arms") and the need of early Americans to resist the British through a well-armed citizenry. Other conservatives, such as those from the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), argued that if the Miller precedent were abolished and gun ownership expanded, then crime would actually decrease. As John R. Lott of AEI stated, "gun-control advocates conveniently ignore that the countries with the highest homicide rates have gun bans . . . In the four years after the U.K. banned handguns in 1996, gun crime rose by an astounding 40% . . . (see "Gun Laws don't reduce crime," USA Today, 5/9/02, p. 11A). In short, broadening of gun ownership in America was the proper policy, not the further restriction of guns. Finally, these opponents noted that neither Ashcroft nor Olsen were advocating the abolition of all gun-control laws. The two men were on record as supporting the idea that the state could qualify gun ownership through rational standards and the denial of firearms to disreputable individuals. Nevertheless, to handgun controllers, the AG/USSG's views provide legal fodder to those who may wish to overturn Miller and then subsequently weaken or even abolish gun control legislation.

Discussion Questions

1. How does the Bush Administration's view of the Second Amendment break with
2. previous Supreme Court precedent regarding the Amendment's meaning?
3. Why do Democrats charge that the Bush Administration's "new version" of the Second
4. Amendment is "politically" motivated?
5. How do some historians interpret the motivations of the Founding Fathers in formulating the
6. Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?
7. How might the Ashcroft/Olson interpretations influence current gun-control laws as well as future
8. gun control legislation?

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The Problems Plaguing Tom Ridge and "Homeland Security"

     In the aftermath of the traumatic events of September 11, Tom Ridge's Office of Homeland Security has grappled with the endless problems confronting the nation in its war against terrorism. But Ridge's planned anti-terrorist policies have been affected by innumerable political, bureaucratic, and budgetary obstacles. In short, his organizational mission has been compromised. Despite the president's confidence in the former Pennsylvania Governor's abilities, Ridge has been undercut by other cabinet officers and federal agency heads who are also involved in the fight against terrorism. The examples are numerous. A recent intelligence report stating that the nation's banks were facing a possible terrorist attack was announced by Attorney General Ashcroft, not by Ridge. Then, after advocating a more expansive, stronger border patrol presence, President Bush overruled Ridge and announced plans for a more modest agency. Third, the decision to stop air patrols over New York City was initiated by the Pentagon without any consultation with Ridge's office. Furthermore, there are so many government agencies involved in the war against terrorism that any attempt by Ridge to coordinate their activities through bureaucratic centralization is a virtual impossibility. Ridge simply does not have the budget or statutory authority. Hence, Congress has gotten into the act. Through a bipartisan effort, a plan has been launched by both Democrats and Republicans to create a cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security. This new Department would combine the Federal Management Emergency Agency, Border Patrol, Coast Guard, Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Customs Service, and parts of the Department of Agriculture. Nevertheless, this expansion of "big government" through the addition of another Cabinet post roils political conservatives. There appears to be equally strong sentiment in Congress for decentralization, i.e., leaving intact the current pattern of independent, specialized agencies.

     Apart from the Cabinet post issue, it is obvious that Ridge has both his critics and defenders. While Ridge has insisted that he has made great strides in creating a genuine national domestic security system, involving the cooperation of health, law enforcement, fire-fighting and local/state officials, other observers find fault with his approach. For example, as reported by Elizabeth Becker of the New York Times ("Big Visions for Security Post Shrink Amid Political Drama," 5/3/02, pp. A1, A16), the Brookings Institution, a liberal think-tank in Washington, asserted that Ridge "had focused too much on air safety without recognizing other vulnerabilities; that he has not given enough help to the Coast Guard, Customs Service, or Border Patrol; and that plans to secure private building and other sites were too scattershot (p. A16)." Conversely, Ridge supporters note that he has correctly stressed that homeland security is strongly linked to America's "hometowns." Consequently, Ridge, responding to his critics, intends to publish a new strategic plan by July 1, by which his agency will "build up the public health system, finance programs to fight bioterrorism, improve border security and give new technology and training to the police, fire and other officials at the front lines of trying to protect the public. The plan . . . has to streamline communications among thousands of agencies, departments and offices across the country to coordinate resources and intelligence. It has to impose safety standards and detail how to protect vital private installations like banks and skyscrapers (Becker, p. A16)." To accomplish such a gargantuan task is incredibly costly and challenging.

     Regarding cost, federal money to the tune of some 3.5 billion (recommended by Ridge) for the states and localities to train anti-terrorist personnel has not yet been approved by Congress. Second, states and localities are facing serious financial constraints from the recession and major financial choices in terms of supporting other worthwhile programs such as education. Third, as noted above, the goal of close coordination between the states and the federal government is still a visionary goal rather than a reality despite the best efforts put forth by Ridge. Few states, if any, are fully ready to handle another major terrorist attack on their soil. But conversely, all 50 states have created their own offices of homeland security since September 11. In many states, any or even all of the following have been created/implemented--anti-terrorism planning commissions, web sites sharing important intelligence information about terrorist activities, training for local governments in bio-terrorist safety procedures, and new surveillance procedures of suspected terrorists, to name but a few. So, in the final analysis, it appears that the value of Ridge's Office of Homeland Security (OHS) does not now lie in its creation of a fully-functional, coherent anti-terrorist infrastructure that assures all Americans of immunity from terrorist attacks in the future. The value of OHS today is that it is a symbolic reminder to the nation and its citizenry that this war against terrorism requires an extensive and persistent vigilance projected over a very long period of time. An effective and secure anti-terrorist infrastructure at home will, like the proverbial jigsaw puzzle, have to be put into place incrementally and slowly. Despite its flaws, Ridge's OHS is trying to fulfill this vital mission against the backdrop of America's first war of the new century.

Discussion Questions

1. What bureaucratic problems has Tom Ridge encountered as Director of Homeland Security?
2. What perhaps is the fundamental "value" of OHS?
3. What has Ridge tried to accomplish as Director of Homeland Security?

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Congress Acts To Overhaul The Immigration And Naturalization Service (INS)

     The aftermath of the traumatic events of September 11 has not been particularly kind to the reputation of the Justice Department's Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The hijackers who flew civilian airlines into the World Trade Center and Pentagon on "9/11" had all entered the United States using "temporary visas." Two of the hijackers were in the country illegally. The INS had "lost" track of those terrorists. Furthermore, in an especially embarrassing development, INS personnel had in March of 2002 sent out letters to a Florida flight school approving visa extensions to two of the now-dead hijackers! A third blow to the INS unfolded when an INS port inspector in Norfolk, Va. ignored post-September 11 national security rules by permitting four Pakistani seamen to come ashore. Three of the four subsequently disappeared. While the men did not appear to be national security risks, the event further tarnished the professionalism of the INS. As noted in a Wall Street Journal article, the INS "hasn't has a top-to-bottom overhaul in decades, and its record-keeping problems have led to embarrassing glitches . . . they have kept it from adequately tracing the 300,000-plus foreigners who have ignored deportation orders. The INS also has been criticized for allowing an estimated eight million illegal aliens to remain in the U.S. (See Marjorie Valbrun, "House Panel Votes to Split INS Into Two Separate Agencies, WSJ, April 11, 2002, p. A6)." Hence, a legislative climate was established to reorganize the INS, a truly beleaguered agency. Once again, as was the case in the electoral reform bill discussed above, political bipartisanship was the order of the day.

      Accordingly, the House Judiciary Committee voted 32-2 on April 10 to split the INS into two agencies, one to enforce immigration laws (defending the nation's borders from illegal immigration and/or suspected terrorists who might enter the country and being sure that visitors do not "overstay" the time specified in their "temporary" visas) and the other to serve foreign nationals on U.S. soil (the issuance of visas and the granting of citizenship status). Similar legislation was to be introduced into the Senate within a week by Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.), the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee Immigration panel, and by Sam Brownback (R, Kansas). The "new" INS would remain housed in the Justice Department in both the House and Senate legislative versions and run by an associate attorney general who would become the number #3 ranking official in Justice. Conversely, the Bush Administration has been somewhat lukewarm toward the congressional INS reorganization plan. The Administration agrees about the INS restructuring into service and immigration bureaus, but wants the Border Patrol joined with the Customs Service. These organizational details need to be worked out, but it appears almost certain that major structural changes within the INS will eventually happen. Congress is determined that such changes will maximize the difficulties for terrorists to enter the nation while establishing policy procedures that will collectively create a fair system for those who wish to obey the nation's immigration statutes.

Discussion Questions

1. Why did the House Judiciary Committee recommend changes in the INS?
2. How and why did September 11 influence congressional resolve to change the INS?
3. What modifications does the Bush Administration want regarding the INS?

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The U.S. Senate passes its version of the Election Reform Bill

     The U.S. Senate, remembering the debacle of the 2000 presidential election, passed its electoral reform bill by an overwhelming bipartisan 99-1 vote (the House passed its own version of electoral reform in December of last year-it is different from the Senate version in several important details). The bill was sponsored by Christopher Dodd (D, Conn.) and Mitch McConnell (R, Kentucky). The Senate bill contained the following important provisions: (a) 3.5 billion in grant money to the states over a five year period for implementing electoral changes (the House version provides up to 2.65 billion) such as upgrading voting technology, i.e., eliminating the infamous punched ballots of 2000; (b) the creation of a new Federal Election Administration Commission that will be a clearinghouse for election data (the Commission would also set maximum "error rates" for equipment that would tabulate ballots); (c) mandating states to establish computerized registration lists of voters; (d) allowing voters a "second chance" if they detect a mistake (incorrectly marked ballots) before leaving the voting booth; (e) an anti-fraud provision whereby the identity of first-time, mail-in voters must be verified through a photo ID or some other relevant document; (f) provisional voting for citizens who cast ballots by mail if there were no driver's license or social security number on the ballot (state election officials would determine the authenticity of the ballot at a later date); (g) facilitating the voting process for the disabled (blind citizens will be permitted to cast secret ballots).

     While most pundits considered the bill as one that would strengthen democratic suffrage, there were critics. Civil rights groups argued that the legislation would discriminate against lower-income and minority group voters who may not possess a driver's license or other types of identification such as a utility bill. In addition, as intimated earlier, there are some key differences between House and Senate versions of the electoral reform bill (i.e., the House version permits the states broader latitude in terms of the method state officials use to upgrade voter technology/hardware; also there was the question of how many federal mandates should be allowed vs. the traditional preference for state and local government control over the electoral process). The precise outcome of the House-Senate conference committee is problematical. However, it was refreshing to see the Senate behaving in a true bipartisan spirit instead of being bogged down in ideological rancor. The symbolic importance of this legislation was also noted by several Senators. As Charles Schumer (D-NY) observed, it was vital that the world's most ancient democracy not be plagued with the oldest voter technology! Finally, it appeared that if the bill does survive conference committee and is then passed by both houses, President Bush will sign the bill into law.

Discussion Questions

1. How does the Senate version of the electoral reform bill differ from the House version?
2. What are the key components of the Senate electoral reform bill?
3. Why might minority group voters object to some provisions of the bill?
4. How do you explain the overwhelming "99-1" vote in the Senate for the electoral reform bill?

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THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION "TARGETS" IRAQ

     President George W. Bush's celebrated "axis of evil" statement in his January State of the Union Address continued to reverberate both internationally and domestically in the month of February. Internationally, the President's statement was intended to put three nations on notice as either sponsors of terrorism and/or developers/exporters of mass destruction weapons-nuclear, biological, and chemical. Those three nations were North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. In his January speech, President Bush also stated that he would not wait for those three nations to develop an unacceptable threat to the United States, i.e., weapons endangering "our way of life." The global response to the Bush "axis of evil" assertion ranged from grudging understanding (Great Britain) to outright condemnation (Iran). Several European allies, such as Germany (the Germany foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, warned the U.S. that its allies were not "satellites"-a reference to cold war bipolarity) and France, believed that the Bush categorization was simplistic and indicative of the American penchant for foreign policy unilateralism ("going it alone") rather than a reliance on consultation (multilateralism) and careful diplomacy. It was no surprise that North Korea, Iran, and Iraq all rejected Bush's allegations. Domestically, Congress and the public seemed supportive in general, but there were fears that the President was stretching U.S. economic and military resources thin as it expanded the war against terrorism to an ever-larger number of nations (note U.S. troops being sent to the Philippines and naval military exercises being conducted off the coast of Somalia). Also, Democrats charged that Bush's statement was alienating moderate elements in the ruling clique of Iran and possibly wrecking the fragile diplomacy that had previously "frozen" North Korea's nuclear arms program. Conversely, it appeared that domestic support was strongest in the case of Iraq. Americans remembered the 1990-1991 Gulf War when another "Bush" had occupied the Oval Office and confronted Iraq's dictator, Saddam Hussein. As expected, few of America's allies backed an American attack against Iraq, insisting that there was no definitive evidence linking Iraq to Osama bin Laden and the attacks of September 11 (but it is a fact that an Iraqi intelligence officer met with one of the September 11th hijackers in the Czech Republic months before the attacks upon the World Trade Center and the Pentagon). Europeans and the Russians also insisted that Iraq's nuclear program could be stopped not by a American preemptive attack upon Iraqi nuclear installations, but rather by adroit negotiations that would open the path for new United Nations' inspectors being placed on Iraqi soil.

     The Bush Administration responded that no inspection team would ever stop the Iraqi drive for nuclear weapons. Nor will sanctions. The only way for America to feel secure is to topple Saddam's regime. Otherwise, Iraq will certainly develop nuclear weapons in the near future, not only threatening Israel and Saudi Arabia but also the United States and the West. The Bush Administration has rejected the European/Russian proposition that Saddam would never use nuclear weapons in anger. So, how can Saddam be overthrown? Clearly, the use of massive numbers of U.S. ground troops is not feasible, either politically or militarily. Also, there is no Iraqi "Northern Alliance" to take on the Iraqi army. However, there is the Iraqi National Congress, an organization of anti-Saddam elements, both inside of Iraq (Kurds, Shiites) and outside (exiled Iraqi generals and politicians). The "INC" is ostensibly committed to a democratic, secular Iraq that will allow representation for all elements of Iraqi society. A democratic Iraq could serve as a stabilizing force for the rest of the Middle East. But how can the INC be brought to power? Congress has allocated millions of dollars in support for the INC, but money alone is clearly insufficient to end Saddam's rule. In short, as reported by Gordon and Sanger (New York Times, "Powell Says U.S. Is Weighing Ways To Topple Hussein," 2/13/02, pp. A1, A14), "there was an emerging consensus within the administration that Mr. Hussein must be overthrown, but there is not agreement on how precisely this should be done (p. A1)." It appears the U.S. will try to combine a blend of diplomatic pressure (giving Iraq an ultimatum to let in United Nations inspectors as one example) with careful military planning (possibly arming INC members, beefing up the U.S. air and ground presence in the region, and cultivating logistical support from allies in the Middle East). But no matter what plan is followed regarding Iraq, success will not come easily. However, the Bush Administration seems determined to accomplish this goal, regardless of the risks involved.

Discussion Questions

1. Why is the Bush Administration openly talking about targeting Iraq as the next target in the U.S. global war against terrorism?
2. In what ways would toppling Iraq's regime be different from the Afghanistan campaign?
3. How have other nations, especially U.S. Allies, reacted to Bush's "axis of evil" allegation?
4. What is the significance of unilateralism vs. multilateralism in U.S. foreign policy?

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THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FINALLY PASSES THE SHAYS-MEEHAN CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM BILL

In the aftermath of the Enron scandal (the now-bankrupt, infamous energy corporation had bestowed huge campaign contributions to both parties and obtained special "access" to the corridors of power in Washington), the House of Representatives finally approved the Shays-Meehan campaign finance reform bill by a 240-189 roll-call vote (the U.S. Senate had passed a comparable bill last year, but the House never followed up due to a procedural deadlock), with 198 Democrats, 41 Republicans, and 1 Independent comprising the victorious coalition. The core of Shays-Meehan was the abolition of "soft money"-unrestricted, unlimited funds donated by unions, wealthy individuals, and corporations to political parties. Those monies are often subsequently funneled to congressional campaigns or "disguised" issue-ads.

However, there is no guarantee that Shays-Meehan will pass the Senate. One cannot even assume presidential signature (President Bush has not publicly announced he would veto the bill; polls also show overwhelming support for tightening campaign-money statutes). Furthermore, critics of campaign finance reform argue that key provisions of Shays-Meehan (and its Senate equivalent, McCain-Feingold) banning soft money to the national political parties and issue-ads (disclosure regulations and TV/radio advertising are forbidden 60 days before a general election, 30 days prior to a primary) violate free speech. However, Shays-Meehan does have a provision allowing for accelerated review by the U.S. District Court in Washington, and then followed by a fairly quick appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court (parts of the bill could be declared unconstitutional without jeopardizing the entire legislation). Supporters claim that campaign finance reform will survive Supreme Court scrutiny. In addition, they point out that the legislation allows individuals to double their "hard money" contributions to congressional/presidential candidates from $1000 to $2000 (in a primary or general election), thereby enhancing grass-roots political participation (the annual cap on total hard donations from an individual goes from $25,000 to $47,000) . In the final analysis, proponents of campaign finance reform essentially argue that soft money and unregulated contributions are corrupting the very essence of American politics. Opponents, in addition to the free speech issue, argued that Shays-Meehan would conveniently take place after the November elections. Furthermore, a loophole in the bill would allow union/corporate/individual donations of up to $10,000 to state/local parties for voter education/turnout activities. To opponents, soft money should be banned entirely at all political levels or not at all.

If this legislation does eventually pass both houses of Congress and is signed by President Bush, then what changes might occur in American politics as a result? According to a Wall Street Journal story ("How New Legislation To Curb ÔSoft Money' Might Redirect Power," 2/15/02, pp. A1, A6), the following could happen: (a) the power of the two major national parties could be eroded; (b) the influence of state parties could rise; (c) TV ad time would be decreased during the election homestretch period; (d) corporations may be forced to contribute to independent political activity rather than "just writing a check for a party-while also making those dollars more likely to be wasted and more difficult for the public and press to track (p. A1)"; (e) wealthy donors will be increasingly hit for "hard money" contributions; but there may be also be a shift to a new political universe of political activists-"younger, more aggressive types who are willing to work their Rolodexes to solicit $2000 donations from others" (p. A6); (f) President Bush's chances of being reelected will improve (Bush can probably collect more hard money contributions than any Democratic presidential hopeful in 2004), but it is unlikely that the "balance of power" over time between Republicans and Democrats will be seriously affected; (g) PACs will likely fill the void created by the ban on soft money to the national parties. Whatever the precise impact of campaign finance reform, the vital role of money in U.S. politics will by no means disappear and to some, neither will related scandals. As noted in the WSJ article above (p. A6), "Republicans and Democrats alike predicted the emergence in relatively short order of scandals under the new system, some involving campaign money hidden in the shadows of independent political groups, others involving illegal coordination between those groups and national parties bereft of familiar soft-money checks." Inevitably, the process of reform will have to be renewed.

Discussion Questions

1. What were the key components of the campaign finance reform bill passed by the House?
2. How did the Enron scandal serve as a catalyst for campaign finance reform?
3. Will the U.S. Senate also approve the bill passed by the House?
4. If the Senate also passes the bill, will President Bush sign the bill?

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PRESIDENT BUSH FORMALLY ANNOUNCES THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE 1972 ABM TREATY

The Bush Administration formally announced in mid-December that the U.S. would withdraw from the 1972 ABM (Antiballistic Missile) Treaty within the next six months. President Bush put it this way in a White House statement: "Today, I have given formal notice to Russia . . . that the United States of America is withdrawing from this almost 30-year old treaty . . . I have concluded the ABM treaty hinders our government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks" (see The New York Times, 12/14/01, p. A12). In short, the following reasons were part of the Administration's rationale for its decision--(a) the Treaty's restrictions upon developing an anti-missile system placed the national security of the U.S. in jeopardy; (b) nuclear threats had changed dramatically since the end of the cold war; an attack from Russia was now unlikely, but a nuclear attack by a "rogue state" such as Iraq, Iran, or North Korea was far more probable during the next decade or two as the acquisition by those states of nuclear weapons and missile technology seemed inevitable; in addition, a terrorist launch of a nuclear weapon was also a distinct possibility; (c) U.S. testing and development of that system had to go forward regardless of complications with Russia and China; a new arms race would not necessarily develop if both of these nations fully and truly understood the reasons behind the U.S. decision. The Bush Administration believed that President Putin of Russia along with the Chinese leadership had been properly prepared "diplomatically" prior to President Bush's formal decision.

Critics of the decision saw the reverse side of the decision-making coin. First of all, would a rogue state ever have the audacity to strike U.S. soil with a nuclear weapon, knowing that U.S. retaliation would be massive, i.e., total destruction? Second, why should the U.S. abolish a Treaty that had been the cornerstone of strategic nuclear stability for nearly three decades? Third, the ABM withdrawal could harm relations with Russia and China in other ways, i.e., perhaps reducing their support for the U.S.-sponsored war on global terrorism. Fourth, testing, development, and full deployment of an ABM system were expensive and irrelevant steps. After all, the critics argued, how would an ABM system protect the U.S. against another conventional terrorist attack or even a "suitcase nuke" smuggled into the country and then detonated on U.S. soil? Why not use the billions of dollars for anti-terrorism defenses, instead of expending valuable dollars on an untried missile defense system that had still not proved itself in previous Air Force tests over the Pacific? Even if such a system could be deployed successfully, the Chinese and Russians could quickly add multiple warheads to their missiles, thereby overwhelming a U.S. ABM network that might only be able to intercept 20-30 warheads at one time. Fifth, critics pointed out that the 1972 Treaty did not actually prevent testing of ground-based interceptors. The U.S. should have proceeded more slowly, gradually convincing Russia and China that an abandonment of the Treaty was to their advantage as well. A unilateral withdrawal placed new pressures upon Putin from his own military, possibly making future arms control concessions more difficult (However, Putin went on Russian TV, assuring his people that the strategic balance would not be endangered since the nation would preserve at least 1500 to 2200 nuclear missiles, more than enough to overwhelm any American ABM system). From the Chinese perspective, the fears were that a U.S. ABM system would negate its minimal force of 20 or so ICBMs and its ability to support its claims to Taiwan, a nation that it sees as belonging to the mainland. Thus, the Chinese leadership hinted that it would take steps to modernize its ICBM force in the future; i.e., meaning the production of additional sophisticated and accurate missiles (Senator Joe Biden, Democratic Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, contended that Bush's decision would force the Chinese to take that very step-see New York Times, 12/14/01, p. A12). Conversely, the Bush Administration tried to reassure China's leadership, especially President Jiang Zemin, that its missile defense system was not aimed at them, but at other rogue states, such as North Korea or Iraq. In short, the Bush foreign policy team apparently believes that both China and Russia will eventually accept the political and strategic implications of the ABM Treaty abrogation.

Discussion Questions

1. Why did President Bush decide to abandon the ABM Treaty?
2. What were the reactions of Russia and China to the Bush announcement?
3. Why were some members of Congress opposed to the ABM Treaty abandonment?
4. How did the war against terrorism influence the ABM Treaty decision?

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OSAMA BIN LADEN AND THE VIDEOTAPE

    While American bombing and Northern Alliance/American ground forces ultimately broke the final resistance of Al Qaeda fighters in the rugged Tora Bora region of Afghanistan, the search for master terrorist Osama bin Laden continued unsuccessfully (there was a $25 million dollar reward for evidence of his death or information leading to his capture). Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld openly speculated that bin Laden might have been killed by the heavy bombing of caves in the area or, as a second possibility, escaped to Pakistan. Whatever bin Laden's final disposition (President Bush reiterated that he wanted him "dead or alive," but preferably dead), the urgency of conclusively determining bin Laden's fate substantially intensified with the Bush Administration's release of an incriminating videotape (apparently found in the city of Jalalabad) revealing bin Laden's complicity in the September 11 attacks upon the World Trade Center Towers and the Pentagon. The tape showed Osama bin Laden casually talking to supporters about the attacks (the November 9th conversation occurred in a Kandahar "guesthouse," the then southern stronghold of the Taliban), in which the exiled Saudi Arabian boasted and laughed about the success of those strikes to his aides and a visiting Saudi cleric.

    It was sometimes hard to hear bin Laden's words on the tape. But those audible portions, translated by Arabic language experts in the U.S., were abundantly clear regarding culpability. Three key points emerged from the video. First, bin Laden revealed that he knew well in advance the operational details of the attacks on America (bin Laden mentions Mohammed Atta, the leader of the terrorists) and the roles/identities of the hijackers (interestingly enough, it appears that most of the hijackers were not aware of the full details of their mission until the last possible moment when they boarded the planes; however they apparently knew they were involved in a "martyrdom operation";). Second, the evil, souless, unremorseful personality of bin Laden is evident when he states on the tape that "we calculated in advance the number of casualties from the enemy, who would be killed based on the position of the tower. We calculated that the floors that would be hit would be three or four floors. I was the most optimistic of them all . . . due to my experience in this field (bin Laden was a former engineer). I was thinking that the fire from the gas in the plane would melt the iron structure of the building and collapse the area where the plane hit and all the floors above it only. This is all that we had hoped for (see Atlanta Constitution, 12/14/01, p. A1)." Third, it was obvious that bin Laden saw the terrorist strikes as part of a holy war against America. The strikes were wholly justified and morally proper, for the deaths of innocent Americans ("infidels") and other nationalities in the World Trade Center Towers were vital to bin Laden's role as the leader of Islam's "crusade" against U.S. influence both in the Middle East (especially Saudi Arabia) and around the world. Indeed, bin Laden makes the point that the attacks had energized the power of Islam. He notes that . . . "in Holland, at one of the centers, the number of people who accepted Islam during the days that followed the operations were more than the people who accepted Islam in the last 11 years."

    To Americans and other western leaders/publics, the tape was compelling evidence of bin Laden's complicity. To mainstream Islamic groups, bin Laden's use of religion to justify mass murder was sacrilegious, to say the least. The Council on American-Islamic Relations, a Washington-based interest group, asserted that the tape demonstrated beyond any doubt that bin Laden was guilty. Furthermore, the group's statement asserted that "Bin Laden seemed to revel in the death and destruction in Washington and New York . . . he falsely implied that the acts of the hijackers were justified by Islamic beliefs (Atlanta Constitution, 12/14/01, p. A16)." However, despite the hopes of the Bush Administration that the tape would dramatically swing Arab global opinion to the U.S. anti-bin Laden position by proving the latter's role behind the September 11 attacks, the reality was otherwise. Many Arab intellectuals argued that the tape was a forgery (the Egyptian father of Mohammed Atta dismissed the tape as a fake) or that the U.S. had the technology to alter dialogue, or even that Osama was incapable of launching such attacks in the first place. An ominous note stemming from the tape was the apparent connection between anti-U.S. clerics in Saudi Arabia and support for bin Laden. One cleric on the tape, Sheik Sulayman, tells Osama that a number of conservative clerics in Saudi Arabia supported the September 11 attacks. Furthermore, many in the Islamic world continued to propound the preposterous conspiracy theory that the CIA or the Israeli intelligence service, Mossad, was actually behind September 11 (see Wall Street Journal, 12/14/01, p. B1). Despite its failure to achieve a new consensus in the Arab world, the Bush Administration persevered, distributing copies of the tape to key news organizations and agencies throughout the Middle East. Whether the tide of opinion would shift massively remained an open question.

Discussion Questions

1. What evidence was revealed on the tape that almost certainly proves bin Laden's complicity in the September 11 attacks that killed over 3000 people?
2. Why were some individuals in the Middle East dubious about the tape's authenticity?
3. What does the tape reveal about bin Laden's personality and terrorist goals?
4. Who were some of the other people on the tape and why are they significant?

While American planes continued striking a wide variety of military targets in Afghanistan (Taliban airports, missile sites, jet fighters, terrorist training sites, etc.) and the rebel Northern Alliance seized the capital, Kabul (the Taliban appeared to be collapsing), Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization publicly declared that they possessed weapons of mass destruction. In a videotaped message, Bin Laden also attacked the United Nations and the its Secretary General, Kofi Annan (a "criminal," according to Bin Laden). Finally, the Saudi Royal family apparently is feeling the pressure of pro-bin Laden factions within their nation.

    First, there was the issue of Osama bin Laden and his possession of weapons of mass destruction. President Bush publicly acknowledged that bin Laden and his terrorist network were "seeking chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. After a meeting with French leader Chirac, Bush asserted that bin Laden was evil and that he "wouldn´t put it past him to develop evil weapons (see USA Today, 11/7/01, p. A1)." U.S. intelligence officials confirmed that bin Laden had tried to acquire nuclear capability in the past. Bin Laden himself had asserted in an interview with a Pakistani journalist that he did have a nuclear device. When the journalist asked bin Laden from where he had obtained nuclear weapons, bin Laden replied "Go to the next question" (see 11/11/01, Atlanta Constitution, p. A10). Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld doubted the nuclear claim, but in the same breath he suggested that Al Qaeda had the determination to accomplish such an acquisition. Rumsfeld also mentioned the threat of "radiological weapons," i.e., "mixtures of conventional explosives and nuclear material deigned to spread radiation without a nuclear detonation (See Atlanta Constitution, November 12, p. A7)." It appeared that bin Laden was trying to acquire this "dirty bomb." There is also fear among American officials that internal unrest within Pakistan could lead to a radical group overthrowing the government or gaining enough power to seize that nation´s nuclear arsenal. While Pakistani officials assure the U.S. that their atomic weapons are secure, doubts remain. Finally, there were reports that Al Qaeda had previously contacted Pakistani nuclear scientists in a first step designed to obtain an atomic device.

    Osama bin Laden also raised new security concerns at the United Nations. In a videotaped message broadcast by the Arab station Al Jazeera, bin Laden stated that "the United Nations is nothing but a tool of crime" and that the international institution "was siding with the "crusader" interests of the West against Muslims. Bin Laden mentioned Bosnia, where Muslim men were killed, Muslim women raped, and Muslim children massacred within the alleged "safe havens" of the United Nations. In short, bin Laden´s message constituted a clever ploy to show that the U.S. and its coalition´s attacks in Afghanistan were clearly part of a global conflict against Islam. As the New York Times described it, "Mr. bin Laden continues to cast himself as a populist holy warrior . . . the core of Mr. bin Laden´s evangelism is a clash of religions—not just Muslim against Christian, or Muslim against Jew, but Muslims against everyone else, the ‘infidels´ (see the Times, ll/9/01, pp. A1, B4)." It was also apparent that U.N. workers could become targets of Al Qaeda´s wrath around the world.

    Finally there was the relationship between Saudi Arabia and bin Laden. Bin Laden was originally a Saudi national who was born into one of the wealthiest families in that country. Although he was eventually exiled, there remain strong pro-bin Laden followers within the oil kingdom. If the Pakistani "nuclear-seizure" scenario gives U.S. policy-makers nightmares, then the fall of Saudi Arabia to a pro bin-Laden regime is even more dreadful. The loss of Saudi oil would be a catastrophe for the American economy. While most American experts on Saudi Arabia downplay any "immediate threat" to the House of Saud, the royal family that rules the oil kingdom, there remains lurking in the background memories of the 1979 overthrow of the Shah of Iran via a turbulent Islamic Revolution. Observers have contrasted the royal family´s ostentatious life-style to the symbol of Osama bin Laden living simply in an Afghanistan cave. In short, will the poor of Saudi Arabia and Saudi Islamic militants prefer bin Lader´s alleged "purer Islam" to the religious practices of the ruling hierarchy? Furthermore, the U.S. bombing in Afghanistan is ample propaganda ammunition for the bin Laden operatives. However, the situation may change now that it appears the Northern Alliance is on the verge of total victory in Afghanistan against the Taliban. Will the Alliance seek out bin Laden and deliver him to American justice? This remains an open question.

Discussion Questions

1. What evidence suggests that Osama bin Laden may or may not have nuclear weapons?

2. What should the U.S. response be if it is confirmed that bin Laden has mass destruction weapons?

3. From what sources might bin Laden have obtained nuclear weapons?

4. What charges did bin Laden level against the United Nations and Kofi Annan?

5. Why are Saudi rulers fearful of bin Laden´s influence?

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  REVISITING ELECTION 2000: THE "BUTTERFLY BALLOT" COST AL GORE THE ELECTION BUT THE ISSUE OF "OVERVOTES/UNDERVOTES" REMAINS CONTROVERSIAL; WILL ELECTORAL REFORMS FOLLOW?

    A new study of the controversial Florida vote from Election 2000 by the Palm Beach Post (along with the Associated Press and seven other newspapers) reveals that Vice President Al Gore would not have overcome George W. Bush's 537 vote lead, (that lead, out of over 6 million cast, gave Bush Florida's 25 Electoral Votes and the presidency, despite Gore outpolling Bush nationally by 540.000 votes) either through statewide "undervote" analysis (undervotes were ballots where voting machines were unable to determine a presidential selection) or by hand recounts in heavily-Democratic Miami-Dade, Broward, Volusia, and Palm Beach counties. However, an earlier March Post study revealed that the infamous Palm Beach County's "butterfly ballot" so confused Gore voters that they mistakenly voted for conservative Pat Buchanan instead (or led many others to cast "overvotes," i.e., votes for more than one candidate on the ballot), thereby costing the Vice President more than 6,000 votes. Hence, this poorly-constructed and imprecise ballot prevented Gore from winning the presidency. Palm Beach County was not the only Florida county with confusing ballot design. The study found that 18 other Florida counties had higher error rates because of ballots that were two pages long or which offered to the voter a complicated two-column structure. For example, in Duval County (the ballot dispersed presidential candidates across two pages), nearly 22,000 voters mistakenly chose two presidential candidates. This was the highest number of overvotes in the entire state.

    Gore's reaction to the November study (NORC-The National Opinion Research Center viewed each tainted ballot) was fairly straightforward. He responded by observing that the election was over ("we are a nation of laws") and that the nation had to stay united behind President Bush in the war against terrorism (the White House's comment was essentially the same). Still, other significant issues emerged from the study. African-American and senior citizen voters in Florida were the two groups that had the largest numbers of uncounted ballots. Both groups went heavily for Gore in Florida. In a "lenient" recount scenario, black precincts throughout the state might have picked up enough votes to erase the Bush lead. Also, if the Gore legal team had been successful in getting Palm Beach election officials to look at all of the county's dimpled ballots, then Gore would probably have erased the Bush lead as well. Finally, it appeared true that if Gore had sought a full statewide recount of all untallied votes (both undervotes and overvotes, totalling 175,000 ballots) in Fla., then he probably would have won the state (Gore had publicly called for a full accounting of the vote, but Bush rejected that idea, arguing that hand recounts were inherently biased and inconsistent). However, an earlier May study by The Miami Herald and USA Today had arrived at a slightly different conclusion regarding the combined review of undervotes (62,000) and overvotes (113,000). Depending upon the standard used to evaluate votes, Bush would have emerged victorious under a "strict standard" while Gore would have prevailed under the "most liberal" standard.

    Perhaps the real importance of Election 2000 lies with the issue of ballot/voting technology reforms throughout the nation. Will the states, with federal help, replace defective voting machines and improve the entire voting process in the 2004 presidential election? Surprisingly, only Florida has truly committed itself to such an extensive effort. For example, a new Florida law has outlawed punch card ballots. Other states, such as Georgia and Maryland, have had legislation passed authorizing massive changes in the ballot and its related technologies, but have not yet appropriated funding to pay for those changes. The states are looking for federal assistance. Congress is currently contemplating an election system bill whereby $2.5 to $2.8 billion would be given to the states/localities for electoral reforms. The bill would require centralized, statewide voter databases, uniform standards for counting ballots, and a provision whereby an individual voter whose registration is doubted may still cast his or her ballot, subject to later verification procedures (see The New York Times, November 7, 2001, p. A15). One thing is certain-the nation cannot afford to experience another flawed presidential election. The strength of democracy is founded upon the integrity and legitimacy of the vote.

Discussion Questions

1. What were the key findings of the Palm Beach Post analysis regarding the 2000 Fla. vote?

2. What were Al Gore's and the White House's response to the newspapers' study?

3. What did a previous post March study reveal about the Florida vote?

4. Why were the votes of the elderly and African-Americans so important in the Florida election? How were those votes affected by the "infamous butterfly ballot" in Palm Beach County?

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  WAS IRAQ INVOLVED IN THE SEPTEMBER 11TH TERRORIST BOMBINGS?

      As American air strikes hit a wide variety of military targets in Afghanistan (Taliban airports, missile sites, jet fighters, terrorist training sites, etc.) and the Bush Administration began preparing for the use of ground troops as a way of flushing out the Bin Laden terrorist network, other anti-terrorist experts (within and outside of official policy circles) pointed out that there was evidence implicating Iraq in the September 11th bombings in New York City and the Pentagon. The dissemination of "anthrax letters" to individuals/media celebrities/politicos in Florida, Nevada, New York, and Washington confirmed to many that Iraq's experiments with and its stockpiling of biological weapons had supplied terrorists who were sending those letters with the required anthrax spores (Note: The FBI, as of mid-October, had been unable to say with certainty that the anthrax letters were being sent by bin Laden operatives). In addition, numerous newspapers accounts revealed that one of the key September 11th hijackers, Mohamed Atta, had visited an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague months before the attacks (Iraq had even earlier contacts with Osama bin Laden in both Sudan and Afghanistan; the most prominent meeting was in 1998 when an important Iraqi intelligence agent personally met Mr. bin Laden in Kandahar, Afghanistan). Finally, key policy makers, such as Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, publicly warned that Iraq's development of mass destruction weapons (chemical, biological, and even nuclear) poses a future threat of extraordinary proportions to the American nation. In short, if America's global war were to be broadened to other nations that supported terrorists, then Iraq would surely be a future target. Iraq has been on America's list of state sponsors of terrorism since the early 1990s. Indeed, theories still abound that Iraq had been behind the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. In short, it was time to finish a job that had been left undone by the senior President Bush during the 1991 Gulf War. That wrong-headed decision to end the war prematurely had led to the survival of the Iraqi leader and his state, a state that still threatened Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and American homeland security.

     But those who opposed targeting Iraq raised a number of interesting points. First, there was no hard evidence linking Osama bin Laden's terrorist network directly to Saddam Hussein, whom bin Laden associates have openly denounced in the past (Hussein has suppressed dissenting Islamic clergy within Iraq). Conversely, both Osama and Saddam have a mutual hatred of America as well as both opposing the Shiite Islamic regime of Iran. Saddam's ruthless pragmatism would allow an alliance to form with Osama. Bin Laden himself has publicly mentioned the plight of the Iraqi people who suffer under U.S. sanctions. But once again, by October 10th, news reports carried stories that intelligence agencies could not find any Iraqi linkage to bin Laden. As New York Times writer Raymond Bonner reported, "Israeli intelligence officials told their American counterparts that they have not found any evidence of an Iraqi role in the attacks . . . (October 11, 2001, p. B7)." The same report revealed that Mr. Bin Laden appears not to need a state sponsor, i.e., he is his own state by using Afghanistan as a sanctuary. Finally, critics of striking Iraq argued that to do so, even if some connection were ultimately uncovered by intelligence agencies, would fracture the Arab coalition against terrorism that President George W. Bush had assembled in the month after the September 11th attacks.

      Nevertheless, it appeared that officials in the Pentagon were still pressing to remove Saddam from power. In an interesting article by Elaine Sciolino and Patrick E. Tyler (NYT, 10/12/01, p. B6), entitled "Some Pentagon Officials and Advisers Seek to Oust Iraq's Leader in War's Next Phase," it was revealed that Paul Wolfowitz was leading a Pentagon study group dedicated to eliminating Saddam's hold over Iraq. According to the plan, American air and ground power would lead to a U.S. armed occupation of southern Iraqi territory. From there, an Iraqi government-in-exile would be placed in a political position whereby a new Iraqi government could eventually be formed. While Colin Powell's State Department considered the Wolfowitz plan dangerous to needed Arab unity, the Wolfowitz plan might become more attractive if and when Saddam's weapons of mass destruction become an imminent reality.

      Discussion Questions

1. What evidence suggests Iraqi involvement in the September 11th bombings?
2. What evidence suggest that Iraq was not involved in the bombings?
3. What U.S. fears emanate from Iraqi progress in developing weapons of mass destruction, including biological, chemical, and nuclear varieties?
4. What were the key components of the Wolfowitz plan?

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  U.S.-ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS IN THE AFTERMATTH OF SEPTEMBER 11TH

     In the month following the bombing of September 11th, U.S-Israeli-Palestinian relationships have clearly been altered. The U.S. need to maintain fragile Arab unity in the wake of those terrorist attacks has strained its relationship with Israel and possibly changed its approach to the Palestinians and their leader Yasser Arafat. First, there have been difficulties between the U.S. and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Sharon has been angered over a number of U.S. Mideast policies during the past month. First, Sharon was appalled by the U.S. conveniently "overlooking" terrorist organizations inside of Israel, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Sharon labeled this strategy as "appeasement, " likening the U.S. action to the 1938 British surrender of Czechoslovakia to Hitler's Nazi Germany (Sharon later apologized for the statement, although it rankled U.S. officials who noted that Israel had been a recipient of over $60 billion in U.S. aid over the last 20 years). Second, there was the endorsement of a "Palestinian state" by President Bush, who saw that state as part of his "vision" of a permanent Israeli-Palestinian settlement. To Sharon, such a state was a "reward" for the actions of terrorist criminals who had savaged Israeli security time and time again. Sharon envisions a form of Palestinian contr